Invariance under type morphisms: the bayesian Nash equilibrium

Ely and Peski (2006) and Friedenberg and Meier (2010) provide examples when changing the type space behind a game, taking a "bigger" type space, induces changes of Bayesian Nash Equilibria, in other words, the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is not invariant under type morphisms. In this paper we introduce the notion of strong type morphism. Strong type morphisms are stronger than ordinary and conditional type morphisms (Ely and Peski, 2006), and we show that Bayesian Nash Equilibria are not invariant under strong type morphisms either. We present our results in a very simple, finite setting, and conclude that there is no chance to get reasonable assumptions for Bayesian Nash Equilibria to be invariant under any kind of reasonable type morphisms

Perseus: Randomized Point-based Value Iteration for POMDPs

Partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs) form an attractive and principled framework for agent planning under uncertainty. Point-based approximate techniques for POMDPs compute a policy based on a finite set of points collected in advance from the agents belief space. We present a randomized point-based value iteration algorithm called Perseus. The algorithm performs approximate value backup stages, ensuring that in each backup stage the value of each point in the belief set is improved; the key observation is that a single backup may improve the value of many belief points. Contrary to other point-based methods, Perseus backs up only a (randomly selected) subset of points in the belief set, sufficient for improving the value of each belief point in the set. We show how the same idea can be extended to dealing with continuous action spaces. Experimental results show the potential of Perseus in large scale POMDP problems