Assignment Situations with Multiple Ownership and their Games

An assignment situation can be considered as a two-sided market consisting of two disjoint sets of objects.A non-negative reward matrix describes the profit if an object of one group is assigned to an object of the other group. Assuming that each object is owned by a different agent, Shapley and Shubik (1972) introduced a class of assignment games arising from these assignment situations.This paper introduces assignment situations with multiple ownership. In these situations each object can be owned by several agents and each agent can participate in the ownership of more than one object.In this paper we study simple assignment games and relaxations that arise from assignment situations with multiple ownership.First, necessary and sufficient conditions are provided for balanced assignment situations with multiple ownership.An assignment situation with multiple ownership is balanced if for any choice of the reward matrix the corresponding simple assignment game is balanced.Second, balancedness results are obtained for relaxations of simple assignment games.assignment situations;matchings;assignment games;balancedness

Assignment Situations with Multiple Ownership and their Games

An assignment situation can be considered as a two-sided market consisting of two disjoint sets of objects.A non-negative reward matrix describes the profit if an object of one group is assigned to an object of the other group. Assuming that each object is owned by a different agent, Shapley and Shubik (1972) introduced a class of assignment games arising from these assignment situations.This paper introduces assignment situations with multiple ownership. In these situations each object can be owned by several agents and each agent can participate in the ownership of more than one object.In this paper we study simple assignment games and relaxations that arise from assignment situations with multiple ownership.First, necessary and sufficient conditions are provided for balanced assignment situations with multiple ownership.An assignment situation with multiple ownership is balanced if for any choice of the reward matrix the corresponding simple assignment game is balanced.Second, balancedness results are obtained for relaxations of simple assignment games.

Playing with Play: Machinima in the Classroom

“So, machinima is really a genre, and not a medium?” The students in my Digital Media and Rhetoric course are grappling with both how to define machinima and how to evaluate whether one is “good” or not. I frustrate them by refusing to provide a definitive answer to this and other similar questions they have asked about the form. This intentional frustration continues as, after watching a few examples they ask me what grade I would give those machinima, if they were turned in for this assignment. Rather than providing a simple answer I redirect, asking them what criteria they would use to evaluate machinima and how the examples we’ve seen in class stand up to this scrutiny. At the beginning of this particular unit, when I announced that we wouldn’t be writing another research paper, they were exuberant. Now, however, the complexity of the task before them is slowly unveiling itself. While a majority of these students are gamers, few of them have experience in video production. None of them have previously looked at fan culture as a source of meaning and knowledge production. We are in unfamiliar territory, and they are getting restless

Game-Based Teaching Methodology and Empathy in Ethics Education

This article describes the experience of a group of educators participating in a graduate course in ethics. Playing role playing games and the work accompanying that play were the predominate methodology employed in the course. An accompanying research study investigated the lived experiences of the course participants. Themes that emerged from interview data included student engagement, participants’ applications, empathy development, and reactions to professor modeling

Personal Relations and their Effect on Behavior in an Organizational Setting: An Experimental Study

We study how personal relations affect performance in organizations. In the experimental game we use a manager has to assign different degrees of decision power to two employees. These two employees then have to make distributive decisions which affect themselves and the manager. Our focus is on the effects on managers' assignment of decision power and on employees' distributive decisions of one of the employees and the manager knowing each other personally. Our evidence shows that managers tend to favor employees that they personally know and that these employees tend, more than other employees, to favor the manager in their distributive decisions. However, this behavior does not affect the performance of the employees that do not know the manager. All these effects are independent of whether the employees that know the manager are more or less productive than those who do not know the manager. The results shed light on discrimination and nepotism and its consequences for the performance of family firms and other organizations.Family firms, nepotism, corporate governance, procedural fairness, experiments

Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity

Most economic models are based on the self-interest hypothesis that assumes that all people are exclusively motivated by their material self-interest. In recent years experimental economists have gathered overwhelming evidence that systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis and suggests that many people are strongly motivated by concerns for fairness and reciprocity. Moreover, several theoretical papers have been written showing that the observed phenomena can be explained in a rigorous and tractable manner. These theories in turn induced a new wave of experimental research offering additional exciting insights into the nature of preferences and into the relative performance of competing theories of fairness. The purpose of this paper is to review these recent developments, to point out open questions, and to suggest avenues for future research

Compensating Losses and Sharing Surpluses in Project-Allocation Situations (version 2)

By introducing the notions of projects and shares, this paper studies a class of economic environments, the so-called project-allocation situations, in which society may profit from cooperation, i.e., by reallocating the initial shares of projects among agents.This paper mainly focuses on the associated issues of compensation of losses and surplus sharing arising from the reallocation of projects.For this purpose, we construct and analyze an associated project-allocation game and a related system of games that explicitly models the underlying cooperative process.Speciffic solution concepts are proposed.allocation;games;projects;cooperation

No Easy Exit: Property Rights, Markets, and Negotiations over Water

The role of water has featured prominently in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation process, and in Arab-Israeli disputes in general. The allocation or reallocation of water rights is a particularly thorny problem. Recent work (Fisher, 1995) seeks to sidestep the issue of rights allocation by appealing to the Coase theorem, which provides conditions under which the efficient use of a good does not depend on the allocation of property rights. It instead emphasizes the small use value of the water in dispute, and concludes that a trade of “water for peace” should be eminently possible. Here, we provide a critique of this conclusion, based on two central ideas. First, the conditions of the Coase theorem are not satisfied, even approximately, and therefore the valuation of the use of water cannot be analytically separated from the allocation of property rights. Second, the existence of subnational interests, and the need to have an agreement acceptable to important actors at this level, creates a further difficulty for negotiating a resolution of any dispute. Even if a trade at the national level can be agreed upon, domestic losers must be compensated enough to make it politically feasible for the national government.

Simulation in Sport Finance

Simulations have long been used in business schools to give students experience making real-world decisions in a relatively low-risk environment. The OAKLAND A’S BASEBALL BUSINESS SIMULATOR takes a traditional business simulation and applies it to the sport industry where sales of tangible products are replaced by sales of an experience provided to fans. The simulator asks students to make decisions about prices for concessions, parking, and merchandise, player payroll expenses, funding for a new stadium, and more. Based on these inputs, the program provides detailed information about the state of the franchise after each simulated year, including attendance, winning percentage, revenues vs. expenses, revenue sharing, and stadium financing. The use of simulations such as this one enhances students’ organizational skills and students’ ability to think critically and imaginatively about the data while applying relevant knowledge and an appropriate strategy to achieve the best possible results. This is particularly important in the field of sport management where few, if any, other simulators exist that are specific to the field.baseball business; computer-based learning; simulation/gaming; stadium/facility financing; sport finance; sport management