14,056 research outputs found

    Consumer Beware – A License to Injure

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    Using emissions trading to regulate global greenhouse gas emissions

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    The inclusion of emissions trading in the Kyoto Protocol reflects an important decision to address climate change issues through flexible market mechanisms. This Article addresses a number of policy issues that must be considered in designing and implementing an international greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions trading scheme. These include emissions trading models, the initial allocation of emissions permits and its competitiveness concerns, banking and borrowing, the liability rules for non-compliance, and bubbles. The following conclusions emerge from the discussion. First, although emissions trading could take place either on an inter-governmental basis or on an inter-source basis, sub-national legal entities are the best entities to trade emissions permits. Allocating permits to individual emissions sources will facilitate private participation in emissions trading. Moreover, it has been argued that individual governments should be left free to devise their own ways of allocating assigned amounts. Second, it has been pointed out that although national emissions trading systems could be modelled as either upstream or downstream or hybrid systems, the distinguishing features of broad coverage and administrative simplicity would make an upstream system the more attractive approach. Moreover, national emissions trading systems should incorporate the maximum degree of flexibility in banking. Third, the liability rules are essential to the success of an international GHG emissions trading scheme. In general, a seller beware liability works well in a strong enforcement environment. In the Kyoto Protocol, however, it may not always work. By contrast, a buyer beware liability could be an effective deterrent to non-compliance, but the costs of imposing it are expected to be very high. To strike a middle ground, it has been suggested a combination of preventive measures with strong but feasible end-of-period punishments to ensure compliance with the Kyoto emissions commitments. Such measures aim to maximize efficiency gains from emissions trading and at the same time, to minimize over-selling risks.Annual retirement; auction; bubbles; buyer beware liability; carbon taxes; clean development mechanism; compliance reserve; compulsory insurance; emissions trading; grandfathering; greenhouse gases; international competitiveness; joint implementation; Kyoto Protocol; seller beware liability; World Trade Organization

    Towards a successful international greenhouse gas emissions trading

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    The inclusion of emissions trading in the Kyoto Protocol reflects an important decision to address climate change issues through flexible market mechanisms. In this paper, we have addressed a number of policy issues that must be considered in designing and implementing an international greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading scheme. These include how much of a Party’s assigned amounts of GHG emissions can be traded internationally; emissions trading models; competitiveness concern in the allocation of emissions permits; banking and borrowing; accountability; emissions trading system enlargement; and bubbles. Although our focus has been exclusively on emissions trading, we have discussed its relationship with the clean development mechanism, joint implementation and bubbles wherever necessary. By providing some new insights, the paper aims to contribute to the design and operationlization of an international emissions trading scheme.Bubbles; carbon tax; clean development mechanism; emissions trading; greenhouse gases; international competitiveness; joint implementation; Kyoto Protocol

    Rethinking Corporate Governance for a Bondholder Financed, Systemically Risky World

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    This Article makes two arguments that, combined, demonstrate an important synergy: first, including bondholders in corporate governance could help to reduce systemic risk because bondholders are more risk averse than shareholders; second, corporate governance should include bondholders because bonds now dwarf equity as a source of corporate financing and bond prices are increasingly tied to firm performance

    Technical Knockout: How Mixed Martial Arts Will Change Copyright Enforcement on the Web

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    Glossary of International Climate Policy Terms

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    Environmental Economics and Policy,
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