The HIRM+ Flight Dynamics Model

The major objective of the GARTEUR Action Group on Analysis Techniques for Clearance of Flight Control Laws FM(AG-11) is the improvement of the flight clearance process by increased automation of the tools used for modelbased analysis of the aircraft’s dynamical behaviour. What is finally needed are techniques for faster detection of the worst case combination of parameter values and manoeuvre cases, from which the flight clearance restrictions are be derived. The basis for such an analysis are accurate mathematical models of the controlled aircraft. In this chapter the HIRM+ flight dynamics model is described as one of the benchmark military aircraft models used within FM(AG-11). HIRM+ originates from the HIRM (High Incidence Research Model) developed within the GARTEUR Action Group on Robust Flight Control M(AG-08). In building the HIRM+, additional emphasis has been put on realistic modelling of parametric uncertainties

Don’t drone?:negotiating ethics of RPAS in emergency response

This paper explores discourses of automation as a key ethical concern in the development of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems for disaster response. We discuss problems arising from ‘humanistic’ dichotomies that pit human against machine, military against civil uses and experts against laypersons. We explore how it may be possible to overcome human-technology dichotomies

The future of UAS: standards, regulations, and operational experiences [workshop report]

This paper presents the outcomes of "The Future of UAS: Standards, Regulations and Operational Experiences" workshop, held on the 7th and 8th of December, 2006 in Brisbane, Queensland, Australia. The goal of the workshop was to identify recent international activities in the Unmanned Airborne Systems (UAS) airspace integration problem. The workshop attracted a broad cross-section of the UAS community, including: airspace and safety regulators, developers, operators and researchers. The three themes of discussion were: progress in the development of standards and regulations, lessons learnt from recent operations, and advances in new technologies. This paper summarises the activities of the workshop and explores the important outcomes and trends as perceived by the authors

The Factory of the Future

A brief history of aircraft production techniques is given. A flexible machining cell is then described. It is a computer controlled system capable of performing 4-axis machining part cleaning, dimensional inspection and materials handling functions in an unmanned environment. The cell was designed to: allow processing of similar and dissimilar parts in random order without disrupting production; allow serial (one-shipset-at-a-time) manufacturing; reduce work-in-process inventory; maximize machine utilization through remote set-up; maximize throughput and minimize labor

AUTONOMOUS MANEUVERING: A DEFENSE ADVANTAGE FOR AFSOC AIRCRAFT

The U.S. military continues to operate in increasingly complex security environments and can no longer expect uncontested or dominant superiority in every domain. Aircraft operated by special operations forces (SOF) need improved defensive capabilities to support missions in non-permissive environments. Integrating automation and human-machine teaming into existing defensive capabilities may reduce threat reaction time and increase the effectiveness of defensive maneuvers in manned and unmanned aircraft configurations. This thesis examines the value of aircraft maneuvering as part of a threat reaction to identify situations where human intervention negatively affects timing and accuracy. It also considers opportunities to replicate Merlin Labs' approach to flight automation and incorporate a machine-trained system capable of performing defensive maneuvers into existing aircraft. The analysis indicates aircraft maneuvering is critical to an effective threat reaction, and automating select operator actions can increase survivability against certain surface-to-air threats. This thesis recommends a renewed focus on defensive capabilities for SOF aircraft and endorses integrating onboard autonomous systems into traditionally manned platforms to improve defensive threat reactions. It also advocates for continued research into the use of optionally manned aircraft in SOF missions to refine their operational utility and expand capabilities across a variety of mission platforms.Major, United States Air ForceMajor, United States Air ForceApproved for public release. Distribution is unlimited

