The neurobiology of reference-dependent value computation

A key focus of current research in neuroeconomics concerns how the human brain computes value. Although, value has generally been viewed as an absolute measure (e.g., expected value, reward magnitude), much evidence suggests that value is more often computed with respect to a changing reference point, rather than in isolation. Here, we present the results of a study aimed to dissociate brain regions involved in reference-independent (i.e., “absolute”) value computations, from those involved in value computations relative to a reference point. During functional magnetic resonance imaging, subjects acted as buyers and sellers during a market exchange of lottery tickets. At a behavioral level, we demonstrate that subjects systematically accorded a higher value to objects they owned relative to those they did not, an effect that results from a shift in reference point (i.e., status quo bias or endowment effect). Our results show that activity in orbitofrontal cortex and dorsal striatum track parameters such as the expected value of lottery tickets indicating the computation of reference-independent value. In contrast, activity in ventral striatum indexed the degree to which stated prices, at a within-subjects and between-subjects level, were distorted with respect to a reference point. The findings speak to the neurobiological underpinnings of reference dependency during real market value computations

The motivation and pleasure dimension of negative symptoms: neural substrates and behavioral outputs.

A range of emotional and motivation impairments have long been clinically documented in people with schizophrenia, and there has been a resurgence of interest in understanding the psychological and neural mechanisms of the so-called "negative symptoms" in schizophrenia, given their lack of treatment responsiveness and their role in constraining function and life satisfaction in this illness. Negative symptoms comprise two domains, with the first covering diminished motivation and pleasure across a range of life domains and the second covering diminished verbal and non-verbal expression and communicative output. In this review, we focus on four aspects of the motivation/pleasure domain, providing a brief review of the behavioral and neural underpinnings of this domain. First, we cover liking or in-the-moment pleasure: immediate responses to pleasurable stimuli. Second, we cover anticipatory pleasure or wanting, which involves prediction of a forthcoming enjoyable outcome (reward) and feeling pleasure in anticipation of that outcome. Third, we address motivation, which comprises effort computation, which involves figuring out how much effort is needed to achieve a desired outcome, planning, and behavioral response. Finally, we cover the maintenance emotional states and behavioral responses. Throughout, we consider the behavioral manifestations and brain representations of these four aspects of motivation/pleasure deficits in schizophrenia. We conclude with directions for future research as well as implications for treatment

Cohabitation: Computation at 70, Cognition at 20

Zenon Pylyshyn cast cognition's lot with computation, stretching the Church/Turing Thesis to its limit: We had no idea how the mind did anything, whereas we knew computation could do just about everything. Doing it with images would be like doing it with mirrors, and little men in mirrors. So why not do it all with symbols and rules instead? Everything worthy of the name "cognition," anyway; not what was too thick for cognition to penetrate. It might even solve the mind/body problem if the soul, like software, were independent of its physical incarnation. It looked like we had the architecture of cognition virtually licked. Even neural nets could be either simulated or subsumed. But then came Searle, with his sino-spoiler thought experiment, showing that cognition cannot be all computation (though not, as Searle thought, that it cannot be computation at all). So if cognition has to be hybrid sensorimotor/symbolic, it turns out we've all just been haggling over the price, instead of delivering the goods, as Turing had originally proposed 5 decades earlier

Cohabitation: Computation at 70, Cognition at 20

Zenon Pylyshyn cast cognition's lot with computation, stretching the Church/Turing Thesis to its limit: We had no idea how the mind did anything, whereas we knew computation could do just about everything. Doing it with images would be like doing it with mirrors, and little men in mirrors. So why not do it all with symbols and rules instead? Everything worthy of the name "cognition," anyway; not what was too thick for cognition to penetrate. It might even solve the mind/body problem if the soul, like software, were independent of its physical incarnation. It looked like we had the architecture of cognition virtually licked. Even neural nets could be either simulated or subsumed. But then came Searle, with his sino-spoiler thought experiment, showing that cognition cannot be all computation (though not, as Searle thought, that it cannot be computation at all). So if cognition has to be hybrid sensorimotor/symbolic, it turns out we've all just been haggling over the price, instead of delivering the goods, as Turing had originally proposed 5 decades earlier

The Spectrum of Strong Behavioral Equivalences for Nondeterministic and Probabilistic Processes

We present a spectrum of trace-based, testing, and bisimulation equivalences for nondeterministic and probabilistic processes whose activities are all observable. For every equivalence under study, we examine the discriminating power of three variants stemming from three approaches that differ for the way probabilities of events are compared when nondeterministic choices are resolved via deterministic schedulers. We show that the first approach - which compares two resolutions relatively to the probability distributions of all considered events - results in a fragment of the spectrum compatible with the spectrum of behavioral equivalences for fully probabilistic processes. In contrast, the second approach - which compares the probabilities of the events of a resolution with the probabilities of the same events in possibly different resolutions - gives rise to another fragment composed of coarser equivalences that exhibits several analogies with the spectrum of behavioral equivalences for fully nondeterministic processes. Finally, the third approach - which only compares the extremal probabilities of each event stemming from the different resolutions - yields even coarser equivalences that, however, give rise to a hierarchy similar to that stemming from the second approach.Comment: In Proceedings QAPL 2013, arXiv:1306.241

The Structure of Sensorimotor Explanation

The sensorimotor theory of vision and visual consciousness is often described as a radical alternative to the computational and connectionist orthodoxy in the study of visual perception. However, it is far from clear whether the theory represents a significant departure from orthodox approaches or whether it is an enrichment of it. In this study, I tackle this issue by focusing on the explanatory structure of the sensorimotor theory. I argue that the standard formulation of the theory subscribes to the same theses of the dynamical hypothesis and that it affords covering-law explanations. This however exposes the theory to the mere description worry and generates a puzzle about the role of representations. I then argue that the sensorimotor theory is compatible with a mechanistic framework, and show how this can overcome the mere description worry and solve the problem of the explanatory role of representations. By doing so, it will be shown that the theory should be understood as an enrichment of the orthodoxy, rather than an alternative

Modeling Life as Cognitive Info-Computation

This article presents a naturalist approach to cognition understood as a network of info-computational, autopoietic processes in living systems. It provides a conceptual framework for the unified view of cognition as evolved from the simplest to the most complex organisms, based on new empirical and theoretical results. It addresses three fundamental questions: what cognition is, how cognition works and what cognition does at different levels of complexity of living organisms. By explicating the info-computational character of cognition, its evolution, agent-dependency and generative mechanisms we can better understand its life-sustaining and life-propagating role. The info-computational approach contributes to rethinking cognition as a process of natural computation in living beings that can be applied for cognitive computation in artificial systems.Comment: Manuscript submitted to Computability in Europe CiE 201

Perspectives on the Neuroscience of Cognition and Consciousness

The origin and current use of the concepts of computation, representation and information in Neuroscience are examined and conceptual flaws are identified which vitiate their usefulness for addressing problems of the neural basis of Cognition and Consciousness. In contrast, a convergence of views is presented to support the characterization of the Nervous System as a complex dynamical system operating in the metastable regime, and capable of evolving to configurations and transitions in phase space with potential relevance for Cognition and Consciousness