28,475 research outputs found
Coordination and Bargaining over the Gaussian Interference Channel
This work considers coordination and bargaining between two selfish users
over a Gaussian interference channel using game theory. The usual information
theoretic approach assumes full cooperation among users for codebook and rate
selection. In the scenario investigated here, each selfish user is willing to
coordinate its actions only when an incentive exists and benefits of
cooperation are fairly allocated. To improve communication rates, the two users
are allowed to negotiate for the use of a simple Han-Kobayashi type scheme with
fixed power split and conditions for which users have incentives to cooperate
are identified. The Nash bargaining solution (NBS) is used as a tool to get
fair information rates. The operating point is obtained as a result of an
optimization problem and compared with a TDM-based one in the literature.Comment: 5 pages, 4 figures, to appear in Proceedings of IEEE ISIT201
Alternating-Offer Bargaining Games over the Gaussian Interference Channel
This paper tackles the problem of how two selfish users jointly determine the
operating point in the achievable rate region of a two-user Gaussian
interference channel through bargaining. In previous work, incentive conditions
for two users to cooperate using a simple version of Han-Kobayashi scheme was
studied and the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) was used to obtain a fair
operating point. Here a noncooperative bargaining game of alternating offers is
adopted to model the bargaining process and rates resulting from the
equilibrium outcome are analyzed. In particular, it is shown that the operating
point resulting from the formulated bargaining game depends on the cost of
delay in bargaining and how bargaining proceeds. If the associated bargaining
problem is regular, a unique perfect equilibrium exists and lies on the
individual rational efficient frontier of the achievable rate region. Besides,
the equilibrium outcome approaches the NBS if the bargaining costs of both
users are negligible.Comment: 8 pages, 6 figures, to appear in Proceedings of Forty-Eighth Annual
Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computin
A Game-Theoretic View of the Interference Channel: Impact of Coordination and Bargaining
This work considers coordination and bargaining between two selfish users
over a Gaussian interference channel. The usual information theoretic approach
assumes full cooperation among users for codebook and rate selection. In the
scenario investigated here, each user is willing to coordinate its actions only
when an incentive exists and benefits of cooperation are fairly allocated. The
users are first allowed to negotiate for the use of a simple Han-Kobayashi type
scheme with fixed power split. Conditions for which users have incentives to
cooperate are identified. Then, two different approaches are used to solve the
associated bargaining problem. First, the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) is
used as a tool to get fair information rates and the operating point is
obtained as a result of an optimization problem. Next, a dynamic
alternating-offer bargaining game (AOBG) from bargaining theory is introduced
to model the bargaining process and the rates resulting from negotiation are
characterized. The relationship between the NBS and the equilibrium outcome of
the AOBG is studied and factors that may affect the bargaining outcome are
discussed. Finally, under certain high signal-to-noise ratio regimes, the
bargaining problem for the generalized degrees of freedom is studied.Comment: 43 pages, 11 figures, to appear on Special Issue of the IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory on Interference Networks, 201
Price-Based Resource Allocation for Spectrum-Sharing Femtocell Networks: A Stackelberg Game Approach
This paper investigates the price-based resource allocation strategies for
the uplink transmission of a spectrum-sharing femtocell network, in which a
central macrocell is underlaid with distributed femtocells, all operating over
the same frequency band as the macrocell. Assuming that the macrocell base
station (MBS) protects itself by pricing the interference from the femtocell
users, a Stackelberg game is formulated to study the joint utility maximization
of the macrocell and the femtocells subject to a maximum tolerable interference
power constraint at the MBS. Especially, two practical femtocell channel
models: sparsely deployed scenario for rural areas and densely deployed
scenario for urban areas, are investigated. For each scenario, two pricing
schemes: uniform pricing and non-uniform pricing, are proposed. Then, the
Stackelberg equilibriums for these proposed games are studied, and an effective
distributed interference price bargaining algorithm with guaranteed convergence
is proposed for the uniform-pricing case. Finally, numerical examples are
presented to verify the proposed studies. It is shown that the proposed
algorithms are effective in resource allocation and macrocell protection
requiring minimal network overhead for spectrum-sharing-based two-tier
femtocell networks.Comment: 27 pages, 7 figures, Submitted to JSA
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