Some Personal Recollections of Army Operations Research on Radar in World War II

Operational Research had its origin at the beginning of the Second World War, and made important early contributions to many aspects of the Air Defence of Great Britain, an activity of monumental significance in the war. Air defence depended for its success on the development of a command, control, communication and information system on a scale that had never been approached before. It also depended on other types of technology, such as high performance aircraft, air-to-air weapons and anti-aircraft artillery, and, most critically, on the new science of radar. All of these offered opportunities for applications of operational research, as did the study of tactics for individual engagements and of strategy for the optimum allocation of dangerously scarce resources. Of the many technological developments that made advances throughout the course of World War II, radar was the one which saw the greatest improvement in capabilities and had the most significant influence on operations. The contributions of radar to fire control of weapons, and the direction and navigation of aircraft and ships, called for systematic studies of the technical design and performance of the radar, of the weapons depending on its information, of the capabilities of the human operators, and of the design and effectiveness of the entire system of which the radar was one vital part. This provided a glorious opportunity for operational research. There was an atmosphere of extreme urgency. There were no worries about budgets. There was no time for extensive instrumented field trials or operational evaluation-new equipment was rushed into service. The data on effectiveness under field conditions was obtained from real operations. In earlier years it was possible to find people who held senior positions in organizations conducting important military operations, and could therefore give a first hand account of the critical decisions and results as seen “top down” from the highest level. But if one wants to go back as far as World War II, where operational research was born, it is getting increasingly difficult to find survivors who held senior appointments in the early 1940s. I am not one of these. However, I was fortunate enough to have been able to participate in operational research during World War II at a junior level, and to have spent most of the half century since then in the study and practice of military OR. I am going to describe a few incidents which occurred in the life of a junior army officer engaged in military operational research on the applications of radar to air defence, during an extremely active period. So what you are going to receive is a bottom up worm’s eye view of operational research during its interesting pioneer period fifty years ago

Preserving a combat commander’s moral agency: The Vincennes Incident as a Chinese Room

We argue that a command and control system can undermine a commander’s moral agency if it causes him/her to process information in a purely syntactic manner, or if it precludes him/her from ascertaining the truth of that information. Our case is based on the resemblance between a commander’s circumstances and the protagonist in Searle’s Chinese Room, together with a careful reading of Aristotle’s notions of ‘compulsory’ and ‘ignorance’. We further substantiate our case by considering the Vincennes Incident, when the crew of a warship mistakenly shot down a civilian airliner. To support a combat commander’s moral agency, designers should strive for systems that help commanders and command teams to think and manipulate information at the level of meaning. ‘Down conversions’ of information from meaning to symbols must be adequately recovered by ‘up conversions’, and commanders must be able to check that their sensors are working and are being used correctly. Meanwhile ethicists should establish a mechanism that tracks the potential moral implications of choices in a system’s design and intended operation. Finally we highlight a gap in normative ethics, in that we have ways to deny moral agency, but not to affirm it

An evaluation of NASA's program in human factors research: Aircrew-vehicle system interaction

Research in human factors in the aircraft cockpit and a proposed program augmentation were reviewed. The dramatic growth of microprocessor technology makes it entirely feasible to automate increasingly more functions in the aircraft cockpit; the promise of improved vehicle performance, efficiency, and safety through automation makes highly automated flight inevitable. An organized data base and validated methodology for predicting the effects of automation on human performance and thus on safety are lacking and without such a data base and validated methodology for analyzing human performance, increased automation may introduce new risks. Efforts should be concentrated on developing methods and techniques for analyzing man machine interactions, including human workload and prediction of performance

Issues on combining human and non-human intelligence

The purpose here is to call attention to some of the issues confronting the designer of a system that combines human and non-human intelligence. We do not know how to design a non-human intelligence in such a way that it will fit naturally into a human organization. The author's concern is that, without adequate understanding and consideration of the behavioral and psychological limitations and requirements of the human member(s) of the system, the introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) subsystems can exacerbate operational problems. We have seen that, when these technologies are not properly applied, an overall degradation of performance at the system level can occur. Only by understanding how human and automated systems work together can we be sure that the problems introduced by automation are not more serious than the problems solved