Responsive vs. Strategic Grantmaking: Exploring the Options

In philanthropy, there is much written about responsive and strategic approaches to philanthropy. Which approach is the most appropriate? Meaningful? Effective? While there is always room for both approaches, it's important for foundations to understand each one to determine when one approach may be preferable to another.In this guide, you'll discover:The definition of responsive vs. strategic grantmakingThe pros and cons of responsive vs. strategic grantmaking10 tips for getting started in strategic grantmaking5 mistakes to avoid when focusing on your grantmakingA board's role in determining direction and strateg

Fostering Innovation in Philanthropy

Innovation is a buzzword with growing resonance in the philanthropic community. But how are foundations going about adopting innovative practices? In this guide, you'll learn the definition of "innovation"; 8 approaches to philanthropic innovation; key practices of innovative funders; recommendations to become innovative and support innovation; and more

Revisiting the ‘Reformed Objection’ to Natural Theology

In the present paper I address two significant and prevalent errors concerning to natural theology within the Reformed theological tradition. First, contrary to Alvin Plantinga, I argue that the idea of properly basic theistic belief has not motivated or otherwise grounded opposition to natural theology within the Reformed tradition. There is, in fact, a Reformed endorsement of natural theology grounded in the notion that theistic belief can be properly basic. Secondly, I argue that late nineteenth- and twentieth-century Reformed criticisms of natural theology do not constitute an objection to natural theology as such but rather an objection to natural theology construed in a particular way. I explore the nature of this objection and its compatibility with an alternative understanding of natural theology

Attitude Ascriptions and Acceptable Translations

Critical notice of Mark Richard's "Context and the Attitudes"

Delusional Altruism: Avoiding Self-Deception and Disrespect

Our new white paper explains the damage that Delusional Altruism can do to your philanthropic effectiveness. Including real-world examples from funders just like you. Most importantly, it provides a roadmap for escape.Here's a sample of what you'll learn:What is delusional altruism?How to streamline & simplify your grant processHow to identify and emphasize the right prioritiesHow to spend more time with the communities you serve, and less on burdensome paperworkWhy investment in a funder's capacity pay such huge dividends in philanthropic resultsHow to overcoming delusion: ten things you can do right no

On Time chez Dummett

I discuss three connections between Dummett's writings about time and philosophical aspects of physics. The first connection (Section 2) arises from remarks of Dummett's about the different relations of observation to time and to space. The main point is uncontroversial and applies equally to classical and quantum physics. It concerns the fact that perceptual processing is so rapid, compared with the typical time-scale on which macroscopic objects change their observable properties, that it engenders the idea of a 'common now', spread across space. The other two connections are specific to quantum theory, as interpreted along the lines of Everett. So for these two connections, the physics side is controversial, just as the philosophical side is. In Section 3, I connect the subjective uncertainty before an Everettian 'splitting' of the multiverse to Dummett's suggestion, inspired by McTaggart, that a complete, i.e. indexical-free description of a temporal reality is impossible. And in Section 4, I connect Barbour's denial that time is real---a denial along the lines of Everett, rather than McTaggart---to Dummett's suggestion that statements about the past are not determinately true or false, because they are not effectively decidable.Comment: 25 pages; no figure

Yeats and Auden: Some Verbal Parallels

As has been previously observed, Auden verbally resembles Yeats on more than one occasion, and Yeats sometimes resembles Auden. But, as far as Daalder is aware, several genuine or possible parallels are yet to be discussed. Daalder's examples are meant to suggest that Auden imitates Yeats, alludes to him, or shows kinship with him; in this article, Daalder is not, however, concerned with Auden's impact on Yeats

The bearable lightness of being

How are philosophical questions about what kinds of things there are to be understood and how are they to be answered? This paper defends broadly Fregean answers to these questions. Ontological categories-such as object, property, and relation-are explained in terms of a prior logical categorization of expressions, as singular terms, predicates of varying degree and level, etc. Questions about what kinds of object, property, etc., there are are, on this approach, reduce to questions about truth and logical form: for example, the question whether there are numbers is the question whether there are true atomic statements in which expressions function as singular terms which, if they have reference at all, stand for numbers, and the question whether there are properties of a given type is a question about whether there are meaningful predicates of an appropriate degree and level. This approach is defended against the objection that it must be wrong because makes what there depend on us or our language. Some problems confronting the Fregean approach-including Frege's notorious paradox of the concept horse-are addressed. It is argued that the approach results in a modest and sober deflationary understanding of ontological commitments