4,276 research outputs found
Atheistic teleology
Wesley Salmon and Michael Martin argue that scientific considerations about the
order in the universe justify atheism. After sketching Salmonâs argument, I examine
the nature of begging the question and argue that Martin takes a sufficient condition
of that fallacy to be a necessary condition. After a pragmatic account to the fallacy
is recommended, I point out how Salmonâs and Martinâs beg the question against all
save those who already adhere to atheism and that the crucial considerations that
they take to be distinctly scientific are really extra-scientific considerations, giving
a specious impression that they are uncontroversial to all who accept mainstream
science
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Circles and analogies in public health reasoning
The study of the fallacies has changed almost beyond recognition since Charles Hamblin called for a radical reappraisal of this area of logical inquiry in his 1970 book Fallacies. The âwitless examples of his forbearsâ to which Hamblin referred have largely been replaced by more authentic cases of the fallacies in actual use. It is now not unusual for fallacy and argumentation theorists to draw on actual sources for examples of how the fallacies are used in our everyday reasoning. However, an aspect of this move towards greater authenticity in the study of the fallacies, an aspect which has been almost universally neglected, is the attempt to subject the fallacies to empirical testing of the type which is more commonly associated with psychological experiments on reasoning. This paper addresses this omission in research on the fallacies by examining how subjects use two fallacies â circular argument and analogical argument â during a reasoning task in which subjects are required to consider a number of public health scenarios. Results are discussed in relation to a view of the fallacies as cognitive heuristics that facilitate reasoning in a context of uncertainty
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Petitio principii: the case for non-fallaciousness
This paper presents a case for the non-fallaciousness of petitio principii in the context where the only evidence which can confirm the conclusion of an argument has a content which is identical to the content of the conclusion. The more usual rhetorical and dialectical frameworks for the analysis off allacies are challenged for what I describe as their proscriptive stance. As an alternative to proscription, I recommend an analysis of the context in which petitio arguments occur. Such an analysis, I argue, suggests the relaxation of a priority condition described by Waiton (1985) and the relevance to the present case of Sorensen's (1991) analysis ofthe non-circularity of certain 'P, therefore, P' arguments
Reasoning, Argumentation and Persuasion
In the paper I want to give a new account of notions of reasoning, argumentation, and persuasion. The aim of it is to resolve problems of the traditional accounts. The investigation uses the issue of circular reasoning (God exists, because there is God). These types of arguments are considered a fallacy in informal logic, whereas formal logic holds that they are valid. The new account suggests a possibility of reconciliation of the informal and formal perspective
Kantâs (Non-Question-Begging) Refutation of Cartesian Scepticism
Interpreters of Kantâs Refutation of Idealism face a dilemma: it seems to
either beg the question against the Cartesian sceptic or else offer a disappointingly
Berkeleyan conclusion. In this article I offer an interpretation
of the Refutation on which it does not beg the question against the
Cartesian sceptic. After defending a principle about question-begging, I
identify four premises concerning our representations that there are textual
reasons to think Kant might be implicitly assuming. Using those assumptions,
I offer a reconstruction of Kantâs Refutation that avoids the interpretative
dilemma, though difficult questions about the argument remain
Pathological Circularity: Deductive Validity and a Contextual Account of the Fallacy of Begging the Question
The purpose of this study is to provide an account of the fallaciousness of begging the question without thereby indicting as fallacious all otherwise acceptable deductively valid reasoning. The solution that we suggest exploits the intuition that all good arguments are weakly circular. The fallaciousness of begging the question is not that the reasoning is circular simpliciter. Rather, begging the question is a fallacy because the conclusion relies on an undischarged assumption that the audience cannot accept without further argumentation. In the face of such an argument the arguer might just as well have merely asserted the conclusion
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Emerging infectious diseases: coping with uncertainty
The worldâs scientific community must be in a state of constant readiness to address the threat posed by newly emerging infectious diseases. Whether the disease in question is SARS in humans or BSE in animals, scientists must be able to put into action various disease containment measures when everything from the causative pathogen to route(s) of transmission is essentially uncertain. A robust epistemic framework, which will inform decision-making, is required under such conditions of uncertainty. I will argue that this framework should have reasoning at its centre and, specifically, that forms of reasoning beyond deduction and induction should be countenanced by scientists who are confronted with emerging infectious diseases. In previous articles, I have presented a case for treating certain so-called traditional informal fallacies as rationally acceptable forms of argument that can facilitate scientific inquiry when little is known about an emerging disease. In this paper, I want to extend that analysis by highlighting the unique features of these arguments that makes them specially adapted to cope with conditions of uncertainty. Of course, such a view of the informal fallacies must at least be consistent with the reasoning practices of scientists, and particularly those scientists (viz. epidemiologists) whose task it is to track and respond to newly emerging infectious diseases. To this end, I draw upon examples of scientific reasoning from the UKâs BSE crisis, a crisis that posed a significant threat to both human and animal health
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