46 research outputs found
Security on Generalized Feistel Scheme with SP Round Function
This paper studies the security against differential/linear
cryptanalysis and the pseudorandomness for a class of generalized
Feistel scheme with SP round function called . We consider
the minimum number of active s-boxes in some consecutive rounds of
,i.e., in four, eight and sixteen consecutive rounds, which
provide the upper bound of the maximum differential/linear
probabilities of 16-round scheme, in order to evaluate the
strength against differential/linear cryptanalysis. Furthermore,
We investigate the pseudorandomness of , point out 7-round
is not pseudorandom for non-adaptive adversary, by using
some distinguishers, and prove that 8-round is pseudorandom
for any adversaries
Revisiting Key-alternating Feistel Ciphers for Shorter Keys and Multi-user Security
Key-Alternating Feistel (KAF) ciphers, a.k.a. Feistel-2 models, refer to Feistel networks with round functions of the form , where is the (secret) round-key and is a public random function. This model roughly captures the structures of many famous Feistel ciphers, and the most prominent instance is DES.
Existing provable security results on KAF assumed independent round-keys and round functions (ASIACRYPT 2004 & FSE 2014). In this paper, we investigate how to achieve security under simpler and more realistic assumptions: with round-keys derived from a short main-key, and hopefully with identical round functions.
For birthday-type security, we consider 4-round KAF, investigate the minimal conditions on the way to derive the four round-keys, and prove that when such adequately derived keys and the same round function are used, the 4-round KAF is secure up to queries.
For beyond-birthday security, we focus on 6-round KAF. We prove that when the adjacent round-keys are independent, and independent round-functions are used, the 6 round KAF is secure up to queries. To our knowledge, this is the first beyond-birthday security result for KAF without assuming completely independent round-keys.
Our results hold in the multi-user setting as well, constituting the first non-trivial multi-user provable security results on Feistel ciphers. We finally demonstrate applications of our results on designing key-schedules and instantiating keyed sponge constructions
D.STVL.9 - Ongoing Research Areas in Symmetric Cryptography
This report gives a brief summary of some of the research trends in symmetric cryptography at the time of writing (2008). The following aspects of symmetric cryptography are investigated in this report: • the status of work with regards to different types of symmetric algorithms, including block ciphers, stream ciphers, hash functions and MAC algorithms (Section 1); • the algebraic attacks on symmetric primitives (Section 2); • the design criteria for symmetric ciphers (Section 3); • the provable properties of symmetric primitives (Section 4); • the major industrial needs in the area of symmetric cryptography (Section 5)
Ongoing Research Areas in Symmetric Cryptography
This report is a deliverable for the ECRYPT European network of excellence in cryptology. It gives a brief summary of some of the research trends in symmetric cryptography at the time of writing. The following aspects of symmetric cryptography are investigated in this report: • the status of work with regards to different types of symmetric algorithms, including block ciphers, stream ciphers, hash functions and MAC algorithms (Section 1); • the recently proposed algebraic attacks on symmetric primitives (Section 2); • the design criteria for symmetric ciphers (Section 3); • the provable properties of symmetric primitives (Section 4); • the major industrial needs in the area of symmetric cryptography (Section 5)
Meet-in-the-Middle Attacks on Classes of Contracting and Expanding Feistel Constructions
We show generic attacks on unbalanced Feistel ciphers based on the meet-in-the-middle technique. We analyze two general classes of unbalanced Feistel structures, namely contracting Feistels and expanding Feistels. In both of the cases, we consider the practical scenario where the round functions are keyless and known to the adversary. In the case of contracting Feistels with 4 branches, we show attacks on 16 rounds when the key length k (in bits) is as large as the block length n (in bits), and up to 24 rounds when k = 2n. In the case of expanding Feistels, we consider two scenarios: one, where different nonlinear functions without particular structures are used in the round function, and a more practical one, where a single nonlinear is used but different linear functions are introduced in the state update. In the former case, we propose generic attacks on 13 rounds when k = n, and up to 21 rounds when k = 2n. In the latter case, 16 rounds can be attacked for k = n, and 24 rounds for k = 2n
Quantitative security of block ciphers:designs and cryptanalysis tools
