Bargaining Between Goals

This report describes research done at the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Support for the laboratory's artificial intelligence research is provided in part by the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense under Office of Naval Research contract N00014-70-A-0362-0003.Bargaining is a process used to modify conflicting demands on an expendable resource so that a satisfactory allocation can be made. In this paper, I consider the design of a bargaining system to handle the problem of scheduling an individual's weekly activities and appointments. The bargaining system is based on the powerful reasoning strategy of producing a simplified linear plan by considering the various constraints independently and then debugging the resulting conflicts.MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory Department of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agenc

The provision of quality in a bilateral search market

We accomplish two goals. First, we provide a non-cooperative foundation for the use of the Nash bargaining solution in search markets. This finding should help to close the rift between the search and the matching-and-bargaining literature. Second, we establish that the diversity of quality offered (at an increasing price-quality ratio) in a decentralized market is an equilibrium phenomenon -even in the limit as search frictions disappear.quality dispersion, Nash Program, bilateral search.

The provision of quality in a bilateral search market

We accomplish two goals. First, we provide a non-cooperative foundation for the use of the Nash bargaining solution in search markets. This finding should help to close the rift between the search and the matching-and-bargaining literature. Second, we establish that the diversity of quality offered (at an increasing price-quality ratio) in a decentralized market is an equilibrium phenomenon - even in the limit as search frictions disappear.quality dispersion, Nash Program, bilateral search

Managing Internal Tensions in Contract Negotiations: A Perspective from the Academic Union’s Side

Academic collective bargaining, like all collective bargaining, presupposes conflicts between goals of the administration and the academic union. The represented parties on both sides, as well as the general public, typically perceive conflicts in collective bargaining in that way. However, both the administration’s and union’s bargaining teams must substantially resolve internal conflicts among the teams‘ own represented parties before the teams can hope to achieve an acceptable collective-bargaining agreement (i.e., a binding contract). After briefly addressing the very real strengths of academic unions in collective bargaining, we will at greater length explain the origin, nature, and usually imperfect resolution of conflicts arising within an academic union

The provision of quality in a bilateral search market

We accomplish two goals. First, we provide a non-cooperative foundation for the use of the Nash bargaining solution in search markets. This finding should help to close the rift between the search and the matching-and-bargaining literature. Second, we establish that the diversity of quality offered (at an increasing price-quality ratio) in a decentralized market is an equilibrium phenomenon - even in the limit as search frictions disappear

The Goals and Assumptions of Conflict Management in Organizations

[Excerpt] This chapter examines how different goals and assumptions about conflict in organizations shape perspectives on managing conflict and resolving disputes. Four frames of reference are described: the neoliberal egoist perspective emphasizing the operation of the free market as the ideal method of resolving conflict; the critical perspective emphasizing broad societal divisions between labor and capital as the source of conflict; the unitarist perspective viewing conflict as primarily a function of interpersonal differences and organizational dysfunction, which can be remedied by improved managerial practice; and the pluralist perspective emphasizing the mixture of common and competing interests in the employment relationship, which requires institutional interventions to remedy the inequality of bargaining power that produces conflict. The pluralist perspective may best balance the often competing goals of efficiency, equity, and voice. It is described further in this chapter together with its implications for the design of dispute resolution procedures and conflict management systems

State of Iowa Employee Handbook, Revised October 2003

I hope you will find a great deal of challenge and personal satisfaction in your employment with the State. You have an important role in accomplishing the goals of your department and of state government. The State has a proud tradition built on the excellence of its employees and their work. We challenge you to help maintain and improve upon this tradition. You soon will discover that our pride is contagious! As a state employee, it is very important that you always present the best possible image to the public. Remember to act promptly, be courteous, and treat people, our customers, respectfully. Your actions will make a lasting impression .... be sure it is a positive one. This is your employee handbook. This information is based on Iowa Department of Administrative Services – Human Resources Enterprise (DAS-HRE) rules and policies. Much of the information in this handbook is also covered in the State’s collective bargaining agreements. Where there are differences between a collective bargaining agreement and this handbook, the collective bargaining agreement prevails for employees covered by the agreement. Where there are differences between this handbook and DAS-HRE rules and policies, DAS-HRE rules and policies prevail. Some of the employee benefit plans described in this handbook are subject to legal requirements concerning reporting and disclosure. This handbook contains highlights of those plans. For complete details about benefit plans, consult the benefit handbooks and the official plan documents. In case of any discrepancy, the official plan documents prevail. Of course, changes in laws may affect the benefit programs described in this handbook. The State of Iowa reserves the right to amend the contents of this handbook at any time without prior notice. The provisions of this handbook and other policies do not establish contractual rights or conditions of employment between the State and its employees

The Propriety of Section 10(j) Bargaining Orders in \u3cem\u3eGissel\u3c/em\u3e Situations

The courts have split on the question of whether a bargaining order constitutes \u27\u27just and proper relief under section 10(j). This Note contends that such an order is always just in a Gissel situation but that a district court may properly issue one only in situations where the Board\u27s prior decisions clearly establish the relevant labor policy and indicate a high probability that the Board will eventually issue a Gissel bargaining order. Part I of the Note develops the criteria relevant to determining what kind of temporary relief is just. Although section 10(j) does not itself define these criteria, the courts may tum to the goals of the LMRA for assistance. Part I relies on these goals to conclude that a court should issue an appropriate section 10(j) order if a union would otherwise suffer irreparable injury between the time an employer commits unfair labor practices and the time the Board adjudicates those practices. Part II applies this principle and concludes that the section 10(j) bargaining order is always just and sometimes proper in Gissel situations. The order is just because it prevents the affected union from suffering irreparable injury while imposing only remediable side effects on other parties. The order is proper only where clearly established labor policy indicates a high probability that the Board will subsequently issue a Gissel bargaining order

National Development and the Fight over Black Gold: U.S. Perspectives on the Argentine Oil Industry 1946-1955

The paper summarizes the relationship between the U.S. and Argentina in the immediate post WWII period focusing on both nations aims in developing Argentina’s oil industry. It is a comparison on the intension of negotiations between the two nations focusing on bargaining strategies and ultimate goals of what developing an industry can mean to multiple actors on an international stage

Working Paper 125 - China and Africa: An Emerging Partnership for Development? - An Overview of Issues

China’s phenomenal growth offers an opportunity to boost development in African countries. Moreover, China’s loans and concessional assistance financed a wide range of development projects. China also is reaping significant benefits from this relationship, through access to raw materials, expanded markets for exports of manufactures, the establishment of investment relationships which could generate significant profits over time and diplomatic influence. But leadership from African governments, particularly to strengthen domestic policies and governance and to harmonize regional policies so as to improve the continent’s bargaining position with China, are required to ensure that the China-Africa relationship contributes to sustainable growth and poverty reduction. The twin goals of this paper are to summarizes the analysis on the economic exchange between China and Africa, and to outline policy recommendations to improve the benefits to both parties.