15,148 research outputs found
Bayesian Model of Behaviour in Economic Games
Classical game theoretic approaches that make strong rationality assumptions have difficulty modeling human behaviour in economic games. We investigate the role
of finite levels of iterated reasoning and non-selfish utility functions in a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process model that incorporates game theoretic notions
of interactivity. Our generative model captures a broad class of characteristic behaviours in a multi-round Investor-Trustee game. We invert the generative process
for a recognition model that is used to classify 200 subjects playing this game against randomly matched opponents
Object-Oriented Bayesian Networks for a Decision Support System
We study an economic decision problem where the actors are two rms and the Antitrust Authority whose main task is to monitor and prevent rms potential anti-competitive behaviour. The Antitrust Au- thority's decision process is modelled using a Bayesian network whose relational structure and parameters are estimated from data provided by the Authority itself. Several economic variables in uencing this de- cision process are included in the model. We analyse how monitoring by the Antitrust Authority aects rms cooperation strategies. These are modelled as a repeated prisoners dilemma using object-oriented Bayesian networks, thus enabling integration of rms decision process and external market information.Antitrust Authority, Bayesian networks, mergers, model integration, prisoners dilemma, repeated games.
Sequential Two-Player Games with Ambiguity
If players' beliefs are strictly non-additive, the Dempster-Shafer updating rule can be used to define beliefs off the equilibrium path. We define an equilibrium concept in sequential two-person games where players update their beliefs with the Dempster-Shafer updating rule. We show that in the limit as uncertainty tends to zero, our equilibrium approximates Bayesian Nash equilibrium by imposing context-dependent constraints on beliefs under uncertainty.
Learning in evolutionary environments
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A tree formulation for signaling games
We provide a detailed presentation and complete analysis of the sender/receiver Lewis signaling game using a game theory extensive form, decision tree formulation. The analysis employs well established game theory ideas and concepts. We establish the existence of four perfect Bayesian equilibria in this game. We explain which equilibrium is the most likely to prevail. Our explanation provides an essential step for understanding the formation of a language convention. Further, we discuss the informational content of such signals and calibrate a more detailed definition of a true (“correct”) signal in terms of the payoffs of the sender and the receiver
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