The Good That Lawyers Do

My topic is the good that lawyers do. This Essay provides a set of arguments for law students who are coming into this noble calling, this important profession. The essay offers a kind of booster shot, inoculation, or vaccination against every relative, classmate from college, or taxi driver who gives you a hard time about being a lawyer

Interpretative dilemmas

In this paper I claim that the reason we are reluctant to call many informal fallacies fallacies of relevance is because we can interpret them as providing contextual information about how the argument is to be interpreted. This interpretative dilemma is that the logical form is determined in part by whether the analyst wishes to be charitable to the proponent or the opponent. The evaluation of the argument is nonetheless purely logical

Economic growth as the limiting factor for wildlife conservation

The concept of limiting factor includes the lack of welfare factors and the presence of decimating factors. Originally applied to populations and species, the concept may also be applied to wildlife in the aggregate. Because the decimating factor of economic growth eliminates welfare factors for virtually all imperiled species via the principle of competitive exclusion, economic growth may be classified as the limiting factor for wildlife conservation. The wildlife profession has been virtually silent about this limiting factor, suggesting that the profession has been laboring in futility. The public, exhorted by neoclassical economists and political leaders, supports economic growth as a national goal. To address the limiting factor for wildlife conservation, wildlife professionals need to become versed in the history of economic growth theory, neoclassical economic growth theory, and the alternative growth paradigm provided by ecological economics. The Wildlife Society should lead the natural resources professions in developing a position on economic growth.carrying capacity; competitive exclusion; ecological economics; economic growth; limiting factor; neoclassical economics; niche breadth; steady state economy

Base rate neglect for the wealth of populations

Base rate neglect has been shown to be a very robust bias in human information processing. It has also been show to be ecologically rational in some environments. However, when arguing about base rate neglect usually isolated individuals are considered. I complement these results by showing that in many scenarios of social learning a base rate neglect increases a population's wealth. I thereby strengthen the argument that the presence of base rate neglect could be evolutionary stable. I pick up a model of social learning that has been used to demonstrate the potential benefits of overconfidence. Individuals are confronted with a safe and a risky option. They receive a private signal about the risky option's outcome, they decide in an exogenously given sequence, and they observe decisions of preceding individuals. I first deviate from the original model by incorporating base rates that differ from fifty-fifty and show that under weighting this base rate can be for the wealth of a population. Then I analyse how the optimal base rate neglect reacts to changes in payoffs. I show that for large set of settings under weighting the base rate is still positive, but for a smaller subset it decreases wealth insteadcognitive biases, base rate neglect, social learning, ecological rationality

Between Scylla and Charybdis - on the place of economic methods and concepts within ecological economics

Ecological Economics inherently faces a challenge akin to sailing between Scylla and Charybdis. In Greek mythology these are two monsters located on opposite sides of a narrow strait, and falling victim to one or other of them is unavoidable. In the recurring process of establishing and refining its conceptual foundations, Ecological Economics runs the risk of, on the one hand, losing important insights by trying to be radically different from mainstream economics and, on the other hand, becoming a redundant appendix to mainstream environmental economics by routinely applying its concepts and methods. We argue that avoiding both fallacies is possible by using Ecological Economics’ orientation towards sustainability as a guiding principle. The scientist’s power of judgment supports her decision concerning which methods are suitable for tackling a given sustainability problem. The intersubjective quality of judgment prevents the resulting methodological pluralism from drifting toward arbitrariness

Is the mind Bayesian? The case for agnosticism

This paper aims to make explicit the methodological conditions that should be satisfied for the Bayesian model to be used as a normative model of human probability judgment. After noticing the lack of a clear definition of Bayesianism in the psychological literature and the lack of justification for using it, a classic definition of subjective Bayesianism is recalled, based on the following three criteria: An epistemic criterion, a static coherence criterion and a dynamic coherence criterion. Then it is shown that the adoption of this framework has two kinds of implications. The first one regards the methodology of the experimental study of probability judgment. The Bayesian framework creates pragmatic constraints on the methodology that are linked to the interpretation of, and the belief in, the information presented, or referred to, by an experimenter in order for it to be the basis of a probability judgment by individual participants. It is shown that these constraints have not been satisfied in the past, and the question of whether they can be satisfied in principle is raised and answered negatively. The second kind of implications consists of two limitations in the scope of the Bayesian model. They regard (i) the background of revision (the Bayesian model considers only revising situations but not updating situations), and (ii) the notorious case of the null priors. In both cases Lewis' rule is an appropriate alternative to Bayes' rule, but its use faces the same operational difficulties

Experiencing simulated outcomes

Whereas much literature has documented difficulties in making probabilistic inferences, it has also emphasized the importance of task characteristics in determining judgmental accuracy. Noting that people exhibit remarkable efficiency in encoding frequency information sequentially, we construct tasks that exploit this ability by requiring people to experience the outcomes of sequentially simulated data. We report two experiments. The first involved seven well-known probabilistic inference tasks. Participants differed in statistical sophistication and answered with and without experience obtained through sequentially simulated outcomes in a design that permitted both between- and within-subject analyses. The second experiment involved interpreting the outcomes of a regression analysis when making inferences for investment decisions. In both experiments, even the statistically naïve make accurate probabilistic inferences after experiencing sequentially simulated outcomes and many prefer this presentation format. We conclude by discussing theoretical and practical implications.probabilistic reasoning; natural frequencies; experiential sampling; simulation., leex