2,609 research outputs found
A Stackelberg Game for Multi-Period Demand Response Management in the Smart Grid
This paper studies a multi-period demand response management problem in the
smart grid where multiple utility companies compete among themselves. The
user-utility interactions are modeled by a noncooperative game of a Stackelberg
type where the interactions among the utility companies are captured through a
Nash equilibrium. It is shown that this game has a unique Stackelberg
equilibrium at which the utility companies set prices to maximize their
revenues (within a Nash game) while the users respond accordingly to maximize
their utilities subject to their budget constraints. Closed-form expressions
are provided for the corresponding strategies of the users and the utility
companies. It is shown that the multi- period scheme, compared with the
single-period case, provides more incentives for the users to participate in
the game. A necessary and sufficient condition on the minimum budget needed for
a user to participate is provided.Comment: Accepted for Proc. 54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Contro
Load Shifting in the Smart Grid: To Participate or Not?
Demand-side management (DSM) has emerged as an important smart grid feature
that allows utility companies to maintain desirable grid loads. However, the
success of DSM is contingent on active customer participation. Indeed, most
existing DSM studies are based on game-theoretic models that assume customers
will act rationally and will voluntarily participate in DSM. In contrast, in
this paper, the impact of customers' subjective behavior on each other's DSM
decisions is explicitly accounted for. In particular, a noncooperative game is
formulated between grid customers in which each customer can decide on whether
to participate in DSM or not. In this game, customers seek to minimize a cost
function that reflects their total payment for electricity. Unlike classical
game-theoretic DSM studies which assume that customers are rational in their
decision-making, a novel approach is proposed, based on the framework of
prospect theory (PT), to explicitly incorporate the impact of customer behavior
on DSM decisions. To solve the proposed game under both conventional game
theory and PT, a new algorithm based on fictitious player is proposed using
which the game will reach an epsilon-mixed Nash equilibrium. Simulation results
assess the impact of customer behavior on demand-side management. In
particular, the overall participation level and grid load can depend
significantly on the rationality level of the players and their risk aversion
tendency.Comment: 9 pages, 7 figures, journal, accepte
- …