Assessing the effect of geographically correlated failures on interconnected power-communication networks

We study the reliability of power transmission networks under regional disasters. Initially, we quantify the effect of large-scale non-targeted disasters and their resulting cascade effects on power networks. We then model the dependence of data networks on the power systems and consider network reliability in this dependent network setting. Our novel approach provides a promising new direction for modeling and designing networks to lessen the effects of geographical disasters.National Science Foundation (U.S.). (grant CNS-1017800)National Science Foundation (U.S.). (grant CNS-0830961)United States. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (HDTRA-09-1-005 )United States. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (HDTRA-1-13-10021

Reliability of Heterogeneous Distributed Computing Systems in the Presence of Correlated Failures

While the reliability of distributed-computing systems (DCSs) has been widely studied under the assumption that computing elements (CEs) fail independently, the impact of correlated failures of CEs on the reliability remains an open question. Here, the problem of modeling and assessing the impact of stochastic, correlated failures on the service reliability of applications running on DCSs is tackled. The service reliability is modeled using an integrated analytical and Monte-Carlo (MC) approach. The analytical component of the model comprises a generalization of a previously developed model for reliability of non-Markovian DCSs to a setting where specific patterns of simultaneous failures in CEs are allowed. The analytical model is complemented by a MC-based procedure to draw correlated-failure patterns using the recently reported concept of probabilistic shared risk groups (PSRGs). The reliability model is further utilized to develop and optimize a novel class of dynamic task reallocation (DTR) policies that maximize the reliability of DCSs in the presence of correlated failures. Theoretical predictions, MC simulations, and results from an emulation testbed show that the reliability can be improved when DTR policies correctly account for correlated failures. The impact of correlated failures of CEs on the reliability and the key dependence of DTR policies on the type of correlated failures are also investigated

Optimizing Interconnectivity among Networks under Attacks

Networks may need to be interconnected for various reasons such as inter-organizational communication, redundant connectivity, increasing data-rate and minimizing delay or packet-loss, etc. However, the trustworthiness of an added interconnection link cannot be taken for granted due to the presence of attackers who may compromise the security of an interconnected network by intercepting the interconnections. Namely, an intercepted interconnection link may not be secured due to the data manipulations by attackers. In the first part of this dissertation, the number of interconnections between the two networks is optimized for maximizing the data-rate and minimizing the packet-loss under the threat of security attacks. The optimization of the interconnectivity considering the security attack is formulated using a rate-distortion optimization setting, as originally introduced by Claude E. Shannon in the information theory. In particular, each intercepted interconnection is modeled as a noisy communication channel where the attackers may manipulate the data by flipping and erasing of data bits, and then the total capacity for any given number of interconnections is calculated. By exploiting such formulation, the optimal number of interconnections between two networks is found under network administrators data-rate and packet-loss requirement, and most importantly, without compromising the data security. It is concluded analytically and verified by simulations under certain conditions, increasing interconnections beyond an optimal number would not be beneficial concerning the data-rates and packet-loss. In the second part of this dissertation, the vulnerability of the interconnected network is analyzed by a probabilistic model that maps the intensity of physical attacks to network component failure distributions. Also, assuming the network is susceptible to the attack propagation, the resiliency of the network is modeled by the influence model and epidemic model. Finally, a stochastic model is proposed to track the node failure dynamics in a network considering dependency with power failures. Besides, the cascading failure in the power grid is analyzed with a data-driven model that reproduces the evolution of power-transmission line failure in power grids. To summarize, the optimal interconnectivity among networks is analyzed under security attacks, and the dynamic interactions in an interconnected network are investigated under various physical and logical attacks. The proper application of this work would add the minimum number of inter-network connections between two networks without compromising the data security. The optimal number interconnections would meet network administrator’s requirement and minimize cost (both security and monetary) associated with unnecessary connections. This work can also be used to estimate the reliability of a communication network under different types of physical attacks independently and also by incorporating the dynamics of power failures

Resilience of the Critical Communication Networks Against Spreading Failures: Case of the European National and Research Networks

