Automated Certification of Implicit Induction Proofs

International audienceTheorem proving is crucial for the formal validation of properties about user specifications. With the help of the Coq proof assistant, we show how to certify properties about conditional specifications that are proved using automated proof techniques like those employed by the Spike prover, a rewrite-based implicit induction proof system. The certification methodology is based on a new representation of the implicit induction proofs for which the underlying induction principle is an instance of Noetherian induction governed by an induction ordering over equalities. We propose improvements of the certification process and show that the certification time is reasonable even for industrial-size applications. As a case study, we automatically prove and certify more than 40% of the lemmas needed for the validation of a conformance algorithm for the ABR protocol

CoLoR: a Coq library on well-founded rewrite relations and its application to the automated verification of termination certificates

Termination is an important property of programs; notably required for programs formulated in proof assistants. It is a very active subject of research in the Turing-complete formalism of term rewriting systems, where many methods and tools have been developed over the years to address this problem. Ensuring reliability of those tools is therefore an important issue. In this paper we present a library formalizing important results of the theory of well-founded (rewrite) relations in the proof assistant Coq. We also present its application to the automated verification of termination certificates, as produced by termination tools

Confluence by Decreasing Diagrams -- Formalized

This paper presents a formalization of decreasing diagrams in the theorem prover Isabelle. It discusses mechanical proofs showing that any locally decreasing abstract rewrite system is confluent. The valley and the conversion version of decreasing diagrams are considered.Comment: 17 pages; valley and conversion version; RTA 201

Using ACL2 to Verify Loop Pipelining in Behavioral Synthesis

Behavioral synthesis involves compiling an Electronic System-Level (ESL) design into its Register-Transfer Level (RTL) implementation. Loop pipelining is one of the most critical and complex transformations employed in behavioral synthesis. Certifying the loop pipelining algorithm is challenging because there is a huge semantic gap between the input sequential design and the output pipelined implementation making it infeasible to verify their equivalence with automated sequential equivalence checking techniques. We discuss our ongoing effort using ACL2 to certify loop pipelining transformation. The completion of the proof is work in progress. However, some of the insights developed so far may already be of value to the ACL2 community. In particular, we discuss the key invariant we formalized, which is very different from that used in most pipeline proofs. We discuss the needs for this invariant, its formalization in ACL2, and our envisioned proof using the invariant. We also discuss some trade-offs, challenges, and insights developed in course of the project.Comment: In Proceedings ACL2 2014, arXiv:1406.123

Recursive Definitions of Monadic Functions

Using standard domain-theoretic fixed-points, we present an approach for defining recursive functions that are formulated in monadic style. The method works both in the simple option monad and the state-exception monad of Isabelle/HOL's imperative programming extension, which results in a convenient definition principle for imperative programs, which were previously hard to define. For such monadic functions, the recursion equation can always be derived without preconditions, even if the function is partial. The construction is easy to automate, and convenient induction principles can be derived automatically.Comment: In Proceedings PAR 2010, arXiv:1012.455

On formal verification of arithmetic-based cryptographic primitives

Cryptographic primitives are fundamental for information security: they are used as basic components for cryptographic protocols or public-key cryptosystems. In many cases, their security proofs consist in showing that they are reducible to computationally hard problems. Those reductions can be subtle and tedious, and thus not easily checkable. On top of the proof assistant Coq, we had implemented in previous work a toolbox for writing and checking game-based security proofs of cryptographic primitives. In this paper we describe its extension with number-theoretic capabilities so that it is now possible to write and check arithmetic-based cryptographic primitives in our toolbox. We illustrate our work by machine checking the game-based proofs of unpredictability of the pseudo-random bit generator of Blum, Blum and Shub, and semantic security of the public-key cryptographic scheme of Goldwasser and Micali.Comment: 13 page

A Verified Certificate Checker for Finite-Precision Error Bounds in Coq and HOL4

Being able to soundly estimate roundoff errors of finite-precision computations is important for many applications in embedded systems and scientific computing. Due to the discrepancy between continuous reals and discrete finite-precision values, automated static analysis tools are highly valuable to estimate roundoff errors. The results, however, are only as correct as the implementations of the static analysis tools. This paper presents a formally verified and modular tool which fully automatically checks the correctness of finite-precision roundoff error bounds encoded in a certificate. We present implementations of certificate generation and checking for both Coq and HOL4 and evaluate it on a number of examples from the literature. The experiments use both in-logic evaluation of Coq and HOL4, and execution of extracted code outside of the logics: we benchmark Coq extracted unverified OCaml code and a CakeML-generated verified binary