Packing Cars into Narrow Roads: PTASs for Limited Supply Highway

In the Highway problem, we are given a path with n edges (the highway), and a set of m drivers, each one characterized by a subpath and a budget. For a given assignment of edge prices (the tolls), the highway owner collects from each driver the total price of the associated path when it does not exceed drivers\u27s budget, and zero otherwise. The goal is to choose the prices to maximize the total profit. A PTAS is known for this (strongly NP-hard) problem [Grandoni,Rothvoss-SODA\u2711, SICOMP\u2716]. In this paper we study the limited supply generalization of Highway, that incorporates capacity constraints. Here the input also includes a capacity u_e >= 0 for each edge e; we need to select, among drivers that can afford the required price, a subset such that the number of drivers that use each edge e is at most u_e (and we get profit only from selected drivers). To the best of our knowledge, the only approximation algorithm known for this problem is a folklore O(log m) approximation based on a reduction to the related Unsplittable Flow on a Path problem (UFP). The main result of this paper is a PTAS for limited supply highway. As a second contribution, we study a natural generalization of the problem where each driver i demands a different amount d_i of capacity. Using known techniques, it is not hard to derive a QPTAS for this problem. Here we present a PTAS for the case that drivers have uniform budgets. Finding a PTAS for non-uniform-demand limited supply highway is left as a challenging open problem

Sequential item pricing for unlimited supply

We investigate the extent to which price updates can increase the revenue of a seller with little prior information on demand. We study prior-free revenue maximization for a seller with unlimited supply of n item types facing m myopic buyers present for k < log n days. For the static (k = 1) case, Balcan et al. [2] show that one random item price (the same on each item) yields revenue within a \Theta(log m + log n) factor of optimum and this factor is tight. We define the hereditary maximizers property of buyer valuations (satisfied by any multi-unit or gross substitutes valuation) that is sufficient for a significant improvement of the approximation factor in the dynamic (k > 1) setting. Our main result is a non-increasing, randomized, schedule of k equal item prices with expected revenue within a O((log m + log n) / k) factor of optimum for private valuations with hereditary maximizers. This factor is almost tight: we show that any pricing scheme over k days has a revenue approximation factor of at least (log m + log n) / (3k). We obtain analogous matching lower and upper bounds of \Theta((log n) / k) if all valuations have the same maximum. We expect our upper bound technique to be of broader interest; for example, it can significantly improve the result of Akhlaghpour et al. [1]. We also initiate the study of revenue maximization given allocative externalities (i.e. influences) between buyers with combinatorial valuations. We provide a rather general model of positive influence of others' ownership of items on a buyer's valuation. For affine, submodular externalities and valuations with hereditary maximizers we present an influence-and-exploit (Hartline et al. [13]) marketing strategy based on our algorithm for private valuations. This strategy preserves our approximation factor, despite an affine increase (due to externalities) in the optimum revenue.Comment: 18 pages, 1 figur

On Profit-Maximizing Pricing for the Highway and Tollbooth Problems

In the \emph{tollbooth problem}, we are given a tree \bT=(V,E) with $n$ edges, and a set of $m$ customers, each of whom is interested in purchasing a path on the tree. Each customer has a fixed budget, and the objective is to price the edges of \bT such that the total revenue made by selling the paths to the customers that can afford them is maximized. An important special case of this problem, known as the \emph{highway problem}, is when \bT is restricted to be a line. For the tollbooth problem, we present a randomized $O(\log n)$-approximation, improving on the current best $O(\log m)$-approximation. We also study a special case of the tollbooth problem, when all the paths that customers are interested in purchasing go towards a fixed root of \bT. In this case, we present an algorithm that returns a $(1-\epsilon)$-approximation, for any $\epsilon > 0$, and runs in quasi-polynomial time. On the other hand, we rule out the existence of an FPTAS by showing that even for the line case, the problem is strongly NP-hard. Finally, we show that in the \emph{coupon model}, when we allow some items to be priced below zero to improve the overall profit, the problem becomes even APX-hard

On Revenue Maximization with Sharp Multi-Unit Demands

We consider markets consisting of a set of indivisible items, and buyers that have {\em sharp} multi-unit demand. This means that each buyer $i$ wants a specific number $d_i$ of items; a bundle of size less than $d_i$ has no value, while a bundle of size greater than $d_i$ is worth no more than the most valued $d_i$ items (valuations being additive). We consider the objective of setting prices and allocations in order to maximize the total revenue of the market maker. The pricing problem with sharp multi-unit demand buyers has a number of properties that the unit-demand model does not possess, and is an important question in algorithmic pricing. We consider the problem of computing a revenue maximizing solution for two solution concepts: competitive equilibrium and envy-free pricing. For unrestricted valuations, these problems are NP-complete; we focus on a realistic special case of "correlated values" where each buyer $i$ has a valuation v_i\qual_j for item $j$, where $v_i$ and \qual_j are positive quantities associated with buyer $i$ and item $j$ respectively. We present a polynomial time algorithm to solve the revenue-maximizing competitive equilibrium problem. For envy-free pricing, if the demand of each buyer is bounded by a constant, a revenue maximizing solution can be found efficiently; the general demand case is shown to be NP-hard.Comment: page2

Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization: Approximation Algorithms and other Generalizations

It was recently shown in [http://arxiv.org/abs/1207.5518] that revenue optimization can be computationally efficiently reduced to welfare optimization in all multi-dimensional Bayesian auction problems with arbitrary (possibly combinatorial) feasibility constraints and independent additive bidders with arbitrary (possibly combinatorial) demand constraints. This reduction provides a poly-time solution to the optimal mechanism design problem in all auction settings where welfare optimization can be solved efficiently, but it is fragile to approximation and cannot provide solutions to settings where welfare maximization can only be tractably approximated. In this paper, we extend the reduction to accommodate approximation algorithms, providing an approximation preserving reduction from (truthful) revenue maximization to (not necessarily truthful) welfare maximization. The mechanisms output by our reduction choose allocations via black-box calls to welfare approximation on randomly selected inputs, thereby generalizing also our earlier structural results on optimal multi-dimensional mechanisms to approximately optimal mechanisms. Unlike [http://arxiv.org/abs/1207.5518], our results here are obtained through novel uses of the Ellipsoid algorithm and other optimization techniques over {\em non-convex regions}