437,616 research outputs found

    Iran\u27s Nuclear Program and International Law

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    In this article, Professor Daniel Joyner analyzes the legal arguments on both sides of the Iran nuclear issue. The article address what the sides regard as the relevant sources of international nuclear law, and their respective interpretations of these sources law. Professor Joyner argues that Iran’s case illustrates warped and incorrect legal interpretations of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and other sources of law, and a prejudicial and inconsistent application of the law by the West and by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The article posits that this warped interpretation of NPT obligations has led to a bleak future for the Treaty as the normative cornerstone of international law’s regulation of nuclear energy. The article concludes by calling for a new grand bargain—one that progresses the aim of global nuclear disarmament, strengthens the legal framework governing nonproliferation, and ensures that civilian nuclear energy programs may be freely pursued and developed by states that choose to do so

    A Defense of the Exclusionary Rule

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    The exclusionary rule is being flayed with increasing vigor by a number of unrelated sources and with a variety of arguments. Some critics find it unworkable and resort to empirically based arguments. Others see it as the product of a belated and unwarranted judicial interpretation. Still others, uncertain whether the rule works, are confident that in some fashion law enforcement\u27s hands are tied. Professor Yale Kamisar, long a defender of the exclusionary rule, reviews the current attacks on the rule and offers a vigorous rebuttal. He finds it difficult to accept that there is a line for acceptable police conduct that is below the line of a constitutional violation

    A Defense of the Exclusionary Rule

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    The exclusionary rule is being flayed with increasing vigor by a number of unrelated sources and with a variety of arguments. Some critics find it unworkable and resort to empirically based arguments. Others see it as the product of a belated and unwarranted judicial interpretation. Still others, uncertain whether the rule works, are confident that in some fashion law enforcement\u27s hands are tied. Professor Yale Kamisar, long a defender of the exclusionary rule, reviews the current attacks on the rule and offers a vigorous rebuttal. He finds it difficult to accept that there is a line for acceptable police conduct that is below the line of a constitutional violation

    Interpretation of Customary International Law in International Courts

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    Customary international law (CIL) is one of the sources of law thatregulates the relationships between States. As with treaty rules, that is,rules contained in international conventions, in order to be applied toparticular cases, customary international law needs to be interpreted.This thesis explores the topic of the interpretation of international customand, in particular, the methods that international courts and tribunalsand quasi-judicial bodies have used to interpret customary rules in theirpractice. Its aim was to bring to light in a systematized manner thedifferent methods of interpretation that can be observed in the case lawof international courts and quasi-judicial bodies.This study not only disproves the fact that customary rules cannot beinterpreted, but also shows that in order to interpret rules of customaryinternational law, international courts, quasi-judicial bodies andinternational judges, in their separate or dissenting opinions, rely onmethods of interpretation that are either identical or similar to thosecontained in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.My hope is that it will contribute, in the long run, to the creation of a setof acceptable methods or rules of CIL interpretation that will guide judgesin crafting their arguments and, as a result, will increase the transparencyand persuasiveness of judicial reasoning

    The Origins of Legislation

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    Although legislation is at the center of legal debates on statutory interpretation, administrative law, and delegation, little is known about how legislation is actually drafted. If scholars pay any attention to Congress at all, they tend to focus on what happens after legislation is introduced, ignoring how the draft came to exist in the first place. In other words, they focus on the legislative process, not the drafting process. The result is that our account of Congress, the legislative process, and the administrative state is impoverished, and debates in statutory interpretation and administrative law are incomplete. This Article seeks to demystify important elements of the legislative drafting process. Descriptively, it provides a comprehensive typology of the origins of legislative drafts, outlining the many ways in which drafts emerge. At times, the descriptive insights are surprising: for example, when a committee drafts legislation in a bipartisan manner, it sometimes uses a “legislative notice-and-comment” process, sharing a draft publicly prior to its introduction so that stakeholders can review the draft and comment. At other times, the descriptive insights add substantial complexity to our accounts. For example, the executive often drafts legislation. This creates a principal-agent drafting problem between Congress and the Executive parallel to the principal-agent problem that emerges with delegation, but operating prior to a legislative enactment. The Article goes on to explain why members of Congress pursue different drafting processes and to explore the consequences of variety in legislative drafting for theories of statutory interpretation, for identifying reliable sources of legislative history, and for arguments about congressional delegation and judicial deference to agencies

    Revisiting the \u3ci\u3eManson\u3c/i\u3e Test: Social Science as a Source of Constitutional Interpretation

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    Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Supreme Court defined the Due Process limitations on the admissibility of eyewitness identifications. The Court ultimately settled on a test in Manson v. Brathwaite. Since 1977, the Court’s test has been roundly criticized in the legal7 and social science8 literature. Despite developments in social science that have augmented our understanding of eyewitness identifications, the Supreme Court has failed to readdress the issue. This Comment considers whether or not the United States Supreme Court should use social science evidence as a source for reinterpreting the Due Process Clause as expressed through the Manson test. While many alternatives to the Manson test have been proposed in the academic literature, relatively little attention has been paid to the question of why social science findings are legitimate sources for interpretation of the Constitution in the case of eyewitness identifications. The respondent and its amici argued in Perry that it would be inappropriate for the Court to consider this evidence in defining the due process limitation on eyewitness evidence. In light of these arguments, it is necessary, as a threshold matter, to defend the legitimacy of social science research as a source of constitutional interpretation. I argue that the Supreme Court should consider social science evidence in its interpretation of the Due Process Clause as it relates to eyewitness testimony and revise the Manson test accordingly. In Part I, I outline the Supreme Court’s eyewitness identification case law. In Part II, I discuss the approaches of state supreme courts that have augmented the federal standard. In Part III, I provide a framework for the use of social science data in constitutional interpretation generally, paying particular attention to the work of David L. Faigman. In Part IV, I apply the principles outlined in the prior part to eyewitness identifications, arguing that social science evidence is particularly relevant to this area of the law. Finally, I consider and reject some objections to the Court’s use of scientific evidence to shape the test for excluding eyewitness evidence

