87 research outputs found
Axiomatizations Of Symmetrically Weighted Solutions
If the excesses of the coalitions in a transferable utility game are weighted, then we show that the arising weighted modifications of the well-known (pre)nucleolus and (pre)kernel satisfy the equal treatment property if and only if the weight system is symmetric in the sense that the weight of a subcoalition of a grand coalition may only depend on the grand coalition and the size of the subcoalition. Hence, the symmetrically weighted versions of the (pre)nucleolus and the (pre)kernel are symmetric, i.e., invariant under symmetries of a game. They may, however, violate anonymity, i.e., they may depend on the names of the players. E.g., a symmetrically weighted nucleolus may assign the classical nucleolus to one game and the per capita nucleolus to another game. We generalize Sobolevâs axiomatization of the prenucleolus and its modification for the nucleolus as well as Pelegâs axiomatization of the prekernel to the symmetrically weighted versions. Only the reduced games have to be replaced by suitably modified reduced games whose definitions may depend on the weight system. Moreover, it is shown that a solution may only satisfy the mentioned sets of modified axioms if the weight system is symmetric
Allocation of fixed costs and the weighted Shapley value
The weighted value was introduced by Shapley in 1953 as an asymmetric version of his value. Since then several approximations have been proposed including one by Shapley in 1981 specifically addressed to cost allocation, a context in which weights appear naturally. It was at the occasion of a comment in which he only stated the axioms. The present paper offers a proof of Shapley's statement as well as an alternative set of axioms. It is shown that the value is the unique rule that allocates additional fixed costs fairly: only the players who are concerned contribute to the fixed cost and they contribute in proportion to their weights. A particular attention is given to the case where some players are assigned a zero weight.cost allocation, Shapley value, fixed cost
Allocation of fixed costs: characterization of the (dual) weighted Shapley value.
The weighted value was introduced by Shapley in 1953 as an asymmetric version of his value. Since then several axiomatizations have been proposed including one by Shapley in 1981 specifically addressed to cost allocation, a context in which weights appear naturally. It was at the occasion of a comment in which he only stated the axioms. The present paper offers a proof of Shapley's statement as well as an alternative set of axioms. It is shown that the value is the unique rule that allocates additional fixed costs fairly: only the players who are concerned contribute to the fixed cost and they contribute in proportion to their weights. A particular attention is given to the case where some players are assigned a zero weight.cost allocation, Shapley value, fixed cost.
Monotonicity and Weighted Prenucleoli: A Characterization Without Consistency
A solution on a set of transferable utility (TU) games satisfies strong aggregate monotonicity (SAM) if every player can improve when the grand coalition becomes richer. It satisfies equal surplus division (ESD) if the solution allows the players to improve equally. We show that the set of weight systems generating weighted prenucleoli that satisfy SAM is open, which implies that for weight systems close enough to any regular system, the weighted prenucleolus satisfies SAM (...
The Incorrect Usage of Propositional Logic in Game Theory: The Case of Disproving Oneself
Recently, we had to realize that more and more game theoretical articles have
been published in peer-reviewed journals with severe logical deficiencies. In
particular, we observed that the indirect proof was not applied correctly.
These authors confuse between statements of propositional logic. They apply an
indirect proof while assuming a prerequisite in order to get a contradiction.
For instance, to find out that "if A then B" is valid, they suppose that the
assumptions "A and not B" are valid to derive a contradiction in order to
deduce "if A then B". Hence, they want to establish the equivalent proposition
"A and not B implies A and not A" to conclude that "if A then B" is valid. In
fact, they prove that a truth implies a falsehood, which is a wrong statement.
As a consequence, "if A then B" is invalid, disproving their own results. We
present and discuss some selected cases from the literature with severe logical
flaws, invalidating the articles.Comment: 16 pages, 2 table
Weighted nucleoli and dually essential coalitions
We consider linearly weighted versions of the least core and the (pre)nuceolus and
investigate the reduction possibilities in their computation. We slightly extend some
well-known related results and establish their counterparts by using the dual game.
Our main results imply, for example, that if the core of the game is not empty, all
dually inessential coalitions (which can be weakly minorized by a partition in the dual
game) can be ignored when we compute the per-capita least core and the per-capita
(pre)nucleolus from the dual game. This could lead to the design of polynomial time
algorithms for the per-capita (and other monotone nondecreasingly weighted versions
of the) least core and the (pre)nucleolus in specific classes of balanced games with
polynomial many dually essential coalitions
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