Account Recovery Methods for Two-Factor Authentication (2FA): An Exploratory Study

System administrators have started to adopt two-factor authentication (2FA) to increase user account resistance to cyber-attacks. Systems with 2FA require users to verify their identity using a password and a second-factor authentication device to gain account access. This research found that 60% of users only enroll one second-factor device to their account. If a user’s second factor becomes unavailable, systems are using different procedures to ensure its authorized owner recovers the account. Account recovery is essentially a bypass of the system’s main security protocols and needs to be handled as an alternative authentication process (Loveless, 2018). The current research aimed to evaluate users’ perceived security for four 2FA account recovery methods. Using Renaud’s (2007) opportunistic equation, the present study determined that a fallback phone number recovery method provides user accounts with the most cyber-attack resistance followed by system-generated recovery codes, a color grid pattern, and graphical passcode. This study surveyed 103 participants about authentication knowledge, general risk perception aptitude, ability to correctly rank the recovery methods in terms of their attackr esistance, and recovery method perceptions. Other survey inquires related to previous 2FA, account recovery, and cybersecurity training experiences. Participants generally performed poorly when asked to rank the recovery methods by security strength. Results suggested that neither risk numeracy, authentication knowledge, nor cybersecurity familiarity impacted users’ ability to rank recovery methods by security strength. However, the majority of participants ranked either generated recovery codes, 39%, or a fallback phone number, 25%, as being most secure. The majority of participants, 45%, preferred the fallback phone number for account recovery, 38% expect it will be the easiest to use, and 46% expect it to be the most memorable. However, user’s annotative descriptions for recovery method preferences revealed that users are likely to disregard the setup instructions and use their phone number instead of an emergency contact number. Overall, this exploratory study offers information that researchers and designers can deploy to improve user’s 2FA- and 2FA account recovery- experiences

Lessons learned from evaluating eight password nudges in the wild

Background. The tension between security and convenience, when creating passwords, is well established. It is a tension that often leads users to create poor passwords. For security designers, three mitigation strategies exist: issuing passwords, mandating minimum strength levels or encouraging better passwords. The first strategy prompts recording, the second reuse, but the third merits further investigation. It seemed promising to explore whether users could be subtly nudged towards stronger passwords.Aim. The aim of the study was to investigate the influence of visual nudges on self-chosen password length and/or strength.Method. A university application, enabling students to check course dates and review grades, was used to support two consecutive empirical studies over the course of two academic years. In total, 497 and 776 participants, respectively, were randomly assigned either to a control or an experimental group. Whereas the control group received no intervention, the experimental groups were presented with different visual nudges on the registration page of the web application whenever passwords were created. The experimental groups’ password strengths and lengths were then compared that of the control group.Results. No impact of the visual nudges could be detected, neither in terms of password strength nor length. The ordinal score metric used to calculate password strength led to a decrease in variance and test power, so that the inability to detect an effect size does not definitively indicate that such an effect does not exist.Conclusion. We cannot conclude that the nudges had no effect on password strength. It might well be that an actual effect was not detected due to the experimental design choices. Another possible explanation for our result is that password choice is influenced by the user’s task, cognitive budget, goals and pre-existing routines. A simple visual nudge might not have the power to overcome these forces. Our lessons learned therefore recommend the use of a richer password strength quantification measure, and the acknowledgement of the user’s context, in future studies

Usability and Trust in Information Systems

The need for people to protect themselves and their assets is as old as humankind. People's physical safety and their possessions have always been at risk from deliberate attack or accidental damage. The advance of information technology means that many individuals, as well as corporations, have an additional range of physical (equipment) and electronic (data) assets that are at risk. Furthermore, the increased number and types of interactions in cyberspace has enabled new forms of attack on people and their possessions. Consider grooming of minors in chat-rooms, or Nigerian email cons: minors were targeted by paedophiles before the creation of chat-rooms, and Nigerian criminals sent the same letters by physical mail or fax before there was email. But the technology has decreased the cost of many types of attacks, or the degree of risk for the attackers. At the same time, cyberspace is still new to many people, which means they do not understand risks, or recognise the signs of an attack, as readily as they might in the physical world. The IT industry has developed a plethora of security mechanisms, which could be used to mitigate risks or make attacks significantly more difficult. Currently, many people are either not aware of these mechanisms, or are unable or unwilling or to use them. Security experts have taken to portraying people as "the weakest link" in their efforts to deploy effective security [e.g. Schneier, 2000]. However, recent research has revealed at least some of the problem may be that security mechanisms are hard to use, or be ineffective. The review summarises current research on the usability of security mechanisms, and discusses options for increasing their usability and effectiveness

PiXi: Password Inspiration by Exploring Information

Passwords, a first line of defense against unauthorized access, must be secure and memorable. However, people often struggle to create secure passwords they can recall. To address this problem, we design Password inspiration by eXploring information (PiXi), a novel approach to nudge users towards creating secure passwords. PiXi is the first of its kind that employs a password creation nudge to support users in the task of generating a unique secure password themselves. PiXi prompts users to explore unusual information right before creating a password, to shake them out of their typical habits and thought processes, and to inspire them to create unique (and therefore stronger) passwords. PiXi's design aims to create an engaging, interactive, and effective nudge to improve secure password creation. We conducted a user study ($N=238$) to compare the efficacy of PiXi to typical password creation. Our findings indicate that PiXi's nudges do influence users' password choices such that passwords are significantly longer and more secure (less predictable and guessable).Comment: 16 page