2,778 research outputs found
What really characterizes explananda: Prior Analytics I.30
In Prior Analytics I.30, Aristotle seems too much optmistic about finding out the principles of sciences. For he seems to say that, if our empirical collection of facts in a given domain is exhaustive or sufficient, it will be easy for us to find out the explanatory principles in the domain. However, there is a distance between collecting facts and finding out the explanatory principles in a given domain. In this paper, I discuss how the key expression in the sentence at 46a25 should be interpreted: āthe true characteristics of thingsā (āĻįæ¶Ī½ į¼Ī»Ī·Īøįæ¶Ļ į½ĻĪ±ĻĻĻĪ½ĻĻĪ½ ĻĪæįæĻ ĻĻĪ¬Ī³Ī¼Ī±ĻĪ¹Ī½ā). I argue that, on a more accurate interpretation of the expression, Aristotleās point would cease to look like a piece of naĆÆve or even silly optimism
Michael T. Ferejohn, Formal Causes: Definition, Explanation, and Primacy in: Socratic and Aristotelian Thought
I review Michael T. Ferejohn's "Formal Causes: Definition, Explanation, and Primacy in Socratic and Aristotelian Thought
Essence and Cause: Making Something Be What It Is
Aristotle frequently describes essence as a ācauseā or āexplanationā, thus ascribing to essence some sort of causal or explanatory role. This explanatory role is often explicated by scholars in terms of essence āmaking the thing be what it isā or āmaking it the very thing that it isā. I argue that this is problematic, at least on the assumption that āmakingā expresses an explanatory relation, since it violates certain formal features of explanation. I then consider whether Aristotle is vulnerable to this problem by examining the explanatory role of essence in Posterior Analytics and Metaphysics Z 17
Spinozaās Metaphysics of Substance: The Substance-Mode Relation as a Relation of Inherence and Prediction
In his groundbreaking work of 1969, Spinoza's Metaphysics: An Essay in Interpretation, Edwin Curley attacked the traditional understanding of the substance-mode relation in Spinoza, which makes modes inhere in the substance. Curley argued that such an interpretation generates insurmountable problems, as had been already claimed by Pierre Bayle in his famous entry on Spinoza. Instead of having the modes inhere in the substance Curley suggested that the modesā dependence upon the substance should be interpreted in terms of (efficient) causation, i.e., as committing Spinoza to nothing over and above the claim that the substance is the (efficient) cause of the modes. These bold and fascinating claims generated one of the most important scholarly controversies in Spinoza scholarship of the past thirty-five years.
In this chapter I argue against Curleyās interpretation and attempt to reestablish the traditional understanding of Spinozistic modes as inhering in God and as predicated of God. I also criticize Curleyās philosophical motivation for suggesting this interpretation. I do believe, however, that Curley is right about the existence of an intimate connection between the substance-mode relation and causation in Spinoza. In the next chapter I will study the notion of āimmanent causeā, which merges efficient causality and inherence. I will clarify the relation between immanent, efficient and material causation, and show where precisely Spinoza diverged from the traditional Aristotelian taxonomy of causes. In the second chapter I also discuss the German Idealistsā view of Spinoza as an āacosmistā. Under this interpretation Spinoza was a modern reviver of Eleatic monism, who allegedly asserts the mere existence of God, and denies the reality of the world of particular things. Spinozistic modes - according to this reading - are nothing but passing and unreal phenomena. Though this view of Spinoza as an āacosmistā can be supported by some lines in Spinozaās thought, I believe it should be rejected since it is not consistent with some of the most central doctrines of the Ethics. In the final part of the second chapter I discuss the relation between modes and the attributes under which they fall, and suggest a terminological distinction between a āmode of Godā (i.e., a mode under all attributes) and a āmode of an attributeā (i.e., a mode under a specific attribute), a distinction which can help us avoid some common confusions in the treatment of the issue
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The Form of the Good in Plato's Republic
The theory of the Form of the Good in the Republic is truly and coherently the centerpiece of the canonical Platonism of the middle dialogues, the centerpiece of Plato's metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and politics, and even his theory of love and art. In this theory of the Form of the Good Plato was truly the first grand philosophical synthesiser. If to achieve such a grand synthesis he had to employ a few unholy combinations, such as the combination of reality, goodness, and self-predication, he may perhaps be forgiven - at least if he is understood
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