Arbitration Among Vertical Services

A 5G network provides several service types, tailored to specific needs such as high bandwidth or low latency. On top of these communication services, verticals are enabled to deploy their own vertical services. These vertical service instances compete for the resources of the underlying common infrastructure. We present a resource arbitration approach that allows to handle such resource conflicts on a high level and to provide guidance to lowerlevel orchestration components.This work has been partially funded by the EU H2020 5GTransformer Project (grant no. 761536)

The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms: Institutional Economics and Concerted Refusals to Deal

An agreement among competitors to refuse to deal with another party is traditionally per se illegal under the antitrust laws. But coordinated refusals to deal are often necessary to punish wrongdoers, and thus to deter undesirable behavior that state-sponsored courts cannot reach. When viewed as a mechanism to govern transactions and induce socially desirable cooperative behavior, coordinated refusals to deal can sustain valuable reputation mechanisms. This paper employs institutional economics to understand the role of coordinated refusals to deal in merchant circles and to evaluate the economic desirability of permitting such coordinated actions among competitors. It concludes that if the objective of antitrust law is to promote economic efficiency, then per se treatment-or any heightened presumption of illegality-of reputation mechanisms with coordinated punishments is misplaced

Reflection on Exclusivity and Termination of Commercial Agency in Jordan: TheIntertwining of Domestic Regulation and International Trade Law

Any foreign manufacturer desiring to market its products in Jordan has several courses open to it. The foreign manufacturer could establish a branch or wholly-owned subsidiary in Jordan or enter into a licensing or joint venture agreement with a company doing business in Jordan. If it wants a less significant presence, however, it is left with the alternative of having a local commercial agent market and sells its products. The purpose of this article is to study certain aspects-exclusivity and termination- of commercial agency according to the Jordanian law. The article is divided into four sections. Section two explains the general rules governing commercial agency in Jordan. Section three analyzes exclusivity of commercial agents. This section introduces the WTO's General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the basic instrument covering trade in services, and analyses the current commercial agencies regulation in Jordan and its relation to articles VIII and IX of GATS. Also, section two explores Jordan schedule of specific commitments under the GATS in order to shed light on the extent and limit of its obligations with regard to commercial agents. Section four discusses agency termination. Finally, the article concludes by summarizing the mai

Community Enforcement of Informal Contracts: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York

The diamond industry is home to many unusual features: the predominance of an ethnically homogeneous community of merchants, the norm of intergenerational family businesses, and a rejection of public courts in favor of private contract enforcement. This paper explains that the diamond industry\u27s unique attributes arise specifically to meet the particularly rigorous hazards of transacting in diamonds. Since diamonds are portable, easily concealable, and extremely valuable, the risk associated with a credit sale can be especially costly. However, the industry enjoys valuable organizational efficiencies if transactions occur on credit between independent, fully incentivized agents. Thus, an efficient system of exchange will find ways to induce merchants who purchase on credit to fulfill their payment obligations. The very features that give the diamond industry an unusual profile are responsible for providing institutions to support credit sales. A system of private arbitration spreads information regarding merchants\u27 past dealings, so a reputation mechanism to monitor merchants can take hold. Intergenerational legacies, though restricting entry only to those who can inherit good reputations from family members, resolve an end-game problem and induce merchants to deal honestly through their very last transaction. And the participation of Ultra-Orthodox Jews, for whom inclusion and participation in their communities is equally paramount to their material wealth, serve important value-added services as diamond cutters and brokers without posing the threat of theft and flight

