Avoiding Wireheading with Value Reinforcement Learning

How can we design good goals for arbitrarily intelligent agents? Reinforcement learning (RL) is a natural approach. Unfortunately, RL does not work well for generally intelligent agents, as RL agents are incentivised to shortcut the reward sensor for maximum reward -- the so-called wireheading problem. In this paper we suggest an alternative to RL called value reinforcement learning (VRL). In VRL, agents use the reward signal to learn a utility function. The VRL setup allows us to remove the incentive to wirehead by placing a constraint on the agent's actions. The constraint is defined in terms of the agent's belief distributions, and does not require an explicit specification of which actions constitute wireheading.Comment: Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) 201

Emergence of Addictive Behaviors in Reinforcement Learning Agents

This paper presents a novel approach to the technical analysis of wireheading in intelligent agents. Inspired by the natural analogues of wireheading and their prevalent manifestations, we propose the modeling of such phenomenon in Reinforcement Learning (RL) agents as psychological disorders. In a preliminary step towards evaluating this proposal, we study the feasibility and dynamics of emergent addictive policies in Q-learning agents in the tractable environment of the game of Snake. We consider a slightly modified settings for this game, in which the environment provides a "drug" seed alongside the original "healthy" seed for the consumption of the snake. We adopt and extend an RL-based model of natural addiction to Q-learning agents in this settings, and derive sufficient parametric conditions for the emergence of addictive behaviors in such agents. Furthermore, we evaluate our theoretical analysis with three sets of simulation-based experiments. The results demonstrate the feasibility of addictive wireheading in RL agents, and provide promising venues of further research on the psychopathological modeling of complex AI safety problems

Self-Modification of Policy and Utility Function in Rational Agents

Any agent that is part of the environment it interacts with and has versatile actuators (such as arms and fingers), will in principle have the ability to self-modify -- for example by changing its own source code. As we continue to create more and more intelligent agents, chances increase that they will learn about this ability. The question is: will they want to use it? For example, highly intelligent systems may find ways to change their goals to something more easily achievable, thereby `escaping' the control of their designers. In an important paper, Omohundro (2008) argued that goal preservation is a fundamental drive of any intelligent system, since a goal is more likely to be achieved if future versions of the agent strive towards the same goal. In this paper, we formalise this argument in general reinforcement learning, and explore situations where it fails. Our conclusion is that the self-modification possibility is harmless if and only if the value function of the agent anticipates the consequences of self-modifications and use the current utility function when evaluating the future.Comment: Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) 201

Personal Universes: A Solution to the Multi-Agent Value Alignment Problem

AI Safety researchers attempting to align values of highly capable intelligent systems with those of humanity face a number of challenges including personal value extraction, multi-agent value merger and finally in-silico encoding. State-of-the-art research in value alignment shows difficulties in every stage in this process, but merger of incompatible preferences is a particularly difficult challenge to overcome. In this paper we assume that the value extraction problem will be solved and propose a possible way to implement an AI solution which optimally aligns with individual preferences of each user. We conclude by analyzing benefits and limitations of the proposed approach