Belief in attacks in epistemic probabilistic argumentation

The epistemic approach to probabilistic argumentation assigns belief to arguments. This is valuable in dialogical argumentation where one agent can model the beliefs another agent has in the arguments and this can be harnessed to make strategic choices of arguments to present. In this paper, we extend this epistemic approach by also representing the belief in attacks. We investigate properties of this proposal and compare it to the constellations approach showing neither subsumes the other

Argument-based Belief in Topological Structures

This paper combines two studies: a topological semantics for epistemic notions and abstract argumentation theory. In our combined setting, we use a topological semantics to represent the structure of an agent's collection of evidence, and we use argumentation theory to single out the relevant sets of evidence through which a notion of beliefs grounded on arguments is defined. We discuss the formal properties of this newly defined notion, providing also a formal language with a matching modality together with a sound and complete axiom system for it. Despite the fact that our agent can combine her evidence in a 'rational' way (captured via the topological structure), argument-based beliefs are not closed under conjunction. This illustrates the difference between an agent's reasoning abilities (i.e. the way she is able to combine her available evidence) and the closure properties of her beliefs. We use this point to argue for why the failure of closure under conjunction of belief should not bear the burden of the failure of rationality.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2017, arXiv:1707.0825

Probabilistic Argumentation with Epistemic Extensions and Incomplete Information

Abstract argumentation offers an appealing way of representing and evaluating arguments and counterarguments. This approach can be enhanced by a probability assignment to each argument. There are various interpretations that can be ascribed to this assignment. In this paper, we regard the assignment as denoting the belief that an agent has that an argument is justifiable, i.e., that both the premises of the argument and the derivation of the claim of the argument from its premises are valid. This leads to the notion of an epistemic extension which is the subset of the arguments in the graph that are believed to some degree (which we defined as the arguments that have a probability assignment greater than 0.5). We consider various constraints on the probability assignment. Some constraints correspond to standard notions of extensions, such as grounded or stable extensions, and some constraints give us new kinds of extensions

Empirical Evaluation of Abstract Argumentation: Supporting the Need for Bipolar and Probabilistic Approaches

In dialogical argumentation it is often assumed that the involved parties always correctly identify the intended statements posited by each other, realize all of the associated relations, conform to the three acceptability states (accepted, rejected, undecided), adjust their views when new and correct information comes in, and that a framework handling only attack relations is sufficient to represent their opinions. Although it is natural to make these assumptions as a starting point for further research, removing them or even acknowledging that such removal should happen is more challenging for some of these concepts than for others. Probabilistic argumentation is one of the approaches that can be harnessed for more accurate user modelling. The epistemic approach allows us to represent how much a given argument is believed by a given person, offering us the possibility to express more than just three agreement states. It is equipped with a wide range of postulates, including those that do not make any restrictions concerning how initial arguments should be viewed, thus potentially being more adequate for handling beliefs of the people that have not fully disclosed their opinions in comparison to Dung's semantics. The constellation approach can be used to represent the views of different people concerning the structure of the framework we are dealing with, including cases in which not all relations are acknowledged or when they are seen differently than intended. Finally, bipolar argumentation frameworks can be used to express both positive and negative relations between arguments. In this paper we describe the results of an experiment in which participants judged dialogues in terms of agreement and structure. We compare our findings with the aforementioned assumptions as well as with the constellation and epistemic approaches to probabilistic argumentation and bipolar argumentation

A Labelling Framework for Probabilistic Argumentation

The combination of argumentation and probability paves the way to new accounts of qualitative and quantitative uncertainty, thereby offering new theoretical and applicative opportunities. Due to a variety of interests, probabilistic argumentation is approached in the literature with different frameworks, pertaining to structured and abstract argumentation, and with respect to diverse types of uncertainty, in particular the uncertainty on the credibility of the premises, the uncertainty about which arguments to consider, and the uncertainty on the acceptance status of arguments or statements. Towards a general framework for probabilistic argumentation, we investigate a labelling-oriented framework encompassing a basic setting for rule-based argumentation and its (semi-) abstract account, along with diverse types of uncertainty. Our framework provides a systematic treatment of various kinds of uncertainty and of their relationships and allows us to back or question assertions from the literature

