Supply Chain Management and the Changing Structure of U.S. Organic Produce

Replaced with revised version of paper 08/31/06.supply chain, produce, organic, vertical coordination, Agribusiness,

Vertical Integration and Market Structure

Contractual theories of vertical integration derive firm boundaries as an efficient response to market transaction costs. These theories predict a relationship between underlying features of transactions and observed integration decisions. There has been some progress in testing these predictions, but less progress in quantifying their importance. One difficulty is that empirical applications often must consider firm structure together with industry structure. Research in industrial organization frequently has adopted this perspective, emphasizing how scale and scope economies, and strategic considerations, influence patterns of industry integration. But this research has paid less attention to contractual or organizational details, so that these two major lines of research on vertical integration have proceeded in parallel with only rare intersection. We discuss the value of combining different viewpoints from organizational economics and industrial organization.

Vertical relationships between health insurers and healthcare providers

The current institutional reforms in the Dutch healthcare sector may increase the extent of vertical relations (such as vertical contracts and vertical integration) between insurers and healthcare providers. Vertical relations may have both welfare increasing and welfare reducing effects. In this study, we focus on the latter, in particular on anticompetitive foreclosure. We distinguish three possible mechanisms that may lead to anticompetitive foreclosure, called respectively 'exclusivity', 'sabotage', and the 'waterbed effect'. We discuss under which conditions they come into play and which policy measures can prevent them.

The Structure and Dynamics of Schools and Business: Do They Face Similar Issues?

The main aims of the report are to: (1) gain a better understanding of key economic forces shaping choices available to schools; (2) build up our practical knowledge of how other organisations deal with the kinds of issues facing schools; and (3) bridge the gap between the view that economics has nothing useful to say about how to organise education and the view that education is just another business and should be treated as such. The report draws on analogies from the business world to highlight parallels between the operating environment facing schools and businesses. It also identifies some important features of schooling which do not have a strong parallel in the business world, which suggests care needs to be taken not to draw too much from any individual example.

Tendering Universal Service Obligations in Liberalized Network Industries

In the past decades, several countries have introduced reverse auctions for allocating universal service or public mission subsidies in various industries. Examples include urban transport, air transport and telecommunications. Recently, such mechanisms have also been envisioned in liberalized postal markets. Issuing an invitation to tender for obligations in otherwise liberalized markets significantly differs from auctioning off a monopolistic provision of services or goods (competition for the market), as is e.g. the case with spectrum auctions in the telecommunications sector. We discuss the rationale for introducing such a regulatory regime as well as conceptual and practical issues concerning its implementation. It turns out that designing an efficient tender for universal service subsidies in liberalized markets is considerably more difficult than tendering e.g. a monopoly franchise. A first reason is that the cost assessment is more complex in the former case as future competitive market outcomes have to be anticipated; in the case with franchise bidding, at least the number of competitors is given by the tender itself. Hence, revenue effects caused by competitors are easier to calculate. Second, the threat of a winner’s moral hazard requires more detailed ex ante regulations. These raise the social cost of universal service provision. Compared to direct designation of universal services with ex post compensation, tendering causes a series of fundamental concerns and trade-offs that make the application of auctions less attractive than in other sectors.Procurement, Tendering, Reverse Auctions, Universal Service Obligation, Liberalization, Network Industries

The Effects of E-commerce on the Structure of Intermediation

The paper questions the notion that the diffusion of electronic commerce will lead to disintermediation. Rather than interpreting intermediation as a single service it is pointed out that intermediaries can provide a number of services. The analysis based on the New Institutional Economics, Market Microstructure Theory, and Information Economics shows that the three intermediation services studied are, generally, not under threat by the diffusion of electronic commerce. The overall effects on intermediation depend on the relevance of these services relative to others (e.g. order processing) which are supposed to become obsolete.B2C eCommerce, intermediation, new institutional economics

Exploiting Plaintiffs Through Settlement: Divide and Conquer

This paper considers settlement negotiations between a single defendant and $N$ plaintiffs when there are fixed costs of litigation. When making simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it offers to the plaintiffs, the defendant adopts a divide and conquer strategy. Plaintiffs settle their claims for less than they are jointly worth. The problem is worse when $N$ is larger, the offers are sequential, and the plaintiffs make offers instead. Although divide and conquer strategies dilute the defendant's incentives, they increase the settlement rate and reduce litigation spending. Plaintiffs can raise their joint payoff through transfer payments, voting rules, and covenants not to accept discriminatory offers.