Spectrum Trading: An Abstracted Bibliography

This document contains a bibliographic list of major papers on spectrum trading and their abstracts. The aim of the list is to offer researchers entering this field a fast panorama of the current literature. The list is continually updated on the webpage \url{http://www.disp.uniroma2.it/users/naldi/Ricspt.html}. Omissions and papers suggested for inclusion may be pointed out to the authors through e-mail (\textit{[email protected]})

FlexAuc: Serving Dynamic Demands in a Spectrum Trading Market with Flexible Auction

In secondary spectrum trading markets, auctions are widely used by spectrum holders (SHs) to redistribute their unused channels to secondary wireless service providers (WSPs). As sellers, the SHs design proper auction schemes to stimulate more participants and maximize the revenue from the auction. As buyers, the WSPs determine the bidding strategies in the auction to better serve their end users. In this paper, we consider a three-layered spectrum trading market consisting of the SH, the WSPs and the end users. We jointly study the strategies of the three parties. The SH determines the auction scheme and spectrum supplies to optimize its revenue. The WSPs have flexible bidding strategies in terms of both demands and valuations considering the strategies of the end users. We design FlexAuc, a novel auction mechanism for this market to enable dynamic supplies and demands in the auction. We prove theoretically that FlexAuc not only maximizes the social welfare but also preserves other nice properties such as truthfulness and computational tractability.Comment: 11 pages, 7 figures, Preliminary version accepted in INFOCOM 201

Beyond Geometry : Towards Fully Realistic Wireless Models

Signal-strength models of wireless communications capture the gradual fading of signals and the additivity of interference. As such, they are closer to reality than other models. However, nearly all theoretic work in the SINR model depends on the assumption of smooth geometric decay, one that is true in free space but is far off in actual environments. The challenge is to model realistic environments, including walls, obstacles, reflections and anisotropic antennas, without making the models algorithmically impractical or analytically intractable. We present a simple solution that allows the modeling of arbitrary static situations by moving from geometry to arbitrary decay spaces. The complexity of a setting is captured by a metricity parameter Z that indicates how far the decay space is from satisfying the triangular inequality. All results that hold in the SINR model in general metrics carry over to decay spaces, with the resulting time complexity and approximation depending on Z in the same way that the original results depends on the path loss term alpha. For distributed algorithms, that to date have appeared to necessarily depend on the planarity, we indicate how they can be adapted to arbitrary decay spaces. Finally, we explore the dependence on Z in the approximability of core problems. In particular, we observe that the capacity maximization problem has exponential upper and lower bounds in terms of Z in general decay spaces. In Euclidean metrics and related growth-bounded decay spaces, the performance depends on the exact metricity definition, with a polynomial upper bound in terms of Z, but an exponential lower bound in terms of a variant parameter phi. On the plane, the upper bound result actually yields the first approximation of a capacity-type SINR problem that is subexponential in alpha

Online Independent Set Beyond the Worst-Case: Secretaries, Prophets, and Periods

We investigate online algorithms for maximum (weight) independent set on graph classes with bounded inductive independence number like, e.g., interval and disk graphs with applications to, e.g., task scheduling and spectrum allocation. In the online setting, it is assumed that nodes of an unknown graph arrive one by one over time. An online algorithm has to decide whether an arriving node should be included into the independent set. Unfortunately, this natural and practically relevant online problem cannot be studied in a meaningful way within a classical competitive analysis as the competitive ratio on worst-case input sequences is lower bounded by $\Omega(n)$. As a worst-case analysis is pointless, we study online independent set in a stochastic analysis. Instead of focussing on a particular stochastic input model, we present a generic sampling approach that enables us to devise online algorithms achieving performance guarantees for a variety of input models. In particular, our analysis covers stochastic input models like the secretary model, in which an adversarial graph is presented in random order, and the prophet-inequality model, in which a randomly generated graph is presented in adversarial order. Our sampling approach bridges thus between stochastic input models of quite different nature. In addition, we show that our approach can be applied to a practically motivated admission control setting. Our sampling approach yields an online algorithm for maximum independent set with competitive ratio $O(\rho^2)$ with respect to all of the mentioned stochastic input models. for graph classes with inductive independence number $\rho$. The approach can be extended towards maximum-weight independent set by losing only a factor of $O(\log n)$ in the competitive ratio with $n$ denoting the (expected) number of nodes

Strategyproof auctions for balancing social welfare and fairness in secondary spectrum markets

Secondary spectrum access is emerging as a promising approach for mitigating the spectrum scarcity in wireless networks. Coordinated spectrum access for secondary users can be achieved using periodic spectrum auctions. Recent studies on such auction design mostly neglect the repeating nature of such auctions, and focus on greedily maximizing social welfare. Such auctions can cause subsets of users to experience starvation in the long run, reducing their incentive to continue participating in the auction. It is desirable to increase the diversity of users allocated spectrum in each auction round, so that a trade-off between social welfare and fairness is maintained. We study truthful mechanisms towards this objective, for both local and global fairness criteria. For local fairness, we introduce randomization into the auction design, such that each user is guaranteed a minimum probability of being assigned spectrum. Computing an optimal, interference-free spectrum allocation is NP-Hard; we present an approximate solution, and tailor a payment scheme to guarantee truthful bidding is a dominant strategy for all secondary users. For global fairness, we adopt the classic maxmin fairness criterion. We tailor another auction by applying linear programming techniques for striking the balance between social welfare and max-min fairness, and for finding feasible channel allocations. In particular, a pair of primal and dual linear programs are utilized to guide the probabilistic selection of feasible allocations towards a desired tradeoff in expectation. © 2011 IEEE.published_or_final_versionThe IEEE INFOCOM 2011, Shanghai, China, 10-15 April 2011. In Conference Proceedings, 2011, p. 3020-302