Applying Abstract Argumentation Theory to Cooperative Game Theory

We apply ideas from abstract argumentation theory to study cooperative game theory. Building on Dung's results in his seminal paper, we further the correspondence between Dung's four argumentation semantics and solution concepts in cooperative game theory by showing that complete extensions (the grounded extension) correspond to Roth's subsolutions (respectively, the supercore). We then investigate the relationship between well-founded argumentation frameworks and convex games, where in each case the semantics (respectively, solution concepts) coincide; we prove that three-player convex games do not in general have well-founded argumentation frameworks.Comment: 15 pages, 1 tabl

Human-Agent Decision-making: Combining Theory and Practice

Extensive work has been conducted both in game theory and logic to model strategic interaction. An important question is whether we can use these theories to design agents for interacting with people? On the one hand, they provide a formal design specification for agent strategies. On the other hand, people do not necessarily adhere to playing in accordance with these strategies, and their behavior is affected by a multitude of social and psychological factors. In this paper we will consider the question of whether strategies implied by theories of strategic behavior can be used by automated agents that interact proficiently with people. We will focus on automated agents that we built that need to interact with people in two negotiation settings: bargaining and deliberation. For bargaining we will study game-theory based equilibrium agents and for argumentation we will discuss logic-based argumentation theory. We will also consider security games and persuasion games and will discuss the benefits of using equilibrium based agents.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2015, arXiv:1606.0729

A Critical Discussion Game for Prohibiting Fallacies

The study of fallacies is at the heart of argumentation studies. In response to Hamblin’s devastating critique of the state of the theory of fallacies in 1970, both formal dialectical and informal approaches to fallacies developed. In the current paper, we focus on an influential informal approach to fallacies, part of the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation. Central to the pragma-dialectical method for analysing and evaluating argumentative discourse is the ideal model of a critical discussion. In this discussion model, a dialectical perspective on argumentation is combined with a pragmatic take on communicative interaction. By formalising and computationally implementing the model of a critical discussion, we take a first step in the development of software to computationally model argumentative dialogue in which fallacies are prohibited along the pragmadialectical norms. We do this by defining the Critical Discussion Game, a formal dialogue game based on the pragma-dialectical discussion model, executable on an online user-interface which is part of a larger infrastructure of argumentation software

On the interplay between games, argumentation and dialogues

Game theory, argumentation and dialogues all address problems concerning inter-agent interaction, but from different perspectives. In this paper, we contribute to the study of the interplay between these fields. In particular, we show that by mapping games in normal form into structured argumentation, computing dominant solutions and Nash equilibria is equivalent to computing admissible sets of arguments. Moreover, when agents lack complete information, computing dominant solutions/Nash equilibria is equivalent to constructing successful (argumentation-based) dialogues. Finally, we study agents’ behaviour in these dialogues in reverse game-theoretic terms and show that, using specific notions of utility, agents engaged in (argumentation-based) dialogues are guaranteed to be truthful and disclose relevant information, and thus can converge to dominant solutions/Nash equilibria of the original games even under incomplete information

Legitimation and Strategic Maneuvering in the Political Field

This article combines a pragma-dialectical conception of argumentation, a sociological conception of legitimacy and a sociological theory of the political field. In particular, it draws on the theorization of the political field developed by Pierre Bourdieu and tries to determine what new insights into the concept of strategic maneuvering might be offered by a sociological analysis of the political field. I analyze a speech made by the President of Romania, Traian Băsescu, following his suspension by Parliament in April 2007. I suggest that the argument developed in this speech can be regarded as an example of adjudication and I discuss its specificity as an adjudication in the political field in an electoral campaign. I also try to relate legitimation as political strategy to strategic maneuvering oriented to meeting the contradictory demands of the political field, which I see—following Bourdieu—as involving a double political game, a game of democratic representation and a game of power

New Perspectives on Games and Interaction

This volume is a collection of papers presented at the 2007 colloquium on new perspectives on games and interaction at the Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences in Amsterdam. The purpose of the colloquium was to clarify the uses of the concepts of game theory, and to identify promising new directions. This important collection testifies to the growing importance of game theory as a tool to capture the concepts of strategy, interaction, argumentation, communication, cooperation and competition. Also, it provides evidence for the richness of game theory and for its impressive and growing application

The logic of the violence in the civil war: the armed conflict in Colombia

This paper proposes a reading of the armed conflict from an evolutionary design that takes into account the Logic of Violence in the Civil War. Their aim is to assess the dynamics of conflict and changes from its author's scientific output. A context of conflicts that includes new expressions of violence and the relative failure of the paramilitary reintegration involves using new analytical models (argumentation, game theory and inconsistent information). The recent evolution of emerging gangs and their expansion into areas that were paramilitary camps requires monitoring not only of the government and the authorities, but those investigating the conflict in the present tense. The author provides heuristic research support from Schelling’s theory of strategy, Nozick’s agencies and the protection, and Gambetta’s recent contributions to the relationship between organized crime and drug cartels.Civil_war, Colombia, armed conflict, strategic_theory, Gambetta, Nozick, Schelling

A Ludological Perspective on Argument

This introductory paper explores a new perspective on argumentation that draws upon the resources of ludology – the critical and academic of study of games qua games. In the Philosophical Investigations, one of the later Wittgenstein’s more mysterious suggestions is that if one understands how games work, then one would be able to understand how natural language works. Similarly, it will be argued that if we look to how games function as games, we will be able to understand how the ‘argument-game’ functions. The epistemic importance of rhetorical argumentation rather than analytic demonstration becomes apparent if we consider ‘argument’ as the communicative interaction in which arguers attempt to improve the cognitive attitudes of a real or potential audience. The activity of arguing is crafted – but not scripted – by the formal aspects of a complex system of interacting elements that give rise to an emergent field of ‘possibility-space’ in which arguments take place. In recognizing how we indirectly craft second-order fields through our first-order design choices, we gain a new perspective and a new set of tools with which to reflect upon the relation between bias, fairness and objectivity in argumentation. Keywords: argumentation theory, language-game, ludology, philosophy, rhetori

Heuristic Schelling: economy of organized crime

This article proposes a reading of the armed conflict from an evolutionary design that takes into account the concept of private protection agencies in the works of Schelling. Their aim is to assess the dynamics of conflict and changes from its author's scientific output. A context of conflicts that includes new expressions of violence and the relative failure of the paramilitary reintegration involves using new analytical models (argumentation, game theory and inconsistent information). The recent evolution of emerging gangs and their expansion into areas that were paramilitary camps requires monitoring not only of the government and the authorities, but those investigating the conflict in the present tense. The author provides heuristic research support from Schelling’s theory of strategy, recent contributions to the relationship between organized crime and drug cartels.Colombia, Government, Civil War, Latin America, Security, Protection Agencies.