The Small-Is-Very-Small Principle

The central result of this paper is the small-is-very-small principle for restricted sequential theories. The principle says roughly that whenever the given theory shows that a property has a small witness, i.e. a witness in every definable cut, then it shows that the property has a very small witness: i.e. a witness below a given standard number. We draw various consequences from the central result. For example (in rough formulations): (i) Every restricted, recursively enumerable sequential theory has a finitely axiomatized extension that is conservative w.r.t. formulas of complexity $\leq n$. (ii) Every sequential model has, for any $n$, an extension that is elementary for formulas of complexity $\leq n$, in which the intersection of all definable cuts is the natural numbers. (iii) We have reflection for $\Sigma^0_2$-sentences with sufficiently small witness in any consistent restricted theory $U$. (iv) Suppose $U$ is recursively enumerable and sequential. Suppose further that every recursively enumerable and sequential $V$ that locally inteprets $U$, globally interprets $U$. Then, $U$ is mutually globally interpretable with a finitely axiomatized sequential theory. The paper contains some careful groundwork developing partial satisfaction predicates in sequential theories for the complexity measure depth of quantifier alternations

Variations on a Montagovian theme

What are the objects of knowledge, belief, probability, apriority or analyticity? For at least some of these properties, it seems plausible that the objects are sentences, or sentence-like entities. However, results from mathematical logic indicate that sentential properties are subject to severe formal limitations. After surveying these results, I argue that they are more problematic than often assumed, that they can be avoided by taking the objects of the relevant property to be coarse-grained (“sets of worlds”) propositions, and that all this has little to do with the choice between operators and predicates

On the Hardness of Almost-Sure Termination

This paper considers the computational hardness of computing expected outcomes and deciding (universal) (positive) almost-sure termination of probabilistic programs. It is shown that computing lower and upper bounds of expected outcomes is $\Sigma_1^0$- and $\Sigma_2^0$-complete, respectively. Deciding (universal) almost-sure termination as well as deciding whether the expected outcome of a program equals a given rational value is shown to be $\Pi^0_2$-complete. Finally, it is shown that deciding (universal) positive almost-sure termination is $\Sigma_2^0$-complete ($\Pi_3^0$-complete).Comment: MFCS 2015. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1410.722

Existential Definability over the Subword Ordering

We study first-order logic (FO) over the structure consisting of finite words over some alphabet A, together with the (non-contiguous) subword ordering. In terms of decidability of quantifier alternation fragments, this logic is well-understood: If every word is available as a constant, then even the ?? (i.e., existential) fragment is undecidable, already for binary alphabets A. However, up to now, little is known about the expressiveness of the quantifier alternation fragments: For example, the undecidability proof for the existential fragment relies on Diophantine equations and only shows that recursively enumerable languages over a singleton alphabet (and some auxiliary predicates) are definable. We show that if |A| ? 3, then a relation is definable in the existential fragment over A with constants if and only if it is recursively enumerable. This implies characterizations for all fragments ?_i: If |A| ? 3, then a relation is definable in ?_i if and only if it belongs to the i-th level of the arithmetical hierarchy. In addition, our result yields an analogous complete description of the ?_i-fragments for i ? 2 of the pure logic, where the words of A^* are not available as constants