Block ciphers probably figure in the list of the most important cryptographic primitives. Although they are used for many different purposes, their essential goal is to ensure confidentiality. This thesis is concerned by their quantitative security, that is, by measurable attributes that reflect their ability to guarantee this confidentiality. The first part of this thesis deals with well know results. Starting with Shannon's Theory of Secrecy, we move to practical implications for block ciphers, recall the main schemes on which nowadays block ciphers are based, and introduce the Luby-Rackoff security model. We describe distinguishing attacks and key-recovery attacks against block ciphers and show how to turn the firsts into the seconds. As an illustration, we recall linear cryptanalysis which is a classical example of statistical cryptanalysis. In the second part, we consider the (in)security of block ciphers against statistical cryptanalytic attacks and develop some tools to perform optimal attacks and quantify their efficiency. We start with a simple setting in which the adversary has to distinguish between two sources of randomness and show how an optimal strategy can be derived in certain cases. We proceed with the practical situation where the cardinality of the sample space is too large for the optimal strategy to be implemented and show how this naturally leads to the concept of projection-based distinguishers, which reduce the sample space by compressing the samples. Within this setting, we re-consider the particular case of linear distinguishers and generalize them to sets of arbitrary cardinality. We show how these distinguishers between random sources can be turned into distinguishers between random oracles (or block ciphers) and how, in this setting, one can generalize linear cryptanalysis to Abelian groups. As a proof of concept, we show how to break the block cipher TOY100, introduce the block cipher DEAN which encrypts blocks of decimal digits, and apply the theory to the SAFER block cipher family. In the last part of this thesis, we introduce two new constructions. We start by recalling some essential notions about provable security for block ciphers and about Serge Vaudenay's Decorrelation Theory, and introduce new simple modules for which we prove essential properties that we will later use in our designs. We then present the block cipher C and prove that it is immune against a wide range of cryptanalytic attacks. In particular, we compute the exact advantage of the best distinguisher limited to two plaintext/ciphertext samples between C and the perfect cipher and use it to compute the exact value of the maximum expected linear probability (resp. differential probability) of C which is known to be inversely proportional to the number of samples required by the best possible linear (resp. differential) attack. We then introduce KFC a block cipher which builds upon the same foundations as C but for which we can prove results for higher order adversaries. We conclude both discussions about C and KFC by implementation considerations
Improved Integral Cryptanalysis of FOX Block Cipher
FOX is a new family of block ciphers presented recently, which is
based upon some results on proven security and has high
performances on various platforms. In this paper, we construct
some distinguishers between 3-round FOX and a random permutation
of the blocks space. By using integral attack and
collision-searching techniques, the distinguishers are used to
attack on 4, 5, 6 and 7-round of FOX64, 4 and 5-round FOX128. The
attack is more efficient than previous integral attack on FOX. The
complexity of improved integral attack is on 4-round
FOX128, against 5-round FOX128 respectively. For
FOX64, the complexity of improved integral attack is on
4-round FOX64, against 5-round FOX64,
against 6-round FOX64, against 7-round FOX64
respectively. Therefore, 4-round FOX64/64, 5-round FOX64/128,
6-round FOX64/192, 7-round FOX64/256 and 5-round FOX128/256 are
not immune to the attack in this paper
Block Cipher Doubling for a Post-Quantum World
In order to maintain a similar security level in a post-quantum setting, many symmetric primitives should have to double their keys and increase their state sizes. So far, no generic way for doing this is known that would provide convincing quantum security guarantees.
In this paper we propose a new generic construction, QuEME, that allows to double the key and the state size of a block cipher.
The QuEME design is inspired by the ECB-Mix-ECB (EME) construction, but is defined for a different choice of mixing function that withstands our new quantum superposition attack that exhibits a periodic property found in collisions and that breaks EME and a large class of variants of it.
We prove that QuEME achieves -bit security in the classical setting, where is the block size of the underlying block cipher, and at least -bit security in the quantum setting. We propose a concrete instantiation of this construction, called Double-AES, that is built with variants of AES-128