Autonomous Systems as Legal Agents: Directly by the Recognition of Personhood or Indirectly by the Alchemy of Algorithmic Entities

The clinical manifestations of platelet dense (δ) granule defects are easy bruising, as well as epistaxis and bleeding after delivery, tooth extractions and surgical procedures. The observed symptoms may be explained either by a decreased number of granules or by a defect in the uptake/release of granule contents. We have developed a method to study platelet dense granule storage and release. The uptake of the fluorescent marker, mepacrine, into the platelet dense granule was measured using flow cytometry. The platelet population was identified by the size and binding of a phycoerythrin-conjugated antibody against GPIb. Cells within the discrimination frame were analysed for green (mepacrine) fluorescence. Both resting platelets and platelets previously stimulated with collagen and the thrombin receptor agonist peptide SFLLRN was analysed for mepacrine uptake. By subtracting the value for mepacrine uptake after stimulation from the value for uptake without stimulation for each individual, the platelet dense granule release capacity could be estimated. Whole blood samples from 22 healthy individuals were analysed. Mepacrine incubation without previous stimulation gave mean fluorescence intensity (MFI) values of 83±6 (mean ± 1 SD, range 69–91). The difference in MFI between resting and stimulated platelets was 28±7 (range 17–40). Six members of a family, of whom one had a known δ-storage pool disease, were analysed. The two members (mother and son) who had prolonged bleeding times also had MFI values disparate from the normal population in this analysis. The values of one daughter with mild bleeding problems but a normal bleeding time were in the lower part of the reference interval

Chimpanzee Rights: The Philosophers' Brief

In December 2013, the Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP) filed a petition for a common law writ of habeas corpus in the New York State Supreme Court on behalf of Tommy, a chimpanzee living alone in a cage in a shed in rural New York (Barlow, 2017). Under animal welfare laws, Tommy’s owners, the Laverys, were doing nothing illegal by keeping him in those conditions. Nonetheless, the NhRP argued that given the cognitive, social, and emotional capacities of chimpanzees, Tommy’s confinement constituted a profound wrong that demanded remedy by the courts. Soon thereafter, the NhRP filed habeas corpus petitions on behalf of Kiko, another chimpanzee housed alone in Niagara Falls, and Hercules and Leo, two chimpanzees held in research facilities at Stony Brook University. Thus began the legal struggle to move these chimpanzees from captivity to a sanctuary, an effort that has led the NhRP to argue in multiple courts before multiple judges. The central point of contention has been whether Tommy, Kiko, Hercules, and Leo have legal rights. To date, no judge has been willing to issue a writ of habeas corpus on their behalf. Such a ruling would mean that these chimpanzees have rights that confinement might violate. Instead, the judges have argued that chimpanzees cannot be bearers of legal rights because they are not, and cannot be persons. In this book we argue that chimpanzees are persons because they are autonomous

"Involving Interface": An Extended Mind Theoretical Approach to Roboethics

In 2008 the authors held Involving Interface, a lively interdisciplinary event focusing on issues of biological, sociocultural, and technological interfacing (see Acknowledgments). Inspired by discussions at this event, in this article, we further discuss the value of input from neuroscience for developing robots and machine interfaces, and the value of philosophy, the humanities, and the arts for identifying persistent links between human interfacing and broader ethical concerns. The importance of ongoing interdisciplinary debate and public communication on scientific and technical advances is also highlighted. Throughout, the authors explore the implications of the extended mind hypothesis for notions of moral accountability and robotics

Ethics of Artificial Intelligence

Artificial intelligence (AI) is a digital technology that will be of major importance for the development of humanity in the near future. AI has raised fundamental questions about what we should do with such systems, what the systems themselves should do, what risks they involve and how we can control these. - After the background to the field (1), this article introduces the main debates (2), first on ethical issues that arise with AI systems as objects, i.e. tools made and used by humans; here, the main sections are privacy (2.1), manipulation (2.2), opacity (2.3), bias (2.4), autonomy & responsibility (2.6) and the singularity (2.7). Then we look at AI systems as subjects, i.e. when ethics is for the AI systems themselves in machine ethics (2.8.) and artificial moral agency (2.9). Finally we look at future developments and the concept of AI (3). For each section within these themes, we provide a general explanation of the ethical issues, we outline existing positions and arguments, then we analyse how this plays out with current technologies and finally what policy conse-quences may be drawn