A backbone network is the central part of the communication network, which provides connectivity within the various systems across large distances. Disruptions in a backbone network would cause severe consequences which could manifest in the service outage on a large scale. Depending on the size and the importance of the network, its failure could leave a substantial impact on the area it is associated with. The failures of the network services could lead to a significant disturbance of human activities. Therefore, making backbone communication networks more resilient directly affects the resilience of the area. Contemporary urban and regional development overwhelmingly converges with the communication infrastructure expansion and their obvious mutual interconnections become more reciprocal. Spreading failures are of particular interest. They usually originate in a single network segment and then spread to the rest of network often causing a global collapse. Two types of spreading failures are given focus, namely: epidemics and cascading failures. How to make backbone networks more resilient against spreading failures? How to tune the topology or additionally protect nodes or links in order to mitigate an effect of the potential failure? Those are the main questions addressed in this thesis. First, the epidemic phenomena are discussed. The subjects of epidemic modeling and identification of the most influential spreaders are addressed using a proposed Linear Time-Invariant (LTI) system approach. Throughout the years, LTI system theory has been used mostly to describe electrical circuits and networks. LTI is suitable to characterize the behavior of the system consisting of numerous interconnected components. The results presented in this thesis show that the same mathematical toolbox could be used for the complex network analysis. Then, cascading failures are discussed. Like any system which can be modeled using an interdependence graph with limited capacity of either nodes or edges, backbone networks are prone to cascades. Numerical simulations are used to model such failures. The resilience of European National Research and Education Networks (NREN) is assessed, weak points and critical areas of the network are identified and the suggestions for its modification are proposed

Stochastic Dynamics of Cascading Failures in Electric-Cyber Infrastructures

Emerging smart grids consist of tightly-coupled systems, namely a power grid and a communication system. While today\u27s power grids are highly reliable and modern control and communication systems have been deployed to further enhance their reliability, historical data suggest that they are yet vulnerable to large failures. A small set of initial disturbances in power grids in conjunction with lack of effective, corrective actions in a timely manner can trigger a sequence of dependent component failures, called cascading failures. The main thrust of this dissertation is to build a probabilistic framework for modeling cascading failures in power grids while capturing their interactions with the coupled communication systems so that the risk of cascading failures in the composite complex electric-cyber infrastructures can be examined, analyzed and predicted. A scalable and analytically tractable continuous-time Markov chain model for stochastic dynamics of cascading failures in power grids is constructed while retaining key physical attributes and operating characteristics of the power grid. The key idea of the proposed framework is to simplify the state space of the complex power system while capturing the effects of the omitted variables through the transition probabilities and their parametric dependence on physical attributes and operating characteristics of the system. In particular, the effects of the interdependencies between the power grid and the communication system have been captured by a parametric formulation of the transition probabilities using Monte-Carlo simulations of cascading failures. The cascading failures are simulated with a coupled power-system simulation framework, which is also developed in this dissertation. Specifically, the probabilistic model enables the prediction of the evolution of the blackout probability in time. Furthermore, the asymptotic analysis of the blackout probability as time tends to infinity enables the calculation of the probability mass function of the blackout size, which has been shown to have a heavy tail, e.g., power-law distribution, specifically when the grid is operating under stress scenarios. A key benefit of the model is that it enables the characterization of the severity of cascading failures in terms of a set of operating characteristics of the power grid. As a generalization to the Markov chain model, a regeneration-based model for cascading failures is also developed. The regeneration-based framework is capable of modeling cascading failures in a more general setting where the probability distribution of events in the system follows an arbitrarily specified distribution with non-Markovian characteristics. Further, a novel interdependent Markov chain model is developed, which provides a general probabilistic framework for capturing the effects of interactions among interdependent infrastructures on cascading failures. A key insight obtained from this model is that interdependencies between two systems can make two individually reliable systems behave unreliably. In particular, we show that due to the interdependencies two chains with non-heavy tail asymptotic failure distribution can result in a heavy tail distribution when coupled. Lastly, another aspect of future smart grids is studied by characterizing the fundamental bounds on the information rate in the sensor network that monitors the power grid. Specifically, a distributed source coding framework is presented that enables an improved estimate of the lower bound for the minimum required communication capacity to accurately describe the state of components in the information-centric power grid. The models developed in this dissertation provide critical understanding of cascading failures in electric-cyber infrastructures and facilitate reliable and quick detection of the risk of blackouts and precursors to cascading failures. These capabilities can guide the design of efficient communication systems and cascade aware control policies for future smart grids

