Voucher funds in transitional economies : the Czech and Slovak experience

Voucher funds have arisen in the transitional economies of Eastern and Central Europe that have used voucher privatization. These funds collect vouchers from citizens and use them to buy shares in enterprises. In the Czech and Slovak Republics, voucher funds are typically organized as corporations owned by the citizens who contributed their vouchers. Recently, they have also been organized as unit trusts (either open-ended or closed). A management company manages the funds under a contract that specifies the management fee. The management company is typically owned by the initial sponsor of the fund - for example, a bank. Voucher funds can give owners a diversified and professionally managed portfolio. More important, the funds select who sits on an enterprise's governance boards (which oversee management and profitability). Although experience is limited, the funds in these two countries have probably stopped most fraud and self-serving by enterprise mangers and are beginning to encourage the restructuring needed for profitability. A few funds have replaced poorly performing or dishonest managers; more often, because qualified replacements are few, they encourage managers to improve performance. There have been complaints about funds'performance. Some have made unrealistic promises to voucher holders and have appointed poorly qualified members to management boards. There is concern about conflicts of interest in the bank-sponsored funds and excessive control of enterprises. Funds typically lack capital or expertise to undertake restructuring - but few other potential owners are likely to be better qualified. The author examines 27 regulations that have been proposed for funds. Regulations in transitional economies, unlike regulations in most western countries, should encourage funds to play a strong role in corporate governance, he contends, as few potential owners have this ability. Most important, regulations should require that funds disclose information about their operations so their owners can monitor and control fund managers. The regulatory regime, the author says, should discourage monopolies and anticompetitive behavior; create incentives for fund managers to improve fund performance; discourage self-serving or fraudulent behavior by fund managers, and conflicts of interest; and eliminate high-risk investments unacceptable to fund owners. Because there is so little experience with these funds, the regulatory regime should not be unduly restrictive. As problems arise, regulations to deal with them can be added.International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Economic Adjustment and Lending,Economic Theory&Research,Agricultural Knowledge&Information Systems,Payment Systems&Infrastructure

Supervisory Control of Fuzzy Discrete Event Systems

In order to cope with situations in which a plant's dynamics are not precisely known, we consider the problem of supervisory control for a class of discrete event systems modelled by fuzzy automata. The behavior of such discrete event systems is described by fuzzy languages; the supervisors are event feedback and can disable only controllable events with any degree. The concept of discrete event system controllability is thus extended by incorporating fuzziness. In this new sense, we present a necessary and sufficient condition for a fuzzy language to be controllable. We also study the supremal controllable fuzzy sublanguage and the infimal controllable fuzzy superlanguage when a given pre-specified desired fuzzy language is uncontrollable. Our framework generalizes that of Ramadge-Wonham and reduces to Ramadge-Wonham framework when membership grades in all fuzzy languages must be either 0 or 1. The theoretical development is accompanied by illustrative numerical examples.Comment: 12 pages, 2 figure

Compositional Set Invariance in Network Systems with Assume-Guarantee Contracts

This paper presents an assume-guarantee reasoning approach to the computation of robust invariant sets for network systems. Parameterized signal temporal logic (pSTL) is used to formally describe the behaviors of the subsystems, which we use as the template for the contract. We show that set invariance can be proved with a valid assume-guarantee contract by reasoning about individual subsystems. If a valid assume-guarantee contract with monotonic pSTL template is known, it can be further refined by value iteration. When such a contract is not known, an epigraph method is proposed to solve for a contract that is valid, ---an approach that has linear complexity for a sparse network. A microgrid example is used to demonstrate the proposed method. The simulation result shows that together with control barrier functions, the states of all the subsystems can be bounded inside the individual robust invariant sets.Comment: Submitted to 2019 American Control Conferenc

Restructuring, firm performance and control mechanisms

Restructurings are the order of the day. Various major companies have just experienced or are in the midst of a major restructuring. This paper presents an overview of the literature on restructuring, firm performance and control mechanisms. To study the phenomena coherently, the concept of an overall restructuring process is presented. Theoretically restructuring has not yet been defined in the framework of the restructuring process formula. Neither have different forms of restructuring found their places within such a structure. Empirically several issues of the process have been studied but on a rather partial basis and mainly in statistical approaches only. Attention for all-inclusive case studies came from Donaldson (1984, 1994). This paper aims at laying the foundation of doing case study research studies with respect to Dutch firms in the 1990s.Corporate Control;Corporate Performance;Organizational Structure;business economics

Board structures around the world: An experimental investigation

We model and experimentally examine the board structure-performance relationship. We examine single-tiered boards, two-tiered boards, insider-controlled boards, and outsider-controlled boards. We find that even insider-controlled boards frequently adopt institutionally preferred rather than self-interested policies. Two-tiered boards adopt institutionally preferred policies more frequently, but tend to destroy value by being too conservative, frequently rejecting good projects. Outsidercontrolled single-tiered boards, both when they have multiple insiders and only a single insider, adopt institutionally preferred policies most frequently. In those board designs where the efficient Nash equilibrium produces strictly higher payoffs to all agents than the coalition-proof equilibria, agents tend to select the efficient Nash equilibria.

CEO and Board Characteristics as Determinants of Private Benefits of Control: Evidence from the Russian Stock Exchange

This paper investigates whether and how various characteristics of CEOs and corporate boards are related to the severity of corporate governance problems within firms. The latter is proxied by private benefits of control, which we measure for dual class stock firms using the voting premium approach. Our empirical analysis is based on data from Russia and takes advantage of the extreme corporate governance problems in the country, considerable variation in corporate governance practices across firms and over time, and presence of a large and exogenously created (during the process of privatization) group of dual class stock companies. The data are assembled from the RTS, SKRIN and SPARK databases and include over 200 firms observed in 1997-2009, with over 1000 observations in total. Our econometric analysis suggests a quadratic relationship between private benefits of control and CEO ownership with a minimum at about 4% CEO ownership, a positive association between CEO tenure and private benefits, and a quadratic in CEO age with a dip in private benefits at about 52 years of age. There is also a quadratic relationship between private benefits of control and board size, implying the optimality of medium-sized (about 9-10 directors) boards. We find no gender effects on private benefits of control.CEO, corporate board, private benefits of control, dual-class stock firms, Russia

Corporate governance and Shariah compliance in institutions offering Islamic financial services

The structures and processes established within an institution offering Islamic financial Services (IIFS) for monitoring and evaluating Shariah compliance rely essentially on arrangements internal to the firm. By being incorporated in the institutional structure, a Shariah supervisory board (SSB) has the advantage of being close to the market. Competent, independent, and empowered to approve new Shariah-conforming instruments, an SSB can enable innovation likely to emerge within the institution. The paper reviews the issues and options facing current arrangements for ensuring Shariah compliance by IIFS. It suggests a framework that draws on internal and external arrangements to the firm and emphasizes market discipline. In issuing its fatwas, an SSB could be guided by standardized contracts and practices that could be harmonized by a self-regulatory professionals'association. A framework with the suggested internal and external features could ensure adequate consistency of interpretation and enhance the enforceability of contracts before civil courts. The review of transactions would mainly be entrusted to internal review units, which would collaborate with external auditors responsible for issuing an annual opinion on whether the institution's activities has met its Shariah requirements. This process would be sustained by reputable entities such as rating agencies, stock markets, financial media, and researchers who would channel signals to market players. This framework would enhance public understanding of the requirements of Shariah and lead to more effective options available to stakeholders to achieve improvements in Islamic financial services.Banks&Banking Reform,Corporate Law,National Governance,Non Bank Financial Institutions,Governance Indicators