19,026 research outputs found

    XNOR Neural Engine: a Hardware Accelerator IP for 21.6 fJ/op Binary Neural Network Inference

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    Binary Neural Networks (BNNs) are promising to deliver accuracy comparable to conventional deep neural networks at a fraction of the cost in terms of memory and energy. In this paper, we introduce the XNOR Neural Engine (XNE), a fully digital configurable hardware accelerator IP for BNNs, integrated within a microcontroller unit (MCU) equipped with an autonomous I/O subsystem and hybrid SRAM / standard cell memory. The XNE is able to fully compute convolutional and dense layers in autonomy or in cooperation with the core in the MCU to realize more complex behaviors. We show post-synthesis results in 65nm and 22nm technology for the XNE IP and post-layout results in 22nm for the full MCU indicating that this system can drop the energy cost per binary operation to 21.6fJ per operation at 0.4V, and at the same time is flexible and performant enough to execute state-of-the-art BNN topologies such as ResNet-34 in less than 2.2mJ per frame at 8.9 fps.Comment: 11 pages, 8 figures, 2 tables, 3 listings. Accepted for presentation at CODES'18 and for publication in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Circuits and Systems (TCAD) as part of the ESWEEK-TCAD special issu

    HardScope: Thwarting DOP with Hardware-assisted Run-time Scope Enforcement

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    Widespread use of memory unsafe programming languages (e.g., C and C++) leaves many systems vulnerable to memory corruption attacks. A variety of defenses have been proposed to mitigate attacks that exploit memory errors to hijack the control flow of the code at run-time, e.g., (fine-grained) randomization or Control Flow Integrity. However, recent work on data-oriented programming (DOP) demonstrated highly expressive (Turing-complete) attacks, even in the presence of these state-of-the-art defenses. Although multiple real-world DOP attacks have been demonstrated, no efficient defenses are yet available. We propose run-time scope enforcement (RSE), a novel approach designed to efficiently mitigate all currently known DOP attacks by enforcing compile-time memory safety constraints (e.g., variable visibility rules) at run-time. We present HardScope, a proof-of-concept implementation of hardware-assisted RSE for the new RISC-V open instruction set architecture. We discuss our systematic empirical evaluation of HardScope which demonstrates that it can mitigate all currently known DOP attacks, and has a real-world performance overhead of 3.2% in embedded benchmarks

    Emergent behaviour in a chlorophenol-mineralising three-tiered microbial `food web'

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    Anaerobic digestion enables the water industry to treat wastewater as a resource for generating energy and recovering valuable by-products. The complexity of the anaerobic digestion process has motivated the development of complex models. However, this complexity makes it intractable to pin-point stability and emergent behaviour. Here, the widely used Anaerobic Digestion Model No. 1 (ADM1) has been reduced to its very backbone, a syntrophic two-tiered microbial food chain and a slightly more complex three-tiered microbial food web, with their stability analysed as function of the inflowing substrate concentration and dilution rate. Parameterised for phenol and chlorophenol degradation, steady-states were always stable and non-oscillatory. Low input concentrations of chlorophenol were sufficient to maintain chlorophenol- and phenol-degrading populations but resulted in poor conversion and a hydrogen flux that was too low to sustain hydrogenotrophic methanogens. The addition of hydrogen and phenol boosted the populations of all three organisms, resulting in the counterintuitive phenomena that (i) the phenol degraders were stimulated by adding hydrogen, even though hydrogen inhibits phenol degradation, and (ii) the dechlorinators indirectly benefitted from measures that stimulated their hydrogenotrophic competitors; both phenomena hint at emergent behaviour.Comment: 19 pages, 8 figure

    Leveraging RISC-V to build an open-source (hardware) OS framework for reconfigurable IoT devices

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    With the growing interest in RISC-V systems and the endless possi bilities of creating customized hardware architectures, we introduce the first proof of concept (PoC) implementation of ChamelIoT, the first open-source agnostic hardware operating system (OS) frame work for reconfigurable Internet of Things (IoT) low-end devices. At this stage, ChamelIoT, leveraging the Rocket Custom Co-Processor Interface (RoCC), provides hardware acceleration support for thread management and scheduling of three different OSes: RIOT, Zephyr, and FreeRTOS. This paper overviews the overall ChamelIoT archi tecture and describes the implementation details of the current PoC deployment. Our first experiments were carried out on a Xilinx Arty-35T FPGA Evaluation kit and the preliminary results are very promising, showing that the desired agnosticism and flexibility can be achieved with determinism and performance advantages at a reasonable cost of hardware resources

    BRISC-V emulator: a standalone, installation-free, browser-based teaching tool

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    Many computer organization and computer architecture classes have recently started adopting the RISC-V architecture as an alternative to proprietary RISC ISAs and architectures. Emulators are a common teaching tool used to introduce students to writing assembly. We present the BRISC-V (Boston University RISC-V) Emulator and teaching tool, a RISC-V emulator inspired by existing RISC and CISC emulators. The emulator is a web-based, pure javascript implementation meant to simplify deployment, as it does not require maintaining support for different operating systems or any installation. Here we present the workings, usage, and extensibility of the BRISC-V emulator.Published versio

    The future of Cybersecurity in Italy: Strategic focus area

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    This volume has been created as a continuation of the previous one, with the aim of outlining a set of focus areas and actions that the Italian Nation research community considers essential. The book touches many aspects of cyber security, ranging from the definition of the infrastructure and controls needed to organize cyberdefence to the actions and technologies to be developed to be better protected, from the identification of the main technologies to be defended to the proposal of a set of horizontal actions for training, awareness raising, and risk management

    TriCheck: Memory Model Verification at the Trisection of Software, Hardware, and ISA

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    Memory consistency models (MCMs) which govern inter-module interactions in a shared memory system, are a significant, yet often under-appreciated, aspect of system design. MCMs are defined at the various layers of the hardware-software stack, requiring thoroughly verified specifications, compilers, and implementations at the interfaces between layers. Current verification techniques evaluate segments of the system stack in isolation, such as proving compiler mappings from a high-level language (HLL) to an ISA or proving validity of a microarchitectural implementation of an ISA. This paper makes a case for full-stack MCM verification and provides a toolflow, TriCheck, capable of verifying that the HLL, compiler, ISA, and implementation collectively uphold MCM requirements. The work showcases TriCheck's ability to evaluate a proposed ISA MCM in order to ensure that each layer and each mapping is correct and complete. Specifically, we apply TriCheck to the open source RISC-V ISA, seeking to verify accurate, efficient, and legal compilations from C11. We uncover under-specifications and potential inefficiencies in the current RISC-V ISA documentation and identify possible solutions for each. As an example, we find that a RISC-V-compliant microarchitecture allows 144 outcomes forbidden by C11 to be observed out of 1,701 litmus tests examined. Overall, this paper demonstrates the necessity of full-stack verification for detecting MCM-related bugs in the hardware-software stack.Comment: Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating System
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