3,945 research outputs found
Composable and Efficient Mechanisms
We initiate the study of efficient mechanism design with guaranteed good
properties even when players participate in multiple different mechanisms
simultaneously or sequentially. We define the class of smooth mechanisms,
related to smooth games defined by Roughgarden, that can be thought of as
mechanisms that generate approximately market clearing prices. We show that
smooth mechanisms result in high quality outcome in equilibrium both in the
full information setting and in the Bayesian setting with uncertainty about
participants, as well as in learning outcomes. Our main result is to show that
such mechanisms compose well: smoothness locally at each mechanism implies
efficiency globally.
For mechanisms where good performance requires that bidders do not bid above
their value, we identify the notion of a weakly smooth mechanism. Weakly smooth
mechanisms, such as the Vickrey auction, are approximately efficient under the
no-overbidding assumption. Similar to smooth mechanisms, weakly smooth
mechanisms behave well in composition, and have high quality outcome in
equilibrium (assuming no overbidding) both in the full information setting and
in the Bayesian setting, as well as in learning outcomes.
In most of the paper we assume participants have quasi-linear valuations. We
also extend some of our results to settings where participants have budget
constraints
Spectrum Trading: An Abstracted Bibliography
This document contains a bibliographic list of major papers on spectrum
trading and their abstracts. The aim of the list is to offer researchers
entering this field a fast panorama of the current literature. The list is
continually updated on the webpage
\url{http://www.disp.uniroma2.it/users/naldi/Ricspt.html}. Omissions and papers
suggested for inclusion may be pointed out to the authors through e-mail
(\textit{[email protected]})
An Auction Mechanism for Resource Allocation in Mobile Cloud Computing Systems
A mobile cloud computing system is composed of heterogeneous services and
resources to be allocated by the cloud service provider to mobile cloud users.
On one hand, some of these resources are substitutable (e.g., users can use
storage from different places) that they have similar functions to the users.
On the other hand, some resources are complementary that the user will need
them as a bundle (e.g., users need both wireless connection and storage for
online photo posting). In this paper, we first model the resource allocation
process of a mobile cloud computing system as an auction mechanism with premium
and discount factors. The premium and discount factors indicate complementary
and substitutable relations among cloud resources provided by the service
provider. Then, we analyze the individual rationality and incentive
compatibility (truthfulness) properties of the users in the proposed auction
mechanism. The optimal solutions of the resource allocation and cost charging
schemes in the auction mechanism is discussed afterwards
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