Advances in negotiation theory : bargaining, coalitions, and fairness

Bargaining is ubiquitous in real life. It is a major dimension of political and business activities. It appears at the international level, when governments negotiate on matters ranging from economic issues (such as the removal of trade barriers), to global security (such as fighting against terrorism) to environmental and related issues (such as climate change control). What factors determinethe outcomes of such negotiations? What strategies can help reach an agreement? How should the parties involved divide the gains from cooperation? With whom will one make alliances? The authors address these questions by focusing on a noncooperative approach to negotiations, which is particularly relevant for the study of international negotiations. By reviewing noncooperative bargaining theory, noncooperative coalition theory, and the theory of fair division, they try to identify the connections among these different facets of the same problem in an attempt to facilitate progress toward a unified framework.Economic Theory&Research,Social Protections&Assistance,Environmental Economics&Policies,Scientific Research&Science Parks,Science Education

Advances in Negotiation Theory: Bargaining, Coalitions and Fairness

Bargaining is ubiquitous in real-life. It is a major dimension of political and business activities. It appears at the international level, when governments negotiate on matters ranging from economic issues (such as the removal of trade barriers), to global security (such as fighting against terrorism) to environmental and related issues (e.g. climate change control). What factors determine the outcome of negotiations such as those mentioned above? What strategies can help reach an agreement? How should the parties involved divide the gains from cooperation? With whom will one make alliances? This paper addresses these questions by focusing on a non-cooperative approach to negotiations, which is particularly relevant for the study of international negotiations. By reviewing noncooperative bargaining theory, non-cooperative coalition theory, and the theory of fair division, this paper will try to identify the connection among these different facets of the same problem in an attempt to facilitate the progress towards a unified framework.Negotiation theory, Bragaining, Coalitions, Fairness, Agreements

Generating Pareto-Optimal Offers in Bilateral Automated Negotiation with One-Side Uncertain Importance Weights

Pareto efficiency is a seminal condition in the bargaining problem which leads autonomous agents to a Nash-equilibrium. This paper investigates the problem of the generating Pareto-optimal offers in bilateral multi-issues negotiation where an agent has incomplete information and the other one has perfect information. To this end, at first, the bilateral negotiation is modeled by split the pie game and alternating-offer protocol. Then, the properties of the Pareto-optimal offers are investigated. Finally, based on properties of the Pareto-optimal offers, an algorithmic solution for generating near-optimal offers with incomplete information is presented. The agent with incomplete information generates near-optimal offers in O(n łog n). The results indicate that, in the early rounds of the negotiation, the agent with incomplete information can generate near-optimal offers, but as time passes the agent can learn its opponents preferences and generate Pareto-optimal offers. The empirical analysis also indicates that the proposed algorithm outperform the smart random trade-offs (SRT) algorithm

Advances in Negotiation Theory: Bargaining, Coalitions and Fairness

Bargaining is ubiquitous in real-life. It is a major dimension of political and business activities. It appears at the international level, when governments negotiate on matters ranging from economic issues (such as the removal of trade barriers), to global security (such as fighting against terrorism) to environmental and related issues (e.g. climate change control). What factors determine the outcome of negotiations such as those mentioned above? What strategies can help reach an agreement? How should the parties involved divide the gains from cooperation? With whom will one make alliances? This paper addresses these questions by focusing on a non-cooperative approach to negotiations, which is particularly relevant for the study of international negotiations. By reviewing non-cooperative bargaining theory, non-cooperative coalition theory, and the theory of fair division, this paper will try to identify the connection among these different facets of the same problem in an attempt to facilitate the progress towards a unified framework.Negotiation theory, Bargaining, Coalitions, Fairness, Agreements

Modified bargaining protocols for automated negotiation in open multi-agent systems

Current research in multi-agent systems (MAS) has advanced to the development of open MAS, which are characterized by the heterogeneity of agents, free exit/entry and decentralized control. Conflicts of interest among agents are inevitable, and hence automated negotiation to resolve them is one of the promising solutions. This thesis studies three modifications on alternating-offer bargaining protocols for automated negotiation in open MAS. The long-term goal of this research is to design negotiation protocols which can be easily used by intelligent agents in accommodating their need in resolving their conflicts. In particular, we propose three modifications: allowing non-monotonic offers during the bargaining (non-monotonic-offers bargaining protocol), allowing strategic delay (delay-based bargaining protocol), and allowing strategic ignorance to augment argumentation when the bargaining comprises argumentation (ignorance-based argumentation-based negotiation protocol). Utility theory and decision-theoretic approaches are used in the theoretical analysis part, with an aim to prove the benefit of these three modifications in negotiation among myopic agents under uncertainty. Empirical studies by means of computer simulation are conducted in analyzing the cost and benefit of these modifications. Social agents, who use common human bargaining strategies, are the subjects of the simulation. In general, we assume that agents are bounded rational with various degrees of belief and trust toward their opponents. In particular in the study of the non-monotonic-offers bargaining protocol, we assume that our agents have diminishing surplus. We further assume that our agents have increasing surplus in the study of delay-based bargaining protocol. And in the study of ignorance-based argumentation-based negotiation protocol, we assume that agents may have different knowledge and use different ontologies and reasoning engines. Through theoretical analysis under various settings, we show the benefit of allowing these modifications in terms of agents’ expected surplus. And through simulation, we show the benefit of allowing these modifications in terms of social welfare (total surplus). Several implementation issues are then discussed, and their potential solutions in terms of some additional policies are proposed. Finally, we also suggest some future work which can potentially improve the reliability of these modifications