Using interdependency matrices to mitigate targeted attacks on interdependent networks: A case study involving a power grid and backbone telecommunications networks

Analysis of the interdependencies between interconnected critical infrastructures can help enhance the robustness of the individual infrastructures as well as the overall interconnected infrastructures. One of the most studied interdependent critical infrastructure network scenarios is a power grid connected to a backbone telecommunications network. In this interdependent infrastructure scenario, the robustness of the entire system is usually analyzed in the context of cascading failure models in the power grid. However, this paper focuses on targeted attacks, where an attack on a telecommunications network node directly affects a connected power grid node, and vice versa. Cascading failures are outside the scope of this paper because the objective is to enhance the robustness of the interconnections between the infrastructures. In order to mitigate the impacts of targeted attacks on the interdependent infrastructures, three interdependency matrices for connecting the infrastructures are specified and analyzed. The analysis identifies the interdependency matrix that best reduces the impacts of targeted attacks and the propagation of failures between the infrastructures. Additionally, the impacts of interconnecting a power grid to different telecommunications networks, each with different susceptibilities to targeted attacks, is evaluate

Four Futures for Finance; A scenario study

This document presents four scenarios for the future of finance. The goal of our study is to imagine the future of finance and to identify challenges faced by policymakers in fighting systemic risk. It builds upon a tradition within the CPB to develop scenarios for policy analysis. We develop four scenarios for the future of finance. Our scenarios differ in two dimensions. First, to what extent soft information lies at the core of banks’ business. Second, to what extent scope economies exist between different banking activities. By combining these two dimensions, we obtain four scenarios: Isolated Islands, Big Banks, Competing Conglomerates, and Flat Finance. Market structure, market failures, and government failures vary between scenarios. These differences then translate into differences in the complexity of balance sheets, the ability to coordinate policy internationally, the information gap faced by regulators, the size of banks’ balance sheets, the tradability of banks’ assets, the level of interconnectedness, the potential for market discipline, and the threat of regulatory capture. As a result, each scenario calls for a different set of policies to combat systemic risk.

GIS-based method to assess seismic vulnerability of interconnected infrastructure: A case of EU gas and electricity networks

Our study concerns the interconnected European Electricity and Gas transmission grid where we address two important issues of these interdependent critical infrastructures. First we assessed the response under seismic hazard for each independent network; then we analysed the increased vulnerability due to coupling between these two heterogeneous networks. We developed a probability reliability model that encompasses the spatial distribution of the network structures using a Geographic Information System (GIS). We applied the seismic risk assessment of individual network facilities and presented the results in the form of the system fragility curves of the (independent and dependant) networks in terms of various performance measures - connectivity loss, power loss, and impact on the population. We characterized the coupling behaviour between the two networks as a physical dependency: here the electricity grid, in part, depends on the gas network due to the generation capacity of gas-fired power plants. The dependence of one network on the other is modelled with an interoperability matrix, which is defined in terms of the strength of coupling; additionally we consider how the mechanical-structural fragility of the pipelines of the gas-source supply stream contributes to this dependence. In addition to network-wide assessment, damage was also evaluated at a local level by examining the performance status of each and every electricity distribution substation in the electricity grid. Finally, the comprehensive geographical distributions of performance loss at the European level can be visualized on a GIS tool; showing, as expected, that the highest direct damage in southeast Europe.JRC.DG.G.5-European laboratory for structural assessmen

Quantification of Lifeline System Interdependencies after the 27 February 2010 Mw 8.8 Offshore Maule, Chile, Earthquake

Data on lifeline system service restoration is seldom exploited for the calibration of performance prediction models or for response comparisons across systems and events. This study explores utility restoration curves after the 2010 Chilean earthquake through a time series method to quantify coupling strengths across lifeline systems. When consistent with field information, cross-correlations from restoration curves without significant lag times quantify operational interdependence, whereas those with significant lags reveal logistical interdependence. Synthesized coupling strengths are also proposed to incorporate cross-correlations and lag times at once. In the Chilean earthquake, coupling across fixed and mobile phones was the strongest per region followed by coupling within and across telecommunication and power systems in adjacent regions. Unapparent couplings were also revealed among telecommunication and power systems with water networks. The proposed methodology can steer new protocols for post-disaster data collection, including anecdotal information to evaluate causality, and inform infrastructure interdependence effect prediction models