Transparent quantification into hyperpropositional contexts de re

This paper is the twin of (Duží and Jespersen, in submission), which provides a logical rule for transparent quantification into hyperprop- ositional contexts de dicto, as in: Mary believes that the Evening Star is a planet; therefore, there is a concept c such that Mary be- lieves that what c conceptualizes is a planet. Here we provide two logical rules for transparent quantification into hyperpropositional contexts de re. (As a by-product, we also offer rules for possible- world propositional contexts.) One rule validates this inference: Mary believes of the Evening Star that it is a planet; therefore, there is an x such that Mary believes of x that it is a planet. The other rule validates this inference: the Evening Star is such that it is believed by Mary to be a planet; therefore, there is an x such that x is believed by Mary to be a planet. Issues unique to the de re variant include partiality and existential presupposition, sub- stitutivity of co-referential (as opposed to co-denoting or synony- mous) terms, anaphora, and active vs. passive voice. The validity of quantifying-in presupposes an extensional logic of hyperinten- sions preserving transparency and compositionality in hyperinten- sional contexts. This requires raising the bar for what qualifies as co-denotation or equivalence in extensional contexts. Our logic is Tichý’s Transparent Intensional Logic. The syntax of TIL is the typed lambda calculus; its highly expressive semantics is based on a procedural redefinition of, inter alia, functional abstraction and application. The two non-standard features we need are a hyper- intension (called Trivialization) that presents other hyperintensions and a four-place substitution function (called Sub) defined over hy- perintensions

Towards an extensional calculus of hyperintensions

In this paper I describe an extensional logic of hyperintensions, viz. Tichý's Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL). TIL preserves transparency and compositionality in all kinds of context, and validates quantifying into all contexts, including intensional and hyperintensional ones. The received view is that an intensional (let alone hyperintensional) context is one that fails to validate transparency, compositionality, and quantifying-in; and vice versa, if a context fails to validate these extensional principles, then the context is 'opaque', that is non-extensional. We steer clear of this circle by defining extensionality for hyperintensions presenting functions, functions (including possible-world intensions), and functional values. The main features of our logic are that the senses of expressions remain invariant across contexts and that our ramified type theory enables quantification over any logical objects of any order into any context. The syntax of TIL is the typed lambda calculus; its semantics is based on a procedural redefinition of, inter alia, functional abstraction and application. The only two non-standard features of our logic are a hyperintension called Trivialization and a fourplace substitution function (called Sub) defined over hyperintensions. Using this logical machinery I propose rules of existential generalization and substitution of identicals into the three kinds of context.Web of Science191452

A note on conditionals and restrictors

Within linguistic semantics, it is near orthodoxy that the function of the word ‘if’ (in most cases) is to mark restrictions on quantification. Despite its linguistic prominence, this view of the word ‘if’ has played little role in the philosophical discussion of conditionals. This paper tries to fill in this gap by systematically discussing the impact of the restrictor view on the competing philosophical views of conditionals. I argue that most philosophical views can and should be understood in a way that is compatible with the restrictor view, but that accepting the restrictor allows for new responses to some prominent arguments for non-truth-conditional account of conditionals

Empty Singular Terms in the Mental-File Framework

Mental files, in Recanati's framework, function as 'singular terms in the language of thought' ; they serve to think about objects in the world (and to store information about them). But they have a derived, metarepresentational function : they serve to represent how other subjects think about objects in the world. To account for the metarepresentational use of files, Recanati introduces the notion of an 'indexed file', i.e. a vicarious file that stands, in the subject's mind, for another subject's file about an object. Using that notion, he argues, one can provide an analysis of attitude ascriptions and the conniving use of empty singular terms