An Investigation of the Negotiation Domain for Electronic Commerce Information Systems

To support fully automatic business cycles, information systems for electronic commerce need to be able to conduct negotiation automatically. In recent years, a number of general frameworks for automated negotiation have been proposed. Application of such frameworks in a specific negotiation situation entails selecting the proper framework and adapting it to this situation. This selection and adaptation process is driven by the specific characteristics of the situation. This paper presents a systematic investigation of there characteristics and surveys a number of frameworks for automated negotiation

The first automated negotiating agents competition (ANAC 2010)

Motivated by the challenges of bilateral negotiations between people and automated agents we organized the first automated negotiating agents competition (ANAC 2010). The purpose of the competition is to facilitate the research in the area bilateral multi-issue closed negotiation. The competition was based on the Genius environment, which is a General Environment for Negotiation with Intelligent multi-purpose Usage Simulation. The first competition was held in conjunction with the Ninth International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-10) and was comprised of seven teams. This paper presents an overview of the competition, as well as general and contrasting approaches towards negotiation strategies that were adopted by the participants of the competition. Based on analysis in post--tournament experiments, the paper also attempts to provide some insights with regard to effective approaches towards the design of negotiation strategies

Intrusiveness, Trust and Argumentation: Using Automated Negotiation to Inhibit the Transmission of Disruptive Information

The question of how to promote the growth and diffusion of information has been extensively addressed by a wide research community. A common assumption underpinning most studies is that the information to be transmitted is useful and of high quality. In this paper, we endorse a complementary perspective. We investigate how the growth and diffusion of high quality information can be managed and maximized by preventing, dampening and minimizing the diffusion of low quality, unwanted information. To this end, we focus on the conflict between pervasive computing environments and the joint activities undertaken in parallel local social contexts. When technologies for distributed activities (e.g. mobile technology) develop, both artifacts and services that enable people to participate in non-local contexts are likely to intrude on local situations. As a mechanism for minimizing the intrusion of the technology, we develop a computational model of argumentation-based negotiation among autonomous agents. A key component in the model is played by trust: what arguments are used and how they are evaluated depend on how trustworthy the agents judge one another. To gain an insight into the implications of the model, we conduct a number of virtual experiments. Results enable us to explore how intrusiveness is affected by trust, the negotiation network and the agents' abilities of conducting argumentation

Online Dispute Resolution Through the Lens of Bargaining and Negotiation Theory: Toward an Integrated Model

[Excerpt] In this article we apply negotiation and bargaining theory to the analysis of online dispute resolution. Our principal objective is to develop testable hypotheses based on negotiation theory that can be used in ODR research. We have not conducted the research necessary to test the hypotheses we develop; however, in a later section of the article we suggest a possible methodology for doing so. There is a vast literature on negotiation and bargaining theory. For the purposes of this article, we realized at the outset that we could only use a small part of that literature in developing a model that might be suitable for empirical testing. We decided to use the behavioral theory of negotiation developed by Richard Walton and Robert McKersie, which was initially formulated in the 1960s. This theory has stood the test of time. Initially developed to explain union-management negotiations, it has proven useful in analyzing a wide variety of disputes and conflict situations. In constructing their theory, Walton and McKersie built on the contributions and work of many previous bargaining theorists including economists, sociologists, game theorists, and industrial relations scholars. In this article, we have incorporated a consideration of the foundations on which their theory was based. In the concluding section of the article we discuss briefly how other negotiation and bargaining theories might be applied to the analysis of ODR

Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements? Experimental Evidence

This paper presents an experiment performed to test the properties of an innovativebargaining mechanism (called automated negotiation) used to resolve disputes arising fromInternet-based transactions. The main result shows that the settlement rule tends to chillbargaining as it creates incentives for individuals to misrepresent their true valuations, whichimplies that automated negotiation is not able to promote agreements. However, this perverseeffect depends strongly on the conflict situation. When the threat that a disagreement occurs ismore credible, the strategic effect is reduced since defendants are more interested inmaximizing the efficiency of a settlement than their own expected profit. The implications ofthese results are then used to discuss the potential role of public regulation and reputationmechanisms in Cyberspace: Online Dispute Resolution, Electronic Commerce, Bargaining, Arbitration,Experimental Economics

