1,010 research outputs found
Beyond local Nash equilibria for adversarial networks
Save for some special cases, current training methods for Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) are at best guaranteed to converge to a ‘local Nash equilibrium’ (LNE). Such LNEs, however, can be arbitrarily far from an actual Nash equilibrium (NE), which implies that there are no guarantees on the quality of the found generator or classifier. This paper proposes to model GANs explicitly as finite games in mixed strategies, thereby ensuring that every LNE is an NE. We use the Parallel Nash Memory as a solution method, which is proven to monotonically converge to a resource-bounded Nash equilibrium. We empirically demonstrate that our method is less prone to typical GAN problems such as mode collapse and produces solutions that are less exploitable than those produced by GANs and MGANs
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs): Challenges, Solutions, and Future Directions
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) is a novel class of deep generative
models which has recently gained significant attention. GANs learns complex and
high-dimensional distributions implicitly over images, audio, and data.
However, there exists major challenges in training of GANs, i.e., mode
collapse, non-convergence and instability, due to inappropriate design of
network architecture, use of objective function and selection of optimization
algorithm. Recently, to address these challenges, several solutions for better
design and optimization of GANs have been investigated based on techniques of
re-engineered network architectures, new objective functions and alternative
optimization algorithms. To the best of our knowledge, there is no existing
survey that has particularly focused on broad and systematic developments of
these solutions. In this study, we perform a comprehensive survey of the
advancements in GANs design and optimization solutions proposed to handle GANs
challenges. We first identify key research issues within each design and
optimization technique and then propose a new taxonomy to structure solutions
by key research issues. In accordance with the taxonomy, we provide a detailed
discussion on different GANs variants proposed within each solution and their
relationships. Finally, based on the insights gained, we present the promising
research directions in this rapidly growing field.Comment: 42 pages, Figure 13, Table
Smoothed Efficient Algorithms and Reductions for Network Coordination Games
Worst-case hardness results for most equilibrium computation problems have
raised the need for beyond-worst-case analysis. To this end, we study the
smoothed complexity of finding pure Nash equilibria in Network Coordination
Games, a PLS-complete problem in the worst case. This is a potential game where
the sequential-better-response algorithm is known to converge to a pure NE,
albeit in exponential time. First, we prove polynomial (resp. quasi-polynomial)
smoothed complexity when the underlying game graph is a complete (resp.
arbitrary) graph, and every player has constantly many strategies. We note that
the complete graph case is reminiscent of perturbing all parameters, a common
assumption in most known smoothed analysis results.
Second, we define a notion of smoothness-preserving reduction among search
problems, and obtain reductions from -strategy network coordination games to
local-max-cut, and from -strategy games (with arbitrary ) to
local-max-cut up to two flips. The former together with the recent result of
[BCC18] gives an alternate -time smoothed algorithm for the
-strategy case. This notion of reduction allows for the extension of
smoothed efficient algorithms from one problem to another.
For the first set of results, we develop techniques to bound the probability
that an (adversarial) better-response sequence makes slow improvements on the
potential. Our approach combines and generalizes the local-max-cut approaches
of [ER14,ABPW17] to handle the multi-strategy case: it requires a careful
definition of the matrix which captures the increase in potential, a tighter
union bound on adversarial sequences, and balancing it with good enough rank
bounds. We believe that the approach and notions developed herein could be of
interest in addressing the smoothed complexity of other potential and/or
congestion games
Strategic Network Formation with Attack and Immunization
Strategic network formation arises where agents receive benefit from
connections to other agents, but also incur costs for forming links. We
consider a new network formation game that incorporates an adversarial attack,
as well as immunization against attack. An agent's benefit is the expected size
of her connected component post-attack, and agents may also choose to immunize
themselves from attack at some additional cost. Our framework is a stylized
model of settings where reachability rather than centrality is the primary
concern and vertices vulnerable to attacks may reduce risk via costly measures.
In the reachability benefit model without attack or immunization, the set of
equilibria is the empty graph and any tree. The introduction of attack and
immunization changes the game dramatically; new equilibrium topologies emerge,
some more sparse and some more dense than trees. We show that, under a mild
assumption on the adversary, every equilibrium network with agents contains
at most edges for . So despite permitting topologies denser
than trees, the amount of overbuilding is limited. We also show that attack and
immunization don't significantly erode social welfare: every non-trivial
equilibrium with respect to several adversaries has welfare at least as that of
any equilibrium in the attack-free model.
We complement our theory with simulations demonstrating fast convergence of a
new bounded rationality dynamic which generalizes linkstable best response but
is considerably more powerful in our game. The simulations further elucidate
the wide variety of asymmetric equilibria and demonstrate topological
consequences of the dynamics e.g. heavy-tailed degree distributions. Finally,
we report on a behavioral experiment on our game with over 100 participants,
where despite the complexity of the game, the resulting network was
surprisingly close to equilibrium.Comment: The short version of this paper appears in the proceedings of WINE-1
Open-ended Learning in Symmetric Zero-sum Games
Zero-sum games such as chess and poker are, abstractly, functions that
evaluate pairs of agents, for example labeling them `winner' and `loser'. If
the game is approximately transitive, then self-play generates sequences of
agents of increasing strength. However, nontransitive games, such as
rock-paper-scissors, can exhibit strategic cycles, and there is no longer a
clear objective -- we want agents to increase in strength, but against whom is
unclear. In this paper, we introduce a geometric framework for formulating
agent objectives in zero-sum games, in order to construct adaptive sequences of
objectives that yield open-ended learning. The framework allows us to reason
about population performance in nontransitive games, and enables the
development of a new algorithm (rectified Nash response, PSRO_rN) that uses
game-theoretic niching to construct diverse populations of effective agents,
producing a stronger set of agents than existing algorithms. We apply PSRO_rN
to two highly nontransitive resource allocation games and find that PSRO_rN
consistently outperforms the existing alternatives.Comment: ICML 2019, final versio
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