Psychological Eudaimonism and Interpretation in Greek Ethics

Plato extends a bold, confident, and surprising empirical challenge. It is implicitly a claim about the psychological — more specifically motivational — economies of human beings, asserting that within each such economy there is a desire to live well. Call this claim ‘psychological eudaimonism’ (‘PE’). Further, the context makes clear that Plato thinks that this desire dominates in those who have it. In other words, the desire to live well can reliably be counted on (when accompanied with correct beliefs about the role of morality or virtue in living well) to move people be virtuous. As we will argue, this general claim appears in not only Plato but Aristotle and the Stoics as well. But it is one we might wonder about, in three ways. First, we might wonder about its warrant. After all, the claim is universal in scope; yet it is about a highly contingent fact about the motivational propensities of individual human organisms, and there is abundant variability in the individual forms human nature takes. What grounds could the ancients have for their confidence that there are no outliers (assuming, as we do, that they do not merely misspeak in framing general claims as universal ones)? Second, we might wonder about its truth. For were it true, it would entail something remarkable about the nature of rationality that we (post-)moderns would be wise to heed. And third, we might wonder about its relationship with normative eudaimonism. By ‘normative eudaimonism’ (‘NE’) we mean the claim that we have conclusive reason to act in ways that conduce to our own eudaimonia. As we will show, the key to these three questions is the first. If we consider what justification the ancients have for their claim, we can see why that claim must be true. Moreover, as we will also show, it must be true because of the nature of practical rationality as the ancients understood it — that is, in terms of normative eudaimonism. We will show this by marshalling unexpected resources: Donald Davidson’s work in understanding how we interpret others and in so doing make sense of them as rational beings. If we couple Davidson’s account of interpretation with the eudaimonist structure of practical rationality essential to these ancient ethical theories, psychological eudaimonism is a consequence. The paper proceeds as follows. In Section I, we lay out the textual basis for ascribing PE to Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. In Section II, we introduce Davidson’s account of interpretation. This allows us to appropriate that account in Section III to the particular purposes of normative eudaimonism, to support the claim that we must ascribe the desire to live well to those whom we would see as rational. Finally, in Section IV we consider challenges to this strategy

A Model of Natural Language Dialogue

In this thesis I have a threefold purpose. Firstly, I will attempt to argue that the individual utterances agents make in natural language dialogue stem from specific beliefs, goals, and plans and that these interlock with those of other agents in the production of dialogue. I suggest that agents utilise syntactic, semantic, pragmatic and contextual knowledge in this process. Furthermore, that these elements contribute to the utterances speakers make and hearers interpret in the pursuit of their individual goals, and cannot be treated separately. I will suggest that utterances, being intentional behaviour, are sub-components of plans to achieve specific communicative purposes. Following from this, I will present a descriptive model showing how the beliefs and goals of agents contribute to the composing of a logical form for an utterance prior to its syntactic representation. It is suggested that the logical form of an utterance, is composed of elements relating to the agent's beliefs and goals, and includes pragmatic and contextual elements and that these are present prior to the utterance being made and predispose the choice of eventual syntactic components. I do not attempt to model the syntactic form of the utterances but limit the model of the agents to a display to each other of their logical forms and show how these might be interpreted and elicit responses from the hearer in furtherance of their goals. My third purpose is to present a hand-simulated process of this model, to demonstrate how a particular dialogue might be constructed by two agents. This is attempted by ascribing a set of beliefs to them and providing them with specific goals. In the final chapter, the achievements and inadequacies of this research are summarised, and possible improvements and developments suggested in the context of current and future directions

Institutions as Knowledge Capital: Ludwig M. Lachmann’s Interpretative Institutionalism

The paper revisits the socioeconomic theory of the Austrian School economist Ludwig M. Lachmann. By showing that the common claim that Lachmann’s idiosyncratic (read: eclectic and multidisciplinary) approach to economics entails nihilism is unfounded, it reaches the following conclusions. (1) Lachmann held a sophisticated institutional position to economics that anticipated developments in contemporary new institutional economics. (2) Lachmann’s sociological and economic reading of institutions offers insights for the problem of coordination. (3) Lachmann extends contemporary new institutional theory without simultaneously denying the policy approach of comparative institutional analysis