Privacy-Preserving Trust Management Mechanisms from Private Matching Schemes

Cryptographic primitives are essential for constructing privacy-preserving communication mechanisms. There are situations in which two parties that do not know each other need to exchange sensitive information on the Internet. Trust management mechanisms make use of digital credentials and certificates in order to establish trust among these strangers. We address the problem of choosing which credentials are exchanged. During this process, each party should learn no information about the preferences of the other party other than strictly required for trust establishment. We present a method to reach an agreement on the credentials to be exchanged that preserves the privacy of the parties. Our method is based on secure two-party computation protocols for set intersection. Namely, it is constructed from private matching schemes.Comment: The material in this paper will be presented in part at the 8th DPM International Workshop on Data Privacy Management (DPM 2013

Obligations of trust for privacy and confidentiality in distributed transactions

Purpose – This paper aims to describe a bilateral symmetric approach to authorization, privacy protection and obligation enforcement in distributed transactions. The authors introduce the concept of the obligation of trust (OoT) protocol as a privacy assurance and authorization mechanism that is built upon the XACML standard. The OoT allows two communicating parties to dynamically exchange their privacy and authorization requirements and capabilities, which the authors term a notification of obligation (NoB), as well as their commitments to fulfilling each other's requirements, which the authors term signed acceptance of obligations (SAO). The authors seek to describe some applicability of these concepts and to show how they can be integrated into distributed authorization systems for stricter privacy and confidentiality control. Design/methodology/approach – Existing access control and privacy protection systems are typically unilateral and provider-centric, in that the enterprise service provider assigns the access rights, makes the access control decisions, and determines the privacy policy. There is no negotiation between the client and the service provider about which access control or privacy policy to use. The authors adopt a symmetric, more user-centric approach to privacy protection and authorization, which treats the client and service provider as peers, in which both can stipulate their requirements and capabilities, and hence negotiate terms which are equally acceptable to both parties. Findings – The authors demonstrate how the obligation of trust protocol can be used in a number of different scenarios to improve upon the mechanisms that are currently available today. Practical implications – This approach will serve to increase trust in distributed transactions since each communicating party receives a difficult to repudiate digitally signed acceptance of obligations, in a standard language (XACML), which can be automatically enforced by their respective computing machinery. Originality/value – The paper adds to current research in trust negotiation, privacy protection and authorization by combining all three together into one set of standardized protocols. Furthermore, by providing hard to repudiate signed acceptance of obligations messages, this strengthens the legal case of the injured party should a dispute arise

Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements? Experimental Evidence

This paper presents the results of an experiment performed to test the properties of an innovative bargaining mechanism (called automated negotiation) used to resolve disputes arising from Internet-based transactions. Automated negotiation is an online sealed-bid process in which an automated algorithm evaluates bids from the parties and settles the case if the offers are within a prescribed range. The observed individual behavior, based on 40 rounds of bargaining, is shown to be drastically affected by the design of automated negotiation. The settlement rule encourages disputants to behave strategically by adopting aggressive bargaining positions, which implies that the mechanism is not able to promote agreements and generate efficiency. This conclusion is consistent with the experimental results on arbitration and the well-known chilling effect: Automated negotiation tends to "chill" bargaining as it creates incentives for individuals to misrepresent their true valuations and discourage them to converge on their own. However, this perverse effect induced by the settlement rule depends strongly on the conflict situation. When the threat that a disagreement occurs is more credible, the strategic effect is reduced since defendants are more interested in maximizing the efficiency of a settlement than their own expected profit.Online Dispute Resolution, Arbitration, Experimental Economics, Electronic Commerce, Bargaining