Belief Revision in Structured Probabilistic Argumentation

In real-world applications, knowledge bases consisting of all the information at hand for a specific domain, along with the current state of affairs, are bound to contain contradictory data coming from different sources, as well as data with varying degrees of uncertainty attached. Likewise, an important aspect of the effort associated with maintaining knowledge bases is deciding what information is no longer useful; pieces of information (such as intelligence reports) may be outdated, may come from sources that have recently been discovered to be of low quality, or abundant evidence may be available that contradicts them. In this paper, we propose a probabilistic structured argumentation framework that arises from the extension of Presumptive Defeasible Logic Programming (PreDeLP) with probabilistic models, and argue that this formalism is capable of addressing the basic issues of handling contradictory and uncertain data. Then, to address the last issue, we focus on the study of non-prioritized belief revision operations over probabilistic PreDeLP programs. We propose a set of rationality postulates -- based on well-known ones developed for classical knowledge bases -- that characterize how such operations should behave, and study a class of operators along with theoretical relationships with the proposed postulates, including a representation theorem stating the equivalence between this class and the class of operators characterized by the postulates

Probabilistic Reasoning with Abstract Argumentation Frameworks

Abstract argumentation offers an appealing way of representing and evaluating arguments and counterarguments. This approach can be enhanced by considering probability assignments on arguments, allowing for a quantitative treatment of formal argumentation. In this paper, we regard the assignment as denoting the degree of belief that an agent has in an argument being acceptable. While there are various interpretations of this, an example is how it could be applied to a deductive argument. Here, the degree of belief that an agent has in an argument being acceptable is a combination of the degree to which it believes the premises, the claim, and the derivation of the claim from the premises. We consider constraints on these probability assignments, inspired by crisp notions from classical abstract argumentation frameworks and discuss the issue of probabilistic reasoning with abstract argumentation frameworks. Moreover, we consider the scenario when assessments on the probabilities of a subset of the arguments are given and the probabilities of the remaining arguments have to be derived, taking both the topology of the argumentation framework and principles of probabilistic reasoning into account. We generalise this scenario by also considering inconsistent assessments, i.e., assessments that contradict the topology of the argumentation framework. Building on approaches to inconsistency measurement, we present a general framework to measure the amount of conflict of these assessments and provide a method for inconsistency-tolerant reasoning

Updating probabilistic epistemic states in persuasion dialogues

In persuasion dialogues, the ability of the persuader to model the persuadee allows the persuader to make better choices of move. The epistemic approach to probabilistic argumentation is a promising way of modelling the persuadee’s belief in arguments, and proposals have been made for update methods that specify how these beliefs can be updated at each step of the dialogue. However, there is a need to better understand these proposals, and moreover, to gain insights into the space of possible update functions. So in this paper, we present a general framework for update functions in which we consider existing and novel update functions

Syntactic Reasoning with Conditional Probabilities in Deductive Argumentation

Evidence from studies, such as in science or medicine, often corresponds to conditional probability statements. Furthermore, evidence can conflict, in particular when coming from multiple studies. Whilst it is natural to make sense of such evidence using arguments, there is a lack of a systematic formalism for representing and reasoning with conditional probability statements in computational argumentation. We address this shortcoming by providing a formalization of conditional probabilistic argumentation based on probabilistic conditional logic. We provide a semantics and a collection of comprehensible inference rules that give different insights into evidence. We show how arguments constructed from proofs and attacks between them can be analyzed as arguments graphs using dialectical semantics and via the epistemic approach to probabilistic argumentation. Our approach allows for a transparent and systematic way of handling uncertainty that often arises in evidence