Beyond 2017: the Australian Defence Force and amphibious warfare

Overview: The delivery of Australia’s new amphibious warships, HMAS Canberra and Adelaide, is an important milestone in the ADF’s quest to develop a strategically relevant amphibious warfare capability. Australia’s position in the world makes the effort a strategic imperative, but the ADF still has a long way to go and many critical decisions ahead if it’s to develop an amphibious warfare capability that’s ready for future challenges. The resources committed to the effort and the associated opportunity costs have been and will be substantial, and the overall need for the capability must be weighed against other priorities, but if Australia’s going to do it, we should do it properly. The aim of the paper was to identify some of the key decisions to be made by ADF leaders over the next two years to ensure that Australia has an amphibious warfare capability that’s effective and relevant to future challenges and provide specific recommendations on the

Privateers in Australia’s conflict and disaster zones

The private security industry has become an established component in the conflict and disaster zones where the Australian Government operates and looks set to be an enduring feature of the security landscape. Although behind the United States, United Kingdom and South Africa, Australia is now a substantial contributor to the global private security industry. Australian companies provide security services across the globe, from Asia to Africa, to governments and private clients alike. Many Australians, mostly former ADF personnel, work as contractors for PSCs—leveraging their military skills to protect infrastructure and individuals. Australians are key players in the private security industry, relied upon for their expertise, combat experience and interoperability with US and UK militaries and private security operators. The Australian Government has been forging a greater leadership role in the private security arena. Australia has been among the most forthright supporters of nascent initiatives designed to regulate the established private security industry. Australian diplomats, academic specialists and international legal experts have actively driven initiatives like the Montreux Document, the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers, and the development of international standards for the private security industry. In August 2013, Australia become a foundation member and key government supporter of the Association of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers, contributing seed funding to this non-government organisation (NGO), which aims to provide a forum to oversee PSC operations

Terms of engagement: Australia’s regional defence diplomacy

Australia is in the process of pivoting back to our own region and looking for new strategies for Defence re-engagement. But the Defence Cooperation Program hasn’t been scrutinised in any depth since an audit report by the Auditor-General in 2001. That pointed to a lack of financial information management and clear and public articulation of the goals and objectives of defence cooperation activities.A fundamental conclusion of the report is that these criticisms remain valid today. The emphasis has shifted over the years from assisting regional countries to build their own defence forces more towards working together to promote a secure region. The report makes a number of recommendations including that our defence engagement in the priority regions should focus on the maritime dimension. The highest priority should be attached to implementing the Pacific Maritime Security Project as the cornerstone of our maritime security engagement in the South Pacific

The Australia, United Kingdom, United States (AUKUS) Nuclear Submarine Agreement: Potential Implications

The AUKUS Nuclear Submarine Agreement seeks to enhance multinational deterrence against Chinese geopolitical assertiveness by giving Australia nuclear powered submarines. ▶ This agreement will pose considerable cost and technical challenges for the Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. ▶ Estimates of when Australia will be able to deploy nuclear submarines range from 2030-2040. ▶ The U.S. and its allies will have to make challenging decisions about where to build AUKUS in Australia. ▶ There is debate as to whether efforts to deter China in the Asia-Pacific should include non-Anglosphere countries in that region. ▶ Consideration should be given as to how China will respond to AUKUS and whether this response will include Beijing increasing security cooperation with North Korea and Russia

How to buy a submarine: part 2

This paper describes some of the approaches that could be taken to replace Australia\u27s Collins class submarines and outlines their pros and cons. Executive summary The building of a replacement for Australia\u27s Collins class submarines will be the country\u27s most expensive defence project to date. It\u27s also likely to be the most complex, with a myriad of capability, commercial and industrial issues to be managed: the expertise for the design and construction of conventional submarines resides in Europe and Asia while Navy\u27s preference is for American combat and weapon systems. Pulling those elements together while managing the technical risks is no easy task. Local construction of the future submarine has been a bipartisan position for several years, and it has the support of industry and the bureaucracy. But there\u27s no simple or fast way to produce a unique Australian submarine. If the government decides to go down that path, it will have to do so in the knowledge that it\u27s a high stakes venture. This paper describes some of the approaches that could be taken and outlines their pros and cons. Despite claims to the contrary, there\u27s little doubt that the merger of a European design and American combat system is possible—after all, that\u27s what the Collins is. But a sensible early step in the process would be to have government-to-government discussions with the potential players—especially in Washington—to determine what the actual constraints are, and what\u27s merely unsubstantiated folklore. Surveying the world market, conventional submarine design capability with the experience and maturity required for our purposes can be found in France, Germany, Japan and Sweden. The UK hasn\u27t designed or built a conventional submarine in over two decades, but the trusted nature of the \u27five eyes\u27 intelligence relationship and its ongoing nuclear submarine programs means that it\u27s also a potential partner

