Integrating facility location and production planning decisions

We consider a metric uncapacitated facility location problem where we must assign each customer to a facility and meet the demand of the customer in future time periods through production and inventory decisions at the facility. We show that the problem, in general, is as hard to approximate as the set cover problem. We therefore focus on developing approximation algorithms for special cases of the problem. These special cases come in two forms: (i) specialize the production and inventory cost structure and (ii) specialize the demand pattern of the customers. In the former, we offer reductions to variants of the metric uncapacitated facility location problem that have been previously studied. The latter gives rise to a class of metric uncapacitated facility location problems where the facility cost function is concave in the amount of demand assigned to the facility. We develop a modified greedy algorithm together with the idea of cost-scaling to provide an algorithm for this class of problems with an approximation guarantee of 1.52. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. NETWORKS, 2010Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/64912/1/20315_ftp.pd

Cost Sharing over Combinatorial Domains: Complement-Free Cost Functions and Beyond

We study mechanism design for combinatorial cost sharing models. Imagine that multiple items or services are available to be shared among a set of interested agents. The outcome of a mechanism in this setting consists of an assignment, determining for each item the set of players who are granted service, together with respective payments. Although there are several works studying specialized versions of such problems, there has been almost no progress for general combinatorial cost sharing domains until recently [S. Dobzinski and S. Ovadia, 2017]. Still, many questions about the interplay between strategyproofness, cost recovery and economic efficiency remain unanswered. The main goal of our work is to further understand this interplay in terms of budget balance and social cost approximation. Towards this, we provide a refinement of cross-monotonicity (which we term trace-monotonicity) that is applicable to iterative mechanisms. The trace here refers to the order in which players become finalized. On top of this, we also provide two parameterizations (complementary to a certain extent) of cost functions which capture the behavior of their average cost-shares. Based on our trace-monotonicity property, we design a scheme of ascending cost sharing mechanisms which is applicable to the combinatorial cost sharing setting with symmetric submodular valuations. Using our first cost function parameterization, we identify conditions under which our mechanism is weakly group-strategyproof, O(1)-budget-balanced and O(H_n)-approximate with respect to the social cost. Further, we show that our mechanism is budget-balanced and H_n-approximate if both the valuations and the cost functions are symmetric submodular; given existing impossibility results, this is best possible. Finally, we consider general valuation functions and exploit our second parameterization to derive a more fine-grained analysis of the Sequential Mechanism introduced by Moulin. This mechanism is budget balanced by construction, but in general only guarantees a poor social cost approximation of n. We identify conditions under which the mechanism achieves improved social cost approximation guarantees. In particular, we derive improved mechanisms for fundamental cost sharing problems, including Vertex Cover and Set Cover

Computing Stable Coalitions: Approximation Algorithms for Reward Sharing

Consider a setting where selfish agents are to be assigned to coalitions or projects from a fixed set P. Each project k is characterized by a valuation function; v_k(S) is the value generated by a set S of agents working on project k. We study the following classic problem in this setting: "how should the agents divide the value that they collectively create?". One traditional approach in cooperative game theory is to study core stability with the implicit assumption that there are infinite copies of one project, and agents can partition themselves into any number of coalitions. In contrast, we consider a model with a finite number of non-identical projects; this makes computing both high-welfare solutions and core payments highly non-trivial. The main contribution of this paper is a black-box mechanism that reduces the problem of computing a near-optimal core stable solution to the purely algorithmic problem of welfare maximization; we apply this to compute an approximately core stable solution that extracts one-fourth of the optimal social welfare for the class of subadditive valuations. We also show much stronger results for several popular sub-classes: anonymous, fractionally subadditive, and submodular valuations, as well as provide new approximation algorithms for welfare maximization with anonymous functions. Finally, we establish a connection between our setting and the well-studied simultaneous auctions with item bidding; we adapt our results to compute approximate pure Nash equilibria for these auctions.Comment: Under Revie

Robust and MaxMin Optimization under Matroid and Knapsack Uncertainty Sets

Consider the following problem: given a set system (U,I) and an edge-weighted graph G = (U, E) on the same universe U, find the set A in I such that the Steiner tree cost with terminals A is as large as possible: "which set in I is the most difficult to connect up?" This is an example of a max-min problem: find the set A in I such that the value of some minimization (covering) problem is as large as possible. In this paper, we show that for certain covering problems which admit good deterministic online algorithms, we can give good algorithms for max-min optimization when the set system I is given by a p-system or q-knapsacks or both. This result is similar to results for constrained maximization of submodular functions. Although many natural covering problems are not even approximately submodular, we show that one can use properties of the online algorithm as a surrogate for submodularity. Moreover, we give stronger connections between max-min optimization and two-stage robust optimization, and hence give improved algorithms for robust versions of various covering problems, for cases where the uncertainty sets are given by p-systems and q-knapsacks.Comment: 17 pages. Preliminary version combining this paper and http://arxiv.org/abs/0912.1045 appeared in ICALP 201

