Skepticism, Fallibilism, and Rational Evaluation

This paper outlines a new type of skepticism that is both compatible with fallibilism and supported by work in psychology. In particular, I will argue that we often cannot properly trust our ability to rationally evaluate reasons, arguments, and evidence (a fundamental knowledge-seeking faculty). We humans are just too cognitively impaired to achieve even fallible knowledge, at least for many beliefs

Are evolutionary debunking arguments really self-defeating?

Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (EDAs) are defined as arguments that appeal to the evolutionary genealogy of our beliefs to undermine their justification. Recently, Helen De Cruz and her coauthors supported the view that EDAs are selfdefeating: if EDAs claim that human arguments are not justified, because the evolutionary origin of the beliefs which figure in such arguments undermines those beliefs, and EDAs themselves are human arguments, then EDAs are not justified, and we should not accept their conclusions about the fact that human arguments are unjustified. De Cruz's objection to EDAs is similar to the objection raised by Reuben Hersh against the claim that, since by Gödel's second incompleteness theorem the purpose of mathematical logic to give a secure foundation for mathematics cannot be achieved, mathematics cannot be said to be absolutely certain. The response given by Carlo Cellucci to Hersh's objection shows that the claim that by Gödel's results mathematics cannot be said to be absolutely certain is not self-defeating, and can be adopted to show that EDAs are not selfdefeating as well in a twofold sense: an argument analogous to Cellucci's one may be developed to face De Cruz's objection, and such argument may be further refined incorporating Cellucci's response itself in it, to make it stronger. This paper aims at showing that the accusation of being self-defeating moved against EDAs is inadequate by elaborating an argument which can be considered an EDA and which can also be shown not to be self-defeating

Loving Truly: An Epistemic Approach to the Doxastic Norms of Love

If you love someone, is it good to believe better of her than epistemic norms allow? The partiality view says that it is: love, on this view, issues norms of belief that clash with epistemic norms. The partiality view is supposedly supported by an analogy between beliefs and actions, by the phenomenology of love, and by the idea that love commits us to the loved one’s good character. I argue that the partiality view is false, and defend what I call the epistemic view. On the epistemic view, love also issues norms of belief. But these say simply (and perhaps surprisingly) that you should adhere to epistemic norms in forming and maintaining beliefs about loved ones. I offer two arguments for the epistemic view. The first appeals to the emotional responses of love, which, when sensitive to what the loved one is really like, can make love great and be morally transformative. The second is a new argument for why caring for a loved one requires true beliefs about him. We see that there may be some boundaries, such as stuffy traditions, that love is right to defy, but that epistemic boundaries are not among them

Are Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Really Self-Defeating?

Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (EDAs) are defined as arguments that appeal to the evolutionary genealogy of our beliefs to undermine their justification. Recently, Helen De Cruz and her coauthors supported the view that EDAs are selfdefeating: if EDAs claim that human arguments are not justified, because the evolutionary origin of the beliefs which figure in such arguments undermines those beliefs, and EDAs themselves are human arguments, then EDAs are not justified, and we should not accept their conclusions about the fact that human arguments are unjustified. De Cruz's objection to EDAs is similar to the objection raised by Reuben Hersh against the claim that, since by Gödel's second incompleteness theorem the purpose of mathematical logic to give a secure foundation for mathematics cannot be achieved, mathematics cannot be said to be absolutely certain. The response given by Carlo Cellucci to Hersh's objection shows that the claim that by Gödel's results mathematics cannot be said to be absolutely certain is not self-defeating, and can be adopted to show that EDAs are not selfdefeating as well in a twofold sense: an argument analogous to Cellucci's one may be developed to face De Cruz's objection, and such argument may be further refined incorporating Cellucci's response itself in it, to make it stronger. This paper aims at showing that the accusation of being self-defeating moved against EDAs is inadequate by elaborating an argument which can be considered an EDA and which can also be shown not to be self-defeating

Advocacy coalitions involved in California's menu labeling policy debate: Exploring coalition structure, policy beliefs, resources, and strategies.

Advocacy coalitions often play an important role in the state health policymaking process, yet little is known about their structure, composition, and behavior. In 2008, California became the first state to enact a menu labeling law. Using the advocacy coalition framework, we examine different facets of the coalitions involved in California's menu labeling policy debate. We use a qualitative research approach to identify coalition members and explore their expressed beliefs and policy arguments, resources, and strategies by analyzing legislative documents (n = 87) and newspaper articles (n = 78) produced between 1999 and 2009. Between 2003 and 2008, six menu labeling bills were introduced in the state's legislature. We found the issue received increasing media attention during this period. We identified two advocacy coalitions involved in the debate-a public health (PH) coalition and an industry coalition. State organizations acted as coalition leaders and participated for a longer duration than elected officials. The structure and composition of each coalition varied. PH coalition leadership and membership notably increased compared to the industry coalition. The PH coalition, led by nonprofit PH and health organizations, promoted a clear and consistent message around informed decision making. The industry coalition, led by a state restaurant association, responded with cost and implementation arguments. Each coalition used various resources and strategies to advance desired outcomes. PH coalition leaders were particularly effective at using resources and employing advocacy strategies, which included engaging state legislators as coalition members, using public opinion polls and information, and leveraging media resources to garner support. Policy precedence and a local policy push emerged as important policymaking strategies. Areas for future research on the state health policymaking process are discussed

The Cliffordian Virtue

There is a case to be made for the contention that it is a virtue to have a disposition to try to conform to W. K. Clifford’s ethics of belief. The arguments are not Clifford’s own but new deductive ones. There is also a discussion of some recent criticisms of Clifford. They seldom succeed against Clifford’s original position and never succeed against the case for the Cliffordian virtue. It is pointed out that there need be no conflict between religion and Cliffordianism. The virtue approach emphasizes the value of striving over the value of success

The Phenomenal Conservative Approach to Religious Epistemology

In this chapter, we argue for a phenomenal conservative perspective on religious epistemology and attempt to answer some common criticisms of this perspective

Four arguments for denying that lottery beliefs are justified

A ‘lottery belief’ is a belief that a particular ticket has lost a large, fair lottery, based on nothing more than the odds against it winning. The lottery paradox brings out a tension between the idea that lottery beliefs are justified and the idea that that one can always justifiably believe the deductive consequences of things that one justifiably believes – what is sometimes called the principle of closure. Many philosophers have treated the lottery paradox as an argument against the second idea – but I make a case here that it is the first idea that should be given up. As I shall show, there are a number of independent arguments for denying that lottery beliefs are justified

Infinite Regresses, Infinite Beliefs

One way of mapping part of the domain of epistemology is to represent various theories as responses to the following argument: (I) A belief (strictly, a token state of belief) is justified only if a justified belief is a reason for it. (Premiss.) (II) There are justified beliefs. (Premiss.) (III) The proper ancestral of the reason-relation is irreflexive. (Premiss.) (IV) There is an infinite sequence (strictly, a sequence with infinite range) of justified beliefs each of which is a reason for its predecessor, if any. (From (I) to (III).) (V) There is no such sequence. (Premiss.) (VI) There both is and is not such a sequence. (From (IV) and (V).) (VII) Not-(I) / not-(II) / not-(III) / not-(V). (Reductio.