    Revisiting the \u3ci\u3eManson\u3c/i\u3e Test: Social Science as a Source of Constitutional Interpretation

    Get PDF
    Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Supreme Court defined the Due Process limitations on the admissibility of eyewitness identifications. The Court ultimately settled on a test in Manson v. Brathwaite. Since 1977, the Court’s test has been roundly criticized in the legal7 and social science8 literature. Despite developments in social science that have augmented our understanding of eyewitness identifications, the Supreme Court has failed to readdress the issue. This Comment considers whether or not the United States Supreme Court should use social science evidence as a source for reinterpreting the Due Process Clause as expressed through the Manson test. While many alternatives to the Manson test have been proposed in the academic literature, relatively little attention has been paid to the question of why social science findings are legitimate sources for interpretation of the Constitution in the case of eyewitness identifications. The respondent and its amici argued in Perry that it would be inappropriate for the Court to consider this evidence in defining the due process limitation on eyewitness evidence. In light of these arguments, it is necessary, as a threshold matter, to defend the legitimacy of social science research as a source of constitutional interpretation. I argue that the Supreme Court should consider social science evidence in its interpretation of the Due Process Clause as it relates to eyewitness testimony and revise the Manson test accordingly. In Part I, I outline the Supreme Court’s eyewitness identification case law. In Part II, I discuss the approaches of state supreme courts that have augmented the federal standard. In Part III, I provide a framework for the use of social science data in constitutional interpretation generally, paying particular attention to the work of David L. Faigman. In Part IV, I apply the principles outlined in the prior part to eyewitness identifications, arguing that social science evidence is particularly relevant to this area of the law. Finally, I consider and reject some objections to the Court’s use of scientific evidence to shape the test for excluding eyewitness evidence

    Warming Up to Climate Change Litigation

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    The surprise in Massachusetts v. EPA was not that it was a close, hotly contested case. Rather, the surprise was the facility and ease with which the Court majority dispatched opposing arguments and redefined prior precedents. Not content to widen doctrines on the margins, Justice Stevens\u27 majority opinion blazed a new path through the law of standing and unearthed newfound regulatory authority for the United States Environmental Protection Agency. Under the Court\u27s new interpretation, the Clean Air Act ( CAA or the Act ) provides EPA with roving authority, if not responsibility, to regulate any substance capable of causing or contributing to environmental harm in the atmosphere. The federal government did much to facilitate this course, as the Environmental Protection Agency has been anything but a reluctant regulator, and as such the present administration was not the most compelling advocate for its own cause. Now that EPA has authority to regulate greenhouse gases, regulatory controls on motor vehicles are sure to follow, as will regulations on other emission sources. In time, however, Massachusetts v. EPA may come to stand for more than the simple proposition that Congress delegated authority to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act. It may herald in a new era of state-sponsored litigation, environmental standing, and statutory interpretation - and yet still do little to cool down a warming planet

    The Effects of Illegal Migration From Mexico to the U.S.

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    The purpose of this author\u27s thesis is to explore the arguments and data found on both sides of the debatable issue of illegal immigration in America. This author made use of the plethora of data surrounding this topic that has been generated from various secondary sources. The use of this secondary data allowed for a re-analysis of the original author\u27s findings which aided in the formulation of new questions while providing a different interpretation from the original assessment. The purpose of re-analysis sought to provide readers with a more-in-depth view concerning the influx of undocumented aliens, Mexican nationals in particular, on the US\u27s economy and national security efforts. The use of qualitative techniques, which consisted of content analysis and literal text analysis, were deployed in order to compare and contrast archival surveys and various other studies collected from the aforementioned secondary sources. The results revealed that there is no single, all-inclusive and totally correct point of view concerning the problems associated with illegal immigration. The study concludes by expounding upon plausible solutions that may be beneficial; both to proponents of illegal immigration and to the opposition. The study also touches upon the need for a better collaboration between local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies; as well as with the private sector and foreign governments

    Warming Up to Climate Change Litigation

    Get PDF
    The surprise in Massachusetts v. EPA was not that it was a close, hotly contested case. Rather, the surprise was the facility and ease with which the Court majority dispatched opposing arguments and redefined prior precedents. Not content to widen doctrines on the margins, Justice Stevens\u27 majority opinion blazed a new path through the law of standing and unearthed newfound regulatory authority for the United States Environmental Protection Agency. Under the Court\u27s new interpretation, the Clean Air Act ( CAA or the Act ) provides EPA with roving authority, if not responsibility, to regulate any substance capable of causing or contributing to environmental harm in the atmosphere. The federal government did much to facilitate this course, as the Environmental Protection Agency has been anything but a reluctant regulator, and as such the present administration was not the most compelling advocate for its own cause. Now that EPA has authority to regulate greenhouse gases, regulatory controls on motor vehicles are sure to follow, as will regulations on other emission sources. In time, however, Massachusetts v. EPA may come to stand for more than the simple proposition that Congress delegated authority to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act. It may herald in a new era of state-sponsored litigation, environmental standing, and statutory interpretation - and yet still do little to cool down a warming planet
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