77,442 research outputs found

    Bandwagon or Barriers? The Role of Standards in the European and American Marketplace. Working Paper #1, November 1997

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    Industrial Standards - a highly technical and even obscure topic to many scholars and policy-makers - are crucial in shaping market access and conditions. They act as non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and may affect relations between governments and businesses. The paper examines the evolution of EU policy toward standards and evaluates recent efforts to foster greater cooperation between the EU and the US in reducing trade inhibiting of industrial standards

    Protection and trade in services : a survey

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    Until recently, trade in services was mostly ignored by iinternational economists, reflecting a perception that services were nontradable. This has never been true. Transportation and travel, for example, have always been important economic activities. In 1995, services trade climbed to a 20-percent share of global trade -no doubt an underestimate, as the most dynamic component of trade in services is telecommunications, which is not being properly captured in conventional balance of payment statistics. The authors survey the literature on trade in services, focusing on thepolicies used to restrict such trade, the gains from liberalization, and the institutional mechanisms adopted in pursuit of liberalization. They argue that technological progress (which makes services more tradable) and iinternational trade negotiations are likely to keep liberalization of trade in services a high-profile policy issue. They suggest that research focus on developing better estimates of the welfare costs of protectionism in the service sector. This will require quantifying barriers to the international exchange of services.Environmental Economics&Policies,Health Economics&Finance,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Economic Theory&Research,Decentralization,Health Economics&Finance,ICT Policy and Strategies,Knowledge Economy,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research

    Is America Exporting Misguided Telecommunications Policy? The U.S.-Japan Telecom Trade Negotiations and Beyond

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    Global telecommunications markets have traditionally been closed to foreign trade and investment. Recent World Trade Organization negotiations resulted in a Basic Telecommunications agreement that sought to construct a multilateral framework to reverse that trend and begin opening telecom markets worldwide. Regrettably, this new WTO framework is quite ambiguous and open to pro-regulatory interpretations by member states. In fact, during recent bilateral trade negotiations with Japan, U.S. government officials adopted the position that the new framework allowed them to demand that the Japanese government adopt very specific regulatory provisions regarding telecom network interconnection and pricing policies. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative argued that Japanese officials should require their domestic telecom providers to share their networks with rivals at a generously discounted price to encourage greater resale competition. Those interconnection and line-sharing rules were borrowed directly from the U.S. Telecommunications Act of 1996, a piece of legislation that remains the subject of intense debate within the United States. Good evidence now exists that those rules generally retard net-work investment and innovation by encouraging infrastructure sharing over facilities-based investment. Consequently, the USTR has generated resentment on the part of Japan and other trading partners as it has attempted to force them to adopt heavy-handed telecommunications mandates that have very little to do with legitimate free-trade policy. The USTR must discontinue efforts to impose American telecommunications regulations on other countries as part of free-trade negotiations and should instead focus on reforming or eliminating the most serious barriers to foreign direct investment both here and abroad

    Infrastructure investment in network industries: The role of incentive regulation and regulatory independence

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    This paper finds that coherent regulatory policies can boost investment in network industries of OECD economies. Rate-of-return regulation is generally thought to result in overinvestment, while incentive regulation is believed to entail underinvestment. Yet, previous empirical work has generally found that the introduction of incentive regulation has not systematically changed investment in network industries. According to the theoretical literature, regulatory uncertainty exposes both types of regimes to the danger of underinvestment. However, regulatory uncertainty is arguably higher under rate-of-return regulation because investment decisions (what can be included in the rate base) are usually evaluated in a discretionary manner, while firms operating under incentive regulation are less affected by this behaviour. In addition, incentive regulation encourages investment in cost-reducing technologies. Using Bayesian model averaging techniques, this paper shows that incentive regulation implemented jointly with an independent sector regulator (indicating lower regulatory uncertainty) has a strong positive impact on investment in network industries. In addition, lower barriers to entry are also found to encourage sectoral investment. These results support the importance of implementing policies in a coherent framework.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/64379/1/wp956.pd
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