Antitrust, the Gig Economy, and Labor Market Power

The purpose of the current study was to develop and validate an automatic algorithm for classification of cross-country (XC) ski-skating gears (G) using Smartphone accelerometer data. Eleven XC skiers (seven men, four women) with regional-to-international levels of performance carried out roller skiing trials on a treadmill using fixed gears (G2left, G2right, G3, G4left, G4right) and a 950-m trial using different speeds and inclines, applying gears and sides as they normally would. Gear classification by the Smartphone (on the chest) and based on video recordings were compared. Formachine-learning, a collective database was compared to individual data. The Smartphone application identified the trials with fixed gears correctly in all cases. In the 950-m trial, participants executed 140 ± 22 cycles as assessed by video analysis, with the automatic Smartphone application giving a similar value. Based on collective data, gears were identified correctly 86.0% ± 8.9% of the time, a value that rose to 90.3% ± 4.1% (P < 0.01) with machine learning from individual data. Classification was most often incorrect during transition between gears, especially to or from G3. Identification was most often correct for skiers who made relatively few transitions between gears. The accuracy of the automatic procedure for identifying G2left, G2right, G3, G4left and G4right was 96%, 90%, 81%, 88% and 94%, respectively. The algorithm identified gears correctly 100% of the time when a single gear was used and 90% of the time when different gears were employed during a variable protocol. This algorithm could be improved with respect to identification of transitions between gears or the side employed within a given gear

AGENTS OF TRUST: BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS IN AGRI-FOOD SUPPLY SYSTEMS

The generation of trust between business partners is a strategic issue for firms in competitive agri-food markets. It is asserted that business associations can be important facilitators of trust between firms. Cross-national comparative research on the UK and Dutch potato industries is conducted to find out how and to what extent business associations perform functions that can facilitate trust. The results show that there are considerable national differences in the intensity and range of such functions performed by business associations. The findings indicate that, in spite of globalization trends, nationally distinct ways of generating trust via business associations continue to exist.Industrial Organization, Institutional and Behavioral Economics,

Post-Privatization Renegotiation and Disputes in Chile

Over the last decade, Chile has undertaken remarkable reforms and transferred publicly owned utilities to the private sector either by selling the assets or through concession agreements. Because of the reforms the country has been able to attract private participation in the provision of public services like energy, transportation, telecommunications, potable water and sewage. In this paper, the authors analyze a series of post-privatization disputes and renegotiations that have taken place in Chile since the late 1980s in the electricity sector. This sector was chosen because the privatization process was, to a large extent, completed a decade ago, providing enough time to properly evaluate negotiations and disputes. The paper also assesses how lessons learned in the reform of electricity were internalized in the design of the regulatory framework for other concessions.Public Utilities, Electricity, Private Sector, IFM-116, electricity sector, dispute renegotiation, Chile, infrastructure, privatization

Confidentiality in Patent Dispute Resolution: Antitrust implications

nformation is crucial to the functioning of the patent system, as it is for other markets. Nevertheless, patent licensing terms are often subject to confidentiality agreements. On the one hand, this is not surprising: sellers and buyers do not normally publicize the details of their transactions. On the other hand, explicit confidentiality agreements are not common in other markets, and they may be particularly problematic for patents. Several United States Supreme Court cases have condemned agreements that suppress market information, and those cases could be applied to confidentiality agreements in the patent context. Of course, confidentiality may sometimes be pro-competitive, particularly when it involves only private negotiations. In other contexts, however, and notably in arbitration, which is a substitute for open court proceedings, the competitive balance is more problematic. Indeed, U.S. patent law mandates that patent arbitration awards be made public through the Patent and Trademark Office, though this requirement is generally ignored. Information about licensing terms is particularly important in one of today’s most important patent licensing contexts. The standard-setting organizations that define the technologies used in products like smartphones typically require their members to commit to license patented technologies that are adopted in standards on fair, reasonable, and non- discriminatory (FRAND) terms. The non-discriminatory element of this commitment is difficult for potential licensees to enforce without information about the licensing terms to which other licensees have agreed. This Article describes the value of patent licensing information and discusses the antitrust implications of agreements to keep that information confidential, particularly in the FRAND context and in arbitration. The Article also offers several ways in which parties, standard- setting organizations, and arbitration bodies could seek to avoid the anticompetitive effects of confidentiality

Final-Offer Arbitration and Salaries of Police and Firefighters

[Excerpt] Did final-offer arbitration have a discernible impact on the salaries of police and firefighters in Massachusetts during the 3-year trial period which ended June 30, 1977? To analyze this question, we collected information on the maximum salary paid to police patrolmen, police sergeants, firefighters, and fire lieutenants for a large sample of Massachusetts municipalities. We integrated these data with police and fire impasse experiences and added several economic and environmental characteristics for each Massachusetts municipality. Then we performed several tests of the economic impact of final-offer arbitration