Budget Feasible Mechanism Design: From Prior-Free to Bayesian

Budget feasible mechanism design studies procurement combinatorial auctions where the sellers have private costs to produce items, and the buyer(auctioneer) aims to maximize a social valuation function on subsets of items, under the budget constraint on the total payment. One of the most important questions in the field is "which valuation domains admit truthful budget feasible mechanisms with `small' approximations (compared to the social optimum)?" Singer showed that additive and submodular functions have such constant approximations. Recently, Dobzinski, Papadimitriou, and Singer gave an O(log^2 n)-approximation mechanism for subadditive functions; they also remarked that: "A fundamental question is whether, regardless of computational constraints, a constant-factor budget feasible mechanism exists for subadditive functions." We address this question from two viewpoints: prior-free worst case analysis and Bayesian analysis. For the prior-free framework, we use an LP that describes the fractional cover of the valuation function; it is also connected to the concept of approximate core in cooperative game theory. We provide an O(I)-approximation mechanism for subadditive functions, via the worst case integrality gap I of LP. This implies an O(log n)-approximation for subadditive valuations, O(1)-approximation for XOS valuations, and for valuations with a constant I. XOS valuations are an important class of functions that lie between submodular and subadditive classes. We give another polynomial time O(log n/loglog n) sub-logarithmic approximation mechanism for subadditive valuations. For the Bayesian framework, we provide a constant approximation mechanism for all subadditive functions, using the above prior-free mechanism for XOS valuations as a subroutine. Our mechanism allows correlations in the distribution of private information and is universally truthful.Comment: to appear in STOC 201

Online Multistage Subset Maximization Problems

Numerous combinatorial optimization problems (knapsack, maximum-weight matching, etc.) can be expressed as subset maximization problems: One is given a ground set N={1,...,n}, a collection F subseteq 2^N of subsets thereof such that the empty set is in F, and an objective (profit) function p: F -> R_+. The task is to choose a set S in F that maximizes p(S). We consider the multistage version (Eisenstat et al., Gupta et al., both ICALP 2014) of such problems: The profit function p_t (and possibly the set of feasible solutions F_t) may change over time. Since in many applications changing the solution is costly, the task becomes to find a sequence of solutions that optimizes the trade-off between good per-time solutions and stable solutions taking into account an additional similarity bonus. As similarity measure for two consecutive solutions, we consider either the size of the intersection of the two solutions or the difference of n and the Hamming distance between the two characteristic vectors. We study multistage subset maximization problems in the online setting, that is, p_t (along with possibly F_t) only arrive one by one and, upon such an arrival, the online algorithm has to output the corresponding solution without knowledge of the future. We develop general techniques for online multistage subset maximization and thereby characterize those models (given by the type of data evolution and the type of similarity measure) that admit a constant-competitive online algorithm. When no constant competitive ratio is possible, we employ lookahead to circumvent this issue. When a constant competitive ratio is possible, we provide almost matching lower and upper bounds on the best achievable one

Scheduling to minimize power consumption using submodular functions

Thesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2010.Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.Includes bibliographical references (p. 59-64).We develop logarithmic approximation algorithms for extremely general formulations of multiprocessor multi-interval offline task scheduling to minimize power usage. Here each processor has an arbitrary specified power consumption to be turned on for each possible time interval, and each job has a specified list of time interval/processor pairs during which it could be scheduled. (A processor need not be in use for an entire interval it is turned on.) If there is a feasible schedule, our algorithm finds a feasible schedule with total power usage within an O(log n) factor of optimal, where n is the number of jobs. (Even in a simple setting with one processor, the problem is Set-Cover hard.) If not all jobs can be scheduled and each job has a specified value, then our algorithm finds a schedule of value at least (1 - c)Z and power usage within an O(log(1/E)) factor of the optimal schedule of value at least Z, for any specified Z and c > 0. At the foundation of our work is a general framework for logarithmic approximation to maximizing any submodular function subject to budget constraints. We also introduce the online version of this scheduling problem, and show its relation to the classical secretary problem. In order to obtain constant competitive algorithms for this online version, we study the secretary problem with submodular utility function. We present several constant competitive algorithms for the secretary problem with different kinds of utility functions.by Morteza Zadimoghaddam.S.M

Single-Sink Fractionally Subadditive Network Design

We study a generalization of the Steiner tree problem, where we are given a weighted network G together with a collection of k subsets of its vertices and a root r. We wish to construct a minimum cost network such that the network supports one unit of flow to the root from every node in a subset simultaneously. The network constructed does not need to support flows from all the subsets simultaneously. We settle an open question regarding the complexity of this problem for k=2, and give a 3/2-approximation algorithm that improves over a (trivial) known 2-approximation. Furthermore, we prove some structural results that prevent many well-known techniques from doing better than the known O(log n)-approximation. Despite these obstacles, we conjecture that this problem should have an O(1)-approximation. We also give an approximation result for a variant of the problem where the solution is required to be a path