1,158 research outputs found
On Revenue Maximization with Sharp Multi-Unit Demands
We consider markets consisting of a set of indivisible items, and buyers that
have {\em sharp} multi-unit demand. This means that each buyer wants a
specific number of items; a bundle of size less than has no value,
while a bundle of size greater than is worth no more than the most valued
items (valuations being additive). We consider the objective of setting
prices and allocations in order to maximize the total revenue of the market
maker. The pricing problem with sharp multi-unit demand buyers has a number of
properties that the unit-demand model does not possess, and is an important
question in algorithmic pricing. We consider the problem of computing a revenue
maximizing solution for two solution concepts: competitive equilibrium and
envy-free pricing.
For unrestricted valuations, these problems are NP-complete; we focus on a
realistic special case of "correlated values" where each buyer has a
valuation v_i\qual_j for item , where and \qual_j are positive
quantities associated with buyer and item respectively. We present a
polynomial time algorithm to solve the revenue-maximizing competitive
equilibrium problem. For envy-free pricing, if the demand of each buyer is
bounded by a constant, a revenue maximizing solution can be found efficiently;
the general demand case is shown to be NP-hard.Comment: page2
Budget Constrained Auctions with Heterogeneous Items
In this paper, we present the first approximation algorithms for the problem
of designing revenue optimal Bayesian incentive compatible auctions when there
are multiple (heterogeneous) items and when bidders can have arbitrary demand
and budget constraints. Our mechanisms are surprisingly simple: We show that a
sequential all-pay mechanism is a 4 approximation to the revenue of the optimal
ex-interim truthful mechanism with discrete correlated type space for each
bidder. We also show that a sequential posted price mechanism is a O(1)
approximation to the revenue of the optimal ex-post truthful mechanism when the
type space of each bidder is a product distribution that satisfies the standard
hazard rate condition. We further show a logarithmic approximation when the
hazard rate condition is removed, and complete the picture by showing that
achieving a sub-logarithmic approximation, even for regular distributions and
one bidder, requires pricing bundles of items. Our results are based on
formulating novel LP relaxations for these problems, and developing generic
rounding schemes from first principles. We believe this approach will be useful
in other Bayesian mechanism design contexts.Comment: Final version accepted to STOC '10. Incorporates significant reviewer
comment
The Value of Information Concealment
We consider a revenue optimizing seller selling a single item to a buyer, on
whose private value the seller has a noisy signal. We show that, when the
signal is kept private, arbitrarily more revenue could potentially be extracted
than if the signal is leaked or revealed. We then show that, if the seller is
not allowed to make payments to the buyer, the gap between the two is bounded
by a multiplicative factor of 3, if the value distribution conditioning on each
signal is regular. We give examples showing that both conditions are necessary
for a constant bound to hold.
We connect this scenario to multi-bidder single-item auctions where bidders'
values are correlated. Similarly to the setting above, we show that the revenue
of a Bayesian incentive compatible, ex post individually rational auction can
be arbitrarily larger than that of a dominant strategy incentive compatible
auction, whereas the two are no more than a factor of 5 apart if the auctioneer
never pays the bidders and if each bidder's value conditioning on the others'
is drawn according to a regular distribution. The upper bounds in both settings
degrade gracefully when the distribution is a mixture of a small number of
regular distributions
De facto capital mobility, equality, and tax policy in open economies
This paper attempts at giving theoretical and empirical answers to the remaining puzzles in
the literature on tax competition: the persistently high tax rates on mobile capital and the large
variation in domestic tax systems. I argue that governments face a political trilemma, in which
they cannot maintain the politically optimal level of public good provision, reduce capital
taxes to competitive levels and implement a political support-maximizing mix of tax rates on
capital and labour simultaneously. In particular, while legal restriction on capital flows have
been eliminated by virtually all OECD countries, de facto capital mobility falls short of being
perfect. Limits to full capital mobility result from ownership structures: the higher the
concentration of capital, the higher the de facto mobility of capital and the lower the
equilibrium tax rate. Second, the demand for the provision of public goods further constraints
governments’ choices of the capital tax rate. If revenue from taxation of mobile factors
declines, politicians cannot necessarily cut back spending without losing political support.
Policy makers, accordingly, do not face a simple optimization problem when deciding on
capital taxation. Rather, they have to choose a tax system which allows them to supply an
appropriate level of public goods. Policy makers finally face a trade-off resulting from the
redistributive conflict between capital-owners and workers. This conflict does not resemble a
mere zero-sum game, because lower levels of capital taxation are likely to improve aggregate
welfare, but the decision on capital taxation also cannot be analyzed in isolation from the
distributive effects of reducing taxes on mobile factors. This political logic of tax competition
generates important predictions which are tested empirically for 23 OECD countries over 30
years within a spatial econometrics framework
"Big Bang" Versus Gradualism in Economic Reforms: An Intertemporal Analysis with an Application to China
This paper analyzes issues concerning the speed of adjustment and sequencing of reforms in a transition economy. It presents a dynamic general equilibrium model parameterized with Chinese data. The model is used to generate different policy simulations that highlight the importance of the policy instruments used during the transition period. The simulations consider privatization, tariff reform, and devaluation, as well as alternative speeds of introducing these policies. They show that different speeds of adjustment, as well as sequencing of reforms, will have very different implications for macroeconomic aggregates. Copyright 2003, International Monetary Fund
Preemptive Scheduling of EV Charging for Providing Demand Response Services
We develop a new algorithm for scheduling the charging process of a large
number of electric vehicles (EVs) over a finite horizon. We assume that EVs
arrive at the charging stations with different charge levels and different
flexibility windows. The arrival process is assumed to have a known
distribution and that the charging process of EVs can be preemptive. We pose
the scheduling problem as a dynamic program with constraints. We show that the
resulting formulation leads to a monotone dynamic program with Lipschitz
continuous value functions that are robust against perturbation of system
parameters. We propose a simulation based fitted value iteration algorithm to
determine the value function approximately, and derive the sample complexity
for computing the approximately optimal solution.Comment: 21 pages, submitted to SEGA
State and Local Fiscal Behavior and Federal Grant Policy
macroeconomics, federal grant policy, state fiscal, local fiscal
- …