Asset pricing with downside liquidity risks

© 2016 INFORMS. We develop a parsimonious liquidity-adjusted downside capital asset pricing model to investigate whether phenomena such as downward liquidity spirals and flights to liquidity impact expected asset returns.We find strong empirical support for the model. Downside liquidity risk (sensitivity of stock liquidity to negative market returns) has an economically meaningful return premium that is 10 times larger than its symmetric analogue. The expected liquidity level and downside market risk are also associated with meaningful return premiums. Downside liquidity risk and its associated premium are higher during periods of low marketwide liquidity and for stocks that are relatively small, illiquid, volatile, and have high book-to-market ratios. These results are consistent with investors requiring compensation for holding assets susceptible to adverse liquidity phenomena. Our findings suggest that mitigation of downside liquidity risk can lower firms' cost of capital

Asymmetric Dependence in US Financial Risk Factors?

.Asymmetric Dependence; Copulas; Diversification Failure; Risk Factor; Systemic Risk; Time-Varying Downside Risk

Regulatory reform : integrating paradigms

The Subprime crisis largely resulted from failures to internalize systemic risk evenly across financial intermediaries and recognize the implications of Knightian uncertainty and mood swings. A successful reform of prudential regulation will need to integrate more harmoniously the three paradigms of moral hazard, externalities, and uncertainty. This is a tall order because each paradigm leads to different and often inconsistent regulatory implications. Moreover, efforts to address the central problem under one paradigm can make the problems under the others worse. To avoid regulatory arbitrage and ensure that externalities are uniformly internalized, all prudentially regulated intermediaries should be subjected to the same capital adequacy requirements, and unregulated intermediaries should be financed only by regulated intermediaries. Reflecting the importance of uncertainty, the new regulatory architecture will also need to rely less on markets and more on"holistic"supervision, and incorporate countercyclical norms that can be adjusted in light of changing circumstances.Debt Markets,Banks&Banking Reform,Emerging Markets,Labor Policies,Financial Intermediation

Downside Risk and the Momentum Effect

Stocks with greater downside risk, which is measured by higher correlations conditional on downside moves of the market, have higher returns. After controlling for the market beta, the size effect and the book-to-market effect, the average rate of return on stocks with the greatest downside risk exceeds the average rate of return on stocks with the least downside risk by 6.55% per annum. Downside risk is important for explaining the cross-section of expected returns. In particular of the profitability of investing in momentum strategies can be explained as compensation for bearing high exposure to downside risk.

Distressed debt in Germany: What's next? Possible innovative exit strategies

During the past two years, private equity funds have acquired substantial portfolios of nonperforming loans from banks in Germany. Typically a private equity investor does not commit funds unless exit strategies are clearly defined. The usual exit strategies for distressed debt investors are fix it (restructuring and turnaround), sell it (sale of debt or equity), or shut it down (liquidation). A new alternative exit strategy for NPL investors considered here is the transfer of credit recovery risk. --Focus,diversification,specialization,monitoring,bank returns,bank risk,Non Performing Loans,Distressed debt investing,Synthetic securitization,Collateralized debt obligations,Credit risk transfer,Credit derivatives,Credit default swaps,Credit recovery swaps,Credit portfolio management,Credit portfolio risk,Credit portfolio returns,Efficiency of credit risk portfolio allocations,Learning effects

The Nature of Alpha

We suggest an empirical model of investment strategy returns which elucidates the importance of non-Gaussian features, such as time-varying volatility, asymmetry and fat tails, in explaining the level of expected returns. Estimating the model on the (former) Lehman Brothers Hedge Fund Index data, we demonstrate that the volatility compensation is a significant component of the expected returns for most strategy styles, suggesting that many of these strategies should be thought of as being `short vol'. We present some fundamental and technical reasons why this should indeed be the case, and suggest explanation for exception cases exhibiting `long vol' characteristics. We conclude by drawing some lessons for hedge fund portfolio construction.Comment: 22 pages, 5 figures, 3 table

Limited Liability and the Known Unknown

Limited liability is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, limited lia-bility may help overcome investors’ risk aversion and facilitate capital formation and economic growth. On the other hand, limited liability is widely believed to contribute to excessive risk-taking and externaliza-tion of losses to the public. The externalization problem can be mitigated imperfectly through existing mechanisms such as regulation, mandatory insurance, and minimum capital requirements. These mechanisms would be more effective if information asymmetries between industry and poli-cymakers were reduced. Private businesses typically have better infor-mation about industry-specific risks than policymakers. A charge for limited liability entities—resembling a corporate income tax but calibrated to risk levels—could have two salutary effects. First, a well-calibrated limited liability tax could help compensate the public fisc for risks and reduce externalization. Second, a limited liability tax could force private industry actors to reveal information to policymakers and regulators, thereby dynamically improving the public response to externalization risk. Charging firms for limited liability at initially similar rates will lead relatively low-risk firms to forgo limited liability, while relatively high-risk firms will pay for limited liability. Policymakers will then be able to focus on the industries whose firms have self-identified as high risk, and thus develop more finely tailored regulatory responses. Because the ben-efits of making the proper election are fully internalized by individual firms, whereas the costs of future regulation or limited liability tax changes will be borne collectively by industries, firms will be unlikely to strategically mislead policymakers in electing limited or unlimited lia-bility. By helping to reveal private information and focus regulators’ at-tention, a limited liability tax could accelerate the pace at which poli-cymakers learn, and therefore, the pace at which regulations improve

Do Financial Institutions Matter?

In standard asset pricing theory, investors are assumed to invest directly in financial markets. The role of financial institutions is ignored. The focus in corporate finance is on agency problems. How do you ensure that managers act in shareholders' interests? There is an inconsistency in assuming that when you give your money to a financial institution there is no agency problem but when you give it to a firm there is. It is argued both areas need to take proper account of the role of financial institutions and markets. Appropriate concepts for analyzing particular situations should be used.

Investing in the Clean Trillion: Closing the Clean Energy Investment Gap

In 2010 world governments agreed to limit the increase in global temperature to two degrees Celsius (2 °C) above pre-industrial levels to avoid the worst impacts of climate change. To have an 80 percent chance of maintaining this 2 °C limit, the IEA estimates an additional $36 trillion in clean energy investment is needed through 2050 -- or an average of$1 trillion more per year compared to a "business as usual" scenario over the next 36 years.This report provides 10 recommendations for investors, companies and policymakers to increase annual global investment in clean energy to at least $1 trillion by 2030 -- roughly a four-fold jump from current investment levels