Advances in Negotiation Theory: Bargaining, Coalitions and Fairness

Published also in World Bank Working Paper 364

Simulation of automated negotiation

Durch die Automatisierung von Verhandlungen sollen bessere Verhandlungsergebnisse erzielt werden können als bei Verhandlungen zwischen Menschen und neue Koordinationsformen für autonome Agentensysteme ermöglicht werden. Diese Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Simulation solcher Systeme für automatisierte Verhandlungen, da operative Systeme zur Zeit noch nicht verfügbar sind. Die Arbeit basiert auf einer Erhebung und Diskussion der aktuellen Literatur im Bereich der Simulation automatisierter Verhandlungen. Existierende Ansätze weisen einige Unzulänglichkeiten bezüglich deren praktischer Umsetzbarkeit in einer offenen Umgebung wie dem Internet auf, wo automatisierte Verhandlungen nicht nur sehr schnell durchgeführt werden sondern sich auch Software-Agenten und Verhandlungsprobleme ändern können. Diese Defizite thematisierend werden Verhandlungssysteme für automatisierte Verhandlungen vorgeschlagen. Diese bestehen zum einen aus Software-Agenten, die generische Angebots- und Konzessionsstratgien verfolgen, zum anderen aus Interaktionsprotokollen, die es Agenten erlauben ihre Strategien vorübergehend oder permanent auszusetzen. Ergebnisse der Simulation dieser Systeme, mit Verhandlungsproblemen aus Verhandlungsexperimenten mit menschlichen Probanden als Input, werden für unterschiedliche Ergebnisdimensionen -- Übereinkunftshäufigkeit, Fairness, individuelle und kollektive Effizienz -- zwischen Systemen und auch mit den Ergebnissen der Experimente verglichen. Trotz fundamentaler Zielkonflikte zwischen den einzelnen Ergebnisdimensionen erzielen einige Systeme konsistent bessere Ergebnisse sowohl im Systemvergleich als auch verglichen mit den Ergebnissen der Experimente. Diese Systeme bestehen aus Software-Agenten die systematisch Angebote mit monoton abnehmendem Nutzen unterbreiten und erste Konzessionensschritte tätigen solange der Opponent bisherige Konzessionen erwidert hat. Das verwendete Interaktionsprotokoll zeichnet sich dadurch aus, dass es den Agenten erlaubt ungünstige Angebote zurückzuweisen und damit neue Angebote des Opponenten einzufordern, durch diese Unterbrechung der eigenen Angebotsstrategie können ungünstige Verhandlungsergebnisse vermieden werden.Automated negotiation is argued to improve negotiation outcomes by replacing humans and to enable coordination in autonomous systems. As operative systems do not yet exist scholars rely on simulations to evaluate potential systems for automated negotiation. This dissertation reviews the state of the art literature on simulation of automated negotiation along its main components - negotiation problem, interaction protocol, and software agents. Deficiencies of existing approaches concerning the practical application in an open environment as the Internet - where automated negotiation proceeds fast, with changing opponents, and for various negotiation problems - are identified. To address these deficiencies we develop and simulate automated negotiation systems, consisting of software agents that follow generic offer generation and concession strategies and protocols that allow these agents to interrupt their strategy to avoid exploitation and unfavorable agreements. Outcomes of simulation runs are compared across systems and to human negotiation along various outcome dimensions - proportion of agreements, dyadic and individual performance, and fairness - for various negotiation problems derived from negotiation experiments with human subjects. Though there exist trade-offs between the different outcome dimensions, systems consisting of software agents, that systematically propose offers of monotonically decreasing utility and make first concession steps if the opponent reciprocated previous concessions, and an interaction protocol that enables to reject unfavorable offers - without immediately aborting negotiations - in order to elicit new offers from the opponent, performed best. These systems performed very well in all outcome dimensions when compared with other systems and were the only that outperformed negotiation between humans in all dimensions