Spectrum Trading: An Abstracted Bibliography

This document contains a bibliographic list of major papers on spectrum trading and their abstracts. The aim of the list is to offer researchers entering this field a fast panorama of the current literature. The list is continually updated on the webpage \url{http://www.disp.uniroma2.it/users/naldi/Ricspt.html}. Omissions and papers suggested for inclusion may be pointed out to the authors through e-mail (\textit{[email protected]})

Coopetition spectrum trading in cognitive radio networks

Spectrum trading is a promising method to improve spectrum usage efficiency. Several issues must be addressed, however, to enable spectrum trading that goes beyond conservative trading idle bands and achieve cooperation between primary and secondary users. In this paper, we argue that spectrum holes should be explicitly endogenous and negotiated by spectrum trading participants. To this end, we proposed an a Vickery auction based, coopetive framework to foster cooperation, while allowing competition for spectrum sharing. Incentive schemes and penalty for revocable spectrum are proposed to increase the spectrum access opportunities for SUs while protecting PUs spectrum value. A simultation study shows that the proposed framework outperforms conservative trading approaches, in a variety of scenarios with different levels of cooperation and bidding strategies. © 2013 IEEE

Spectrum sharing models in cognitive radio networks

Spectrum scarcity demands thinking new ways to manage the distribution of radio frequency bands so that its use is more effective. The emerging technology that can enable this paradigm shift is the cognitive radio. Different models for organizing and managing cognitive radios have emerged, all with specific strategic purposes. In this article we review the allocation spectrum patterns of cognitive radio networks and analyse which are the common basis of each model.We expose the vulnerabilities and open challenges that still threaten the adoption and exploitation of cognitive radios for open civil networks.L'escassetat de demandes d'espectre fan pensar en noves formes de gestionar la distribució de les bandes de freqüència de ràdio perquè el seu ús sigui més efectiu. La tecnologia emergent que pot permetre aquest canvi de paradigma és la ràdio cognitiva. Han sorgit diferents models d'organització i gestió de les ràdios cognitives, tots amb determinats fins estratègics. En aquest article es revisen els patrons d'assignació de l'espectre de les xarxes de ràdio cognitiva i s'analitzen quals són la base comuna de cada model. S'exposen les vulnerabilitats i els desafiaments oberts que segueixen amenaçant l'adopció i l'explotació de les ràdios cognitives per obrir les xarxes civils.La escasez de demandas de espectro hacen pensar en nuevas formas de gestionar la distribución de las bandas de frecuencia de radio para que su uso sea más efectivo. La tecnología emergente que puede permitir este cambio de paradigma es la radio cognitiva. Han surgido diferentes modelos de organización y gestión de las radios cognitivas, todos con determinados fines estratégicos. En este artículo se revisan los patrones de asignación del espectro de las redes de radio cognitiva y se analizan cuales son la base común de cada modelo. Se exponen las vulnerabilidades y los desafíos abiertos que siguen amenazando la adopción y la explotación de las radios cognitivas para abrir las redes civiles

Energy saving market for mobile operators

Ensuring seamless coverage accounts for the lion's share of the energy consumed in a mobile network. Overlapping coverage of three to five mobile network operators (MNOs) results in enormous amount of energy waste which is avoidable. The traffic demands of the mobile networks vary significantly throughout the day. As the offered load for all networks are not same at a given time and the differences in energy consumption at different loads are significant, multi-MNO capacity/coverage sharing can dramatically reduce energy consumption of mobile networks and provide the MNOs a cost effective means to cope with the exponential growth of traffic. In this paper, we propose an energy saving market for a multi-MNO network scenario. As the competing MNOs are not comfortable with information sharing, we propose a double auction clearinghouse market mechanism where MNOs sell and buy capacity in order to minimize energy consumption. In our setting, each MNO proposes its bids and asks simultaneously for buying and selling multi-unit capacities respectively to an independent auctioneer, i.e., clearinghouse and ends up either as a buyer or as a seller in each round. We show that the mechanism allows the MNOs to save significant percentage of energy cost throughout a wide range of network load. Different than other energy saving features such as cell sleep or antenna muting which can not be enabled at heavy traffic load, dynamic capacity sharing allows MNOs to handle traffic bursts with energy saving opportunity.Comment: 6 pages, 2 figures, to be published in ICC 2015 workshop on Next Generation Green IC

Incentive Mechanisms for Hierarchical Spectrum Markets

In this paper, we study spectrum allocation mechanisms in hierarchical multi-layer markets which are expected to proliferate in the near future based on the current spectrum policy reform proposals. We consider a setting where a state agency sells spectrum channels to Primary Operators (POs) who subsequently resell them to Secondary Operators (SOs) through auctions. We show that these hierarchical markets do not result in a socially efficient spectrum allocation which is aimed by the agency, due to lack of coordination among the entities in different layers and the inherently selfish revenue-maximizing strategy of POs. In order to reconcile these opposing objectives, we propose an incentive mechanism which aligns the strategy and the actions of the POs with the objective of the agency, and thus leads to system performance improvement in terms of social welfare. This pricing-based scheme constitutes a method for hierarchical market regulation. A basic component of the proposed incentive mechanism is a novel auction scheme which enables POs to allocate their spectrum by balancing their derived revenue and the welfare of the SOs.Comment: 9 page