Persistence of discrimination: revisiting Axtell, Epstein and Young

We reformulate an earlier model of the "Emergence of classes..." proposed by Axtell etal. using more elaborate cognitive processes allowing a statistical physics approach. The thorough analysis of the phase space and of the basins of attraction leads to a reconsideration of the previous social interpretations: our model predicts the reinforcement of discrimination biases and their long term stability rather than the emergence of classes.Comment: 21 pages, 7 figure

HySIM: A Hybrid Spectrum and Information Market for TV White Space Networks

We propose a hybrid spectrum and information market for a database-assisted TV white space network, where the geo-location database serves as both a spectrum market platform and an information market platform. We study the inter- actions among the database operator, the spectrum licensee, and unlicensed users systematically, using a three-layer hierarchical model. In Layer I, the database and the licensee negotiate the commission fee that the licensee pays for using the spectrum market platform. In Layer II, the database and the licensee compete for selling information or channels to unlicensed users. In Layer III, unlicensed users determine whether they should buy the exclusive usage right of licensed channels from the licensee, or the information regarding unlicensed channels from the database. Analyzing such a three-layer model is challenging due to the co-existence of both positive and negative network externalities in the information market. We characterize how the network externalities affect the equilibrium behaviours of all parties involved. Our numerical results show that the proposed hybrid market can improve the network profit up to 87%, compared with a pure information market. Meanwhile, the achieved network profit is very close to the coordinated benchmark solution (the gap is less than 4% in our simulation).Comment: This manuscript serves as the online technical report of the article published in IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM), 201

Institutions and Inequality in Liberalizing Markets: Explaining Different Trajectories of Institutional Change in Social Europe

Economic and Social Research Council [grant number RES-061-25-0444]

Evolutionary Dynamics of the Market Equilibrium with Division of Labor∗

Recently, a growing literature, known as the new classical economics, attempts to resurrect the classical economic thoughts on division of labor within an analytical framework inherited from neoclassical economics. The paper inspects the feasibility of this approach and finds that the current analytical framework of the new classical economics is not able to spell out how individuals’ decisions on specialization are coordinated and how division of labor is realized in a large and decentralized economy. Evolutionary dynamics are then introduced into the existing models. Using a simple economy for example, the paper shows that the equilibrium network of division of labor predicted by the new classical economics is supported by evolutionary stability and can be realized by the outcome of evolutionary processes, such as Replicator Dynamics. Mutation is important in the realization of division of labor since it provides an approach for the economy to escape from an initial state of autarky. The study implies that the inherent evolutionary process of the market constructs an “invisible hand”, which can spontaneously coordinate self-interested individuals’ decentralized decisions on specialization to discover an efficient order of division of labor in a large economy.division of labor, evolutionarily stable strategy, replicator dynamics, mutation