235,896 research outputs found

    Belief Revision in Expressive Knowledge Representation Formalisms

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    We live in an era of data and information, where an immeasurable amount of discoveries, findings, events, news, and transactions are generated every second. Governments, companies, or individuals have to employ and process all that data for knowledge-based decision-making (i.e. a decision-making process that uses predetermined criteria to measure and ensure the optimal outcome for a specific topic), which then prompt them to view the knowledge as valuable resource. In this knowledge-based view, the capability to create and utilize knowledge is the key source of an organization or individual’s competitive advantage. This dynamic nature of knowledge leads us to the study of belief revision (or belief change), an area which emerged from work in philosophy and then impacted further developments in computer science and artificial intelligence. In belief revision area, the AGM postulates by AlchourrĂłn, GĂ€rdenfors, and Makinson continue to represent a cornerstone in research related to belief change. Katsuno and Mendelzon (K&M) adopted the AGM postulates for changing belief bases and characterized AGM belief base revision in propositional logic over finite signatures. In this thesis, two research directions are considered. In the first, by considering the semantic point of view, we generalize K&M’s approach to the setting of (multiple) base revision in arbitrary Tarskian logics, covering all logics with a classical model-theoretic semantics and hence a wide variety of logics used in knowledge representation and beyond. Our generic formulation applies to various notions of “base”, such as belief sets, arbitrary or finite sets of sentences, or single sentences. The core result is a representation theorem showing a two-way correspondence between AGM base revision operators and certain “assignments”: functions mapping belief bases to total — yet not transitive — “preference” relations between interpretations. Alongside, we present a companion result for the case when the AGM postulate of syntax-independence is abandoned. We also provide a characterization of all logics for which our result can be strengthened to assignments producing transitive preference relations (as in K&M’s original work), giving rise to two more representation theorems for such logics, according to syntax dependence vs. independence. The second research direction in this thesis explores two approaches for revising description logic knowledge bases under fixed-domain semantics, namely model-based approach and individual-based approach. In this logical setting, models of the knowledge bases can be enumerated and can be computed to produce the revision result, semantically. We show a characterization of the AGM revision operator for this logic and present a concrete model-based revision approach via distance between interpretations. In addition, by weakening the KB based on certain domain elements, a novel individual-based revision operator is provided as an alternative approach

    An Ordinal View of Independence with Application to Plausible Reasoning

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    An ordinal view of independence is studied in the framework of possibility theory. We investigate three possible definitions of dependence, of increasing strength. One of them is the counterpart to the multiplication law in probability theory, and the two others are based on the notion of conditional possibility. These two have enough expressive power to support the whole possibility theory, and a complete axiomatization is provided for the strongest one. Moreover we show that weak independence is well-suited to the problems of belief change and plausible reasoning, especially to address the problem of blocking of property inheritance in exception-tolerant taxonomic reasoning.Comment: Appears in Proceedings of the Tenth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI1994

    EEMCS final report for the causal modeling for air transport safety (CATS) project

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    This document reports on the work realized by the DIAM in relation to the completion of the CATS model as presented in Figure 1.6 and tries to explain some of the steps taken for its completion. The project spans over a period of time of three years. Intermediate reports have been presented throughout the project’s progress. These are presented in Appendix 1. In this report the continuous‐discrete distribution‐free BBNs are briefly discussed. The human reliability models developed for dealing with dependence in the model variables are described and the software application UniNet is presente

    Theorising path dependence : how does history come to matter in organisations, and what can we do about it?

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    This paper examines the concept of path dependence in organisational theory, attempting to utilise insights from a number of academic disciplines to improve our understanding of it. It examines the claims of the resource-based view of business, perhaps the organisational approach most commonly linked with path dependence, and reassesses them in the light of the framework presented here. It concludes by considering the role of history in organisations, the mechanisms through which it manifests itself in the present, and what we can do to break free from path dependence

    On Horgan's Causal Compatibilism

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    It is quite obvious why the antireductionist picture of mental causation, which rests on supervenience, is such an attractive theory. On one side it secures the mental a preservation of its unique and different nature; on the other side it tries to place the mental in our world in a way that is compatible with the physicalistic view. But Kim's argument from supervenience reminds us that while trying to do so the antireductionists face the following dilemma: if mental properties have causal powers we risk a violation of the causal closure of the physics and threaten our physicalistic position; if they do not have them we adopt epiphenomenalism, which denies the mental causal powers of any sort. So, either we violate the causal closure of the physics or we adopt epiphenomenalism. We can write it as an argument in the form of a constructive dilemma and may call it the causal dilemma

    Dispositions, Their Bases And Correlates – Meinong's Analysis

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    I shall first set out the main lines of Meinong’s account then look at the theo- ries of dependence and possibility on which it is based. Finally I consider some applications of the theory, most of which are at least hinted at by Meinong
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