Model of the 2000 Presidential Election: Instrumenting for Ideology

In a spatial model of voting, a voter's utility for a candidate is a function of ideological distance from the candidate and a candidate's quality. Candidate quality can potentially bias the measure of ideological distance in two ways. First, voters may be more drawn to high quality candidates thereby reducing the ideological distance. Second, a candidate's ideological position is a function of rivals�qualities and his own quality. We derive a theoretical model to sign the direction of both biases analytically. Next, using techniques established in the industrial organization literature, we estimate the model using two sets of instrumental variables.spatial voting, discrete choice, instrumental variables

How Prediction Markets can Save Event Studies

Event studies have been used in political science to study the cost of regulation (Schwert, 1981), the value of political connections (Roberts, 1990a; Fisman, 2001), the effect of political parties on defense spending (Roberts, 1990b), the importance of rules in congressional committees (Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1988), the reaction of different interests to trade legislation (Schnietz, 2000), how party control in parliamentary systems affects broad-based stock indices (Herron, 2000), the value of defense contracts (Rogerson, 1989), the effect of the political party of the US President and congressional majorities on particular industry segments (Mattozzi, 2008; Knight, 2006; Herron et al., 1999; Den Hartog and Monroe, 2008; Monroe, 2008; Jayachandran, 2006), and other questions

Political Polarization and the Electoral Effects of Media Bias

Many political commentators diagnose an increasing polarization of the U.S. electorate into two opposing camps. However, in standard spatial voting models, changes in the political preference distribution are irrelevant as long as the position of the median voter does not change. We show that media bias provides a mechanism through which political polarization can affect electoral outcomes.In our model, media firms’ profits depend on their audience rating. Maximizing profits may involve catering to a partisan audience by slanting the news. While voters are rational, understand the nature of the news suppression bias and update appropriately, important information is lost through bias, potentially resulting in inefficient electoral outcomes. We show that polarization increases the profitability of slanting news, thereby raising the likelihood of electoral mistakes. We also show that, if media are biased, then there are some news realizations such that the electorate appears more polarized to an outside observer, even if citizens’ policy preferences do not change.media bias, polarization, information aggregation, democracy

E-democracy and values in information systems design

In this paper I demonstrate the utility of a Values in Design (VID) perspective for the assessment, the design and development of e-democracy tools. In the first part, I give some background information on Values in Design and Value-Sensitive Design and their relevance in the context of e-democracy. In part 2, I analyze three different e-democracy tools from a VID-perspective. The paper ends with some conclusions concerning the merits of VID for e-democracy as well as some considerations concerning the dual tasks of philosophers in assessing and promoting value-sensitive technology design

Capacity-testing as a means of increasing political inclusion

Some competent political actors, primarily young people and the cognitively impaired, are excluded from political participation by modern liberal democratic states. This exclusion occurs because the means utilized by states to distinguish between competent citizens (who must be included) and incompetent ones (who may be excluded) are imperfect. They include age restrictions on enfranchisement and, commonly, legal restrictions on enfranchisement for those with cognitive disabilities. Capacity-testing provides a means to improve on these existing mechanisms for exclusion. It is not, however, often suggested, nor seen as viable. Here, I argue that we should utilize capacity-testing to more effectively include capable citizens in our democratic practice. I defend a particular scope and kind of capacity-testing against common objections

A Conflict Theory of Voting

Research in the behavioral psychology of voting has found that voters tend to be poorly informed, highly responsive to candidate personality, and follow a "fast and frugal" heuristic. This paper analyzes optimal candidate strategies in a two-party election in which voters are assumed to behave according to these traits. Under this assumption, candidates face a trade-off between appealing to a broader base and being overly ambiguous in their policy stances. A decrease in the cost of ambiguity within this model offers a parsimonious justification for the increase in voter independence, candidate ambiguity, and party politics that empirical studies have revealed over the last five decades. I additionally argue a decrease in the cost of ambiguity is a natural result of the primary system, campaign finance reform, and changing media environment.

Government-Assisted Housing and Electoral Participation in New York City, 2000-2001

For a representative democracy to function optimally, citizens from all walks of life should have equal chances to express their preferences through the electoral process. In practice, we know that the actual rate of electoral participation varies greatly depending on individual circumstances and social settings. Better off, better educated, non-Hispanic white citizens are more likely to vote; poor, less educated, and minority individuals are much less likely to do so. Gaining a better understanding of why and how this might be so is crucial for moving toward a more democratic polity

To Segregate or to Integrate: Education Politics and Democracy

The governments of nearly all countries are major providers of primary and secondary education to its citizens. In some countries, however, public schools coexist with private schools, while in others the government is the sole provider of education. In this study,we askwhy different societiesmake different choices regarding the mix of private and public schooling. We develop a theory which integrates private education and fertility decisionswith voting on public schooling expenditures. In a given political environment, high income inequality leads to more private education, as rich people opt out of the public system. Comparing across political systems, we find that concentration of political power can lead to multiple equilibria in the determination of public education spending.