The Ontology of Group Agency

We present an ontological analysis of the notion of group agency developed by Christian List and Philip Pettit. We focus on this notion as it allows us to neatly distinguish groups, organizations, corporations – to which we may ascribe agency – from mere aggregates of individuals. We develop a module for group agency within a foundational ontology and we apply it to organizations

Evolving Persons and Free Will

Human beings are masters of deception if they want to appear superior to others and to suggest that they have everything under control (see, e.g., Fingarette 2000, Mele 2000). Such self-delusions might be advantageous, because those are the most successful liars who believe their own lies. Although it seems paradoxical at first (for he who does not tell the untruth intentionally is, strictly speaking, not a liar at all), it rests upon a much more radical self-deception which is quite useful – a systematic and continuous illusion regarding ourselves. Higher-order forms of self-consciousness, namely I-consciousness, are based on a feature which is called a self-model. This is an episodically active representational entity (e.g. a complex activation pattern in a human brain), the contents of which are properties of the system itself. It is embedded and constantly updated in a global model of the world, based on perceptions, memories, innate information etc. (Metzinger 1993). But because self-models cannot represent their own representations as their own representations as their own representations and so on ad infinitum, they are semantically transparent, i.e. on the level of their content they do not contain the information that they are models. Thus, such systems are not able to recognize their self-model as a self-model (Van Gulick 1988). The result is an ego-illusion, which is stable, coherent, and cannot be transcended on the level of conscious experience itself

Agent oriented programming: An overview of the framework and summary of recent research

This is a short overview of the agent-oriented programming (AOP) framework. AOP can be viewed as an specialization of object-oriented programming. The state of an agent consists of components called beliefs, choices, capabilities, commitments, and possibly others; for this reason the state of an agent is called its mental state. The mental state of agents is captured formally in an extension of standard epistemic logics: beside temporalizing the knowledge and belief operators, AOP introduces operators for commitment, choice and capability. Agents are controlled by agent programs, which include primitives for communicating with other agents. In the spirit of speech-act theory, each communication primitive is of a certain type: informing, requesting, offering, etc. This document describes these features in more detail and summarizes recent results and ongoing AOP-related work

Institutions as Knowledge Capital: Ludwig M. Lachmann’s Interpretative Institutionalism

The paper revisits the socioeconomic theory of the Austrian School economist Ludwig M. Lachmann. By showing that the common claim that Lachmann’s idiosyncratic (read: eclectic and multidisciplinary) approach to economics entails nihilism is unfounded, it reaches the following conclusions. (1) Lachmann held a sophisticated institutional position to economics that anticipated developments in contemporary new institutional economics. (2) Lachmann’s sociological and economic reading of institutions offers insights for the problem of coordination. (3) Lachmann extends contemporary new institutional theory without simultaneously denying the policy approach of comparative institutional analysis.Comparative institutional analysis; coordination; expectations; institutional evolution; interpretative institutionalism

Emerging Challenges and Opportunities in Infectious Disease Epidemiology.

Much of the intellectual tradition of modern epidemiology stems from efforts to understand and combat chronic diseases persisting through the 20th century epidemiologic transition of countries such as the United States and United Kingdom. After decades of relative obscurity, infectious disease epidemiology has undergone an intellectual rebirth in recent years amid increasing recognition of the threat posed by both new and familiar pathogens. Here, we review the emerging coalescence of infectious disease epidemiology around a core set of study designs and statistical methods bearing little resemblance to the chronic disease epidemiology toolkit. We offer our outlook on challenges and opportunities facing the field, including the integration of novel molecular and digital information sources into disease surveillance, the assimilation of such data into models of pathogen spread, and the increasing contribution of models to public health practice. We next consider emerging paradigms in causal inference for infectious diseases, ranging from approaches to evaluating vaccines and antimicrobial therapies to the task of ascribing clinical syndromes to etiologic microorganisms, an age-old problem transformed by our increasing ability to characterize human-associated microbiota. These areas represent an increasingly important component of epidemiology training programs for future generations of researchers and practitioners