Recruiting, advertising and marketing strategies in all-volunteer force nations case studies of Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States

http://archive.org/details/recruitingdverti109452442

The Air Warfare Destroyer program

This paper assesses the progress of SEA 4000—Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) from its inception at the start of the previous decade until August 2014. SEA 4000 is a program to build three guided missile destroyers (or DDGs to give them their hull classification symbol) for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). These three vessels, to be named HMAS Hobart, HMAS Brisbane and HMAS Sydney (collectively the Hobart Class), will be delivered to the RAN between 2016 and 2019 and will replace the four remaining Adelaide Class frigates which have been in service since the early 1980s and are due to be withdrawn from service by 2019. The current approved budget for this program is $7,849 million. Executive summary The Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) program will deliver three Hobart Class AWDs and support systems to the Navy under an alliance-based contracting arrangement between ASC Pty Ltd, Raytheon Australia Pty Ltd and the Australian Government, represented by the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO). The total approved budget for the AWD build is$7,849 million but the actual cost is likely to be greater. The AWD program has suffered from various delays and cost increases and has been the subject of an independent review which has led to the Government approving plans for remediation of the project. The current government has stated that the AWD build must be fixed before it can confidently approve further substantial military shipbuilding projects in Australia

Heavy weather: climate and the Australian Defence Force

This report argues that the downstream implications of climate change are forcing Defence to become involved in mitigation and response tasks. Defence’s workload here will increase, so we need a new approach. Heavy Weather makes a number of recommendations including: Defence should work with the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency to establish an interagency working group on climate change and security. It would focus on addressing climate event scenarios for Australia and the Asia–Pacific  to manage the risks those scenarios pose to national resilience and regional stability.  Defence should appoint an adviser to the Chief of the Defence Force on climate issues to develop a Responding to Climate Change Plan that details how Defence will manage the effects of climate change on its operations and infrastructure. Defence should audit its environmental data to determine its relevance for climate scientists and systematically make that data publicly available. It should set up an energy audit team to see where energy efficiencies can be achieved in Defence. Australia should work with like-minded countries in the ‘Five Eyes’ community to share best practice and thinking on how military organisations should best respond to extreme weather events.   The recommendations aren’t about Defence having a ‘green’ view of the world: they’re about the ADF being well placed to deal with the potential disruptive forces of climate change

Expanding alliance: ANZUS cooperation and Asia–Pacific security

Is an alliance conceived as a bulwark against a resurgence of Japanese militarism and which cut its military and intelligence teeth in the Cold War is still relevant to today’s strategic concerns? Overview The alliance between Australia and the US, underpinned by the formal ANZUS Treaty of 1951, continues to be a central part of Australian defence and security thinking and an instrument of American policy in the Asia–Pacific. How is it that an alliance conceived as a bulwark against a resurgence of Japanese militarism and which cut its military and intelligence teeth in the Cold War is still relevant to today’s strategic concerns? The answer is partly—and importantly—that the core values of the ANZUS members are strongly aligned, and successive Australian governments and American presidential administrations have seen great value in working with like-minded partners to ensure Asia–Pacific security. Far from becoming a historical curiosity, today it’s not just relevant, but of greater importance than has been the case in the past few decades. To explore new ideas on how to strengthen the US–Australia alliance, ASPI conducted a high-level strategic dialogue in Honolulu in July this year. Discussions canvassed the future strategic environment; the forthcoming Australian Defence White Paper; budget, sovereignty and expectation risks; and cooperation in the maritime, land, air, cyber, space and intelligence domains. A key purpose of the Honolulu dialogue was to help ASPI develop policy recommendations on the alliance relationship for government. This report is the product of those discussions