216 research outputs found
Econometrics for Learning Agents
The main goal of this paper is to develop a theory of inference of player
valuations from observed data in the generalized second price auction without
relying on the Nash equilibrium assumption. Existing work in Economics on
inferring agent values from data relies on the assumption that all participant
strategies are best responses of the observed play of other players, i.e. they
constitute a Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we show how to perform inference
relying on a weaker assumption instead: assuming that players are using some
form of no-regret learning. Learning outcomes emerged in recent years as an
attractive alternative to Nash equilibrium in analyzing game outcomes, modeling
players who haven't reached a stable equilibrium, but rather use algorithmic
learning, aiming to learn the best way to play from previous observations. In
this paper we show how to infer values of players who use algorithmic learning
strategies. Such inference is an important first step before we move to testing
any learning theoretic behavioral model on auction data. We apply our
techniques to a dataset from Microsoft's sponsored search ad auction system
Truthful Learning Mechanisms for Multi-Slot Sponsored Search Auctions with Externalities
Sponsored search auctions constitute one of the most successful applications
of microeconomic mechanisms. In mechanism design, auctions are usually designed
to incentivize advertisers to bid their truthful valuations and to assure both
the advertisers and the auctioneer a non-negative utility. Nonetheless, in
sponsored search auctions, the click-through-rates (CTRs) of the advertisers
are often unknown to the auctioneer and thus standard truthful mechanisms
cannot be directly applied and must be paired with an effective learning
algorithm for the estimation of the CTRs. This introduces the critical problem
of designing a learning mechanism able to estimate the CTRs at the same time as
implementing a truthful mechanism with a revenue loss as small as possible
compared to an optimal mechanism designed with the true CTRs. Previous work
showed that, when dominant-strategy truthfulness is adopted, in single-slot
auctions the problem can be solved using suitable exploration-exploitation
mechanisms able to achieve a per-step regret (over the auctioneer's revenue) of
order (where T is the number of times the auction is repeated).
It is also known that, when truthfulness in expectation is adopted, a per-step
regret (over the social welfare) of order can be obtained. In
this paper we extend the results known in the literature to the case of
multi-slot auctions. In this case, a model of the user is needed to
characterize how the advertisers' valuations change over the slots. We adopt
the cascade model that is the most famous model in the literature for sponsored
search auctions. We prove a number of novel upper bounds and lower bounds both
on the auctioneer's revenue loss and social welfare w.r.t. to the VCG auction
and we report numerical simulations investigating the accuracy of the bounds in
predicting the dependency of the regret on the auction parameters
Multiplicative Bidding in Online Advertising
In this paper, we initiate the study of the multiplicative bidding language
adopted by major Internet search companies. In multiplicative bidding, the
effective bid on a particular search auction is the product of a base bid and
bid adjustments that are dependent on features of the search (for example, the
geographic location of the user, or the platform on which the search is
conducted). We consider the task faced by the advertiser when setting these bid
adjustments, and establish a foundational optimization problem that captures
the core difficulty of bidding under this language. We give matching
algorithmic and approximation hardness results for this problem; these results
are against an information-theoretic bound, and thus have implications on the
power of the multiplicative bidding language itself. Inspired by empirical
studies of search engine price data, we then codify the relevant restrictions
of the problem, and give further algorithmic and hardness results. Our main
technical contribution is an -approximation for the case of
multiplicative prices and monotone values. We also provide empirical
validations of our problem restrictions, and test our algorithms on real data
against natural benchmarks. Our experiments show that they perform favorably
compared with the baseline.Comment: 25 pages; accepted to EC'1
- …