In Defense of Deference

Uppsatsens syfte är att undersöka hur skapande människor beskriver inspiration i sina skapandeprocesser genom att analysera texter skrivna utav fem olika skapande människor själva. Birger Gerhardsson (2014) har skrivit i Nationalencyklopedin att inspiration är ett andligt fenomen som övergår människans förmåga. Vidare i uppsatsen beskrivs den tidigare forskning och teori som funnits inom inspiration och kreativitet. Metoden som använts är textanalys och det för att kunna analysera vad det är författarna verkligen menar. Uppsatsen tar även upp kreativitet i relation till inspiration då de är två begrepp som relaterar till varandra. I resultatanalysen har Helene Billgren (2011) skrivit om hur hon kan titta på klippdockor för att hitta inspiration medan flera av de andra författarna inte har skrivit om inspiration med just det begreppet utan har skrivit mer om sina skapandeprocesser på ett sätt som går att tolka som inspiration. I summeringen av resultatanalysen beskrivs kortfattat vad uppsatsens resultat är, bland annat att det finns många olika sätt att beskriva inspiration och att alla beskrivningar kommer ifrån olika utgångspunkter. Diskussionsdelen diskuterar och argumenterar kring varför valet av metod var bra, hur frågeställningen blev besvarad och hur en vidare forskning på ämnet inspiration skulle kunna se ut

Reading Between the Blurred Lines of Fisher v. University of Texas

After more than eight months of anticipation and speculation, the Supreme Court finally issued its opinion in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin. Contrary to fears held by some and hopes held by others, the Court did not use the case as an opportunity to overrule Grutter v. Bollinger, thereby prohibiting the consideration of race in higher education admissions decisions. Instead, the Court vacated the Fifth Circuit’s decision upholding the University of Texas’ (“UT” or “University”) race-based admissions policy and remanded the case “for further proceedings consistent with [the] opinion.” At first glance, the majority opinion authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy appears to be a straight forward tutorial regarding the parameters of strict scrutiny by which courts are to examine the constitutionality of race-based admissions plans. After concluding that the Fifth Circuit failed to analyze the UT plan under the proper constitutional standard due to the deference shown to the University during its narrow tailoring analysis, the Court decided that “fairness to the litigants and the courts that heard the case requires that it be remanded so that the admissions process can be considered and judged under a correct analysis.” While the University and other affirmative action supporters may view the Court’s decision as an optimistic signpost for the future of race-based admissions policies, this Essay fears that, unfortunately, such optimism may be misplaced. It argues that a closer reading of the opinion reveals troubling language and sentiments that could detrimentally impact both the UT admissions plan, specifically, and the future of racial diversity in higher education, more broadly

Congressional Devolution of Immigration Policymaking: A Separation of Powers Critique

For roughly a decade, federal legislation has devolved to the states some of Congress\u27s authority to adopt immigration policies that discriminate against permanent resident aliens. Equal protection challenges to discriminatory state policies so authorized by Congress raise the knotty issue of the appropriate scope of judicial review. Courts remain divided. The source of the difficulty is that the equal protection congruence principle is not applicable to alienage discrimination. Unlike equal protection cases throughout most of constitutional law, the judiciary deploys different standards of judicial review in alienage discrimination cases depending on whether the discrimination arises under federal or state law. Applying a highly deferential standard of review, courts normally uphold congressionally enacted immigration policies discriminating against aliens. By contrast, courts normally invoke strict judicial scrutiny to find state alienage discrimination unlawful. Congressional devolution legislation authorizing states to adopt policies that discriminate against aliens spawn equal protection challenges that do not fit neatly into either category of judicial review: the controversies entail state alienage discrimination but the discrimination being challenged is congressionally authorized. Devolution presents the question whether Congress should be able to immunize the states from strict judicial scrutiny by authorizing the states to adopt discriminatory immigration policies that Congress could itself adopt. That question is the subject of this Article

Good Faith Discrimination

The Supreme Court\u27s current doctrinal rules governing racial discrimination and affirmative action are unsatisfying. They often seem artificial, internally inconsistent, and even conceptually incoherent. Despite a long and continuing history of racial discrimination in the United States, many of the problems with the Supreme Court\u27s racial jurisprudence stem from the Court\u27s willingness to view the current distribution of societal resources as establishing a colorblind, race-neutral baseline that can be used to make equality determinations. As a result, the current rules are as likely to facilitate racial discrimination as to prevent it, or to remedy the lingering effects of past discrimination