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07431 Abstracts Collection -- Computational Issues in Social Choice
From the 21st to the 26th of October 2007, the Dagstuhl Seminar 07431
on ``Computational Issues in Social Choice\u27\u27 was held
at the International Conference and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl.
During the seminar, several participants presented their recent
research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed.
The abstracts of the talks given during the seminar are collected in this paper.
The first section summarises the seminar topics and goals in general.
Links to full papers are provided where available
Finding a Collective Set of Items: From Proportional Multirepresentation to Group Recommendation
We consider the following problem: There is a set of items (e.g., movies) and
a group of agents (e.g., passengers on a plane); each agent has some intrinsic
utility for each of the items. Our goal is to pick a set of items that
maximize the total derived utility of all the agents (i.e., in our example we
are to pick movies that we put on the plane's entertainment system).
However, the actual utility that an agent derives from a given item is only a
fraction of its intrinsic one, and this fraction depends on how the agent ranks
the item among the chosen, available, ones. We provide a formal specification
of the model and provide concrete examples and settings where it is applicable.
We show that the problem is hard in general, but we show a number of
tractability results for its natural special cases
A non-proposition-wise variant of majority voting for aggregating judgments
Majority voting is commonly used in aggregating judgments. The literature to date on judgment
aggregation (JA) has focused primarily on proposition-wise majority voting (PMV). Given a set of issues
on which a group is trying to make collective judgments, PMV aggregates individual judgments issue by
issue, and satisfies a salient property of JA rules—independence. This paper introduces a variant of
majority voting called holistic majority voting (HMV). This new variant also meets the condition of
independence. However, instead of aggregating judgments issue by issue, it aggregates individual
judgments en bloc. A salient and straightforward feature of HMV is that it guarantees the logical
consistency of the propositions expressing collective judgments, provided that the individual points of
view are consistent. This feature contrasts with the known inability of PMV to guarantee the consistency
of the collective outcome. Analogously, while PMV may present a set of judgments that have been
rejected by everyone in the group as collectively accepted, the collective judgments returned by HMV
have been accepted by a majority of individuals in the group and, therefore, rejected by a minority of
them at most. In addition, HMV satisfies a large set of appealing properties, as PMV also does. However,
HMV may not return any complete proposition expressing the judgments of the group on all the issues at
stake, even in cases where PMV does. Moreover, demanding completeness from HMV leads to
impossibility results similar to the known impossibilities on PMV and on proposition-wise JA rules in
genera
Voting Rules for Expressing Conditional Preferences in Multiwinner Elections
Ο τομέας της Υπολογιστικής Θεωρίας Κοινωνικής Επιλογής μελετά, από αλγοριθμική σκοπιά, την αποτίμηση των προσωπικών προτιμήσεων προς μια συλλογική απόφαση. Πληθώρα προβλημάτων σε πολυπρακτορικά συστήματα, τεχνολογίες λήψης αποφάσεων, σχεδιασμό δικτύων, πολιτικό σχεδιασμό, συστήματα συστάσεων και άλλα, απαιτούν το σχεδιασμό και τη θεωρητική αξιολόγηση κανόνων ψηφοφορίας.
Στο πρώτο κεφάλαιο παρουσιάζουμε την προέλευση, ορισμένες εφαρμογές και υποπεριοχές μαζί με μία ιστορική επισκόπηση του αντικειμένου. Στο δεύτερο κεφάλαιο, εισάγουμε τον αναγνώστη σε εκλογικά σενάρια με περισσότερους από έναν νικητές, περιγράφοντας κάποιες επιθυμητές ιδιότητες των σχετικών κανόνων ψηφοφοριών και ορίζοντας τους πιο συχνά χρησιμοποιούμενους κανόνες μαζί με μία ματιά στα γνωστά αλγοριθμικά και υπολογιστικά τους αποτελέσματα. Μιας και σε πολλές περιπτώσεις, οι ψηφοφόροι επιθυμούν να τους επιτραπεί να εκφράσουν εξαρτήσεις μεταξύ των θεμάτων, όταν καλούνται να αποφασίσουν για περισσότερα από ένα θέματα, στο τρίτο κεφάλαιο εστιάζουμε σε εκλογές συνδυαστικής φύσεως, παρουσιάζοντας ορισμένες σχετικές εφαρμογές μαζί με λύσεις που έχουν προταθεί για την αντιμετώπιση αυτών των περιστάσεων. Τέλος, στο τέταρτο κεφάλαιο, περιγράφουμε ένα μοντέλο για χειρισμό ψήφων αποδοχής υπό συνθήκες σε πολλαπλά δυαδικά ζητήματα, ακολουθούμενο από ορισμένα νέα αποτελέσματα που αφορούν κυρίως βέλτιστους και προσεγγιστικούς αλγορίθμους για τον minisum και τον minimax κανόνα.Computational Social Choice studies the aggregation of individual preferences toward a collective decision from an algorithmic point of view. Various problems in multiagent systems, decision making technologies, network design, policy making, recommendation systems and so on, require the design and theoretical evaluation of a wide range of voting rules.
In the first chapter we present the origins, possible applications, some of the subtopics of Computational Social Choice as well as a historical overview of the field. In the second chapter we introduce the reader to election scenarios with more than a single winner by describing some commonly desired properties of multi-winner voting rules and defining the most widely used rules together with a glance at algorithmic and computational aspects. Since in many voting settings, voters wish to be allowed to express preferential dependencies, in the third chapter we focus on elections on combinatorial domains by presenting some specific applications along with some solutions which have been proposed in order to deal with combinatorial votes. Ultimately, in the fourth chapter we describe the recently proposed model for handling conditional approval preferences on multiple binary issues followed by new contributions which mainly concerns optimum and approximate results for minisum and minimax conditional approval voting rule
Multi-Winner Voting with Approval Preferences
Approval-based committee (ABC) rules are voting rules that output a
fixed-size subset of candidates, a so-called committee. ABC rules select
committees based on dichotomous preferences, i.e., a voter either approves or
disapproves a candidate. This simple type of preferences makes ABC rules widely
suitable for practical use. In this book, we summarize the current
understanding of ABC rules from the viewpoint of computational social choice.
The main focus is on axiomatic analysis, algorithmic results, and relevant
applications.Comment: This is a draft of the upcoming book "Multi-Winner Voting with
Approval Preferences
Multi-Winner Voting with Approval Preferences
From fundamental concepts and results to recent advances in computational social choice, this open access book provides a thorough and in-depth look at multi-winner voting based on approval preferences. The main focus is on axiomatic analysis, algorithmic results and several applications that are relevant in artificial intelligence, computer science and elections of any kind. What is the best way to select a set of candidates for a shortlist, for an executive committee, or for product recommendations? Multi-winner voting is the process of selecting a fixed-size set of candidates based on the preferences expressed by the voters. A wide variety of decision processes in settings ranging from politics (parliamentary elections) to the design of modern computer applications (collaborative filtering, dynamic Q&A platforms, diversity in search results, etc.) share the problem of identifying a representative subset of alternatives. The study of multi-winner voting provides the principled analysis of this task. Approval-based committee voting rules (in short: ABC rules) are multi-winner voting rules particularly suitable for practical use. Their usability is founded on the straightforward form in which the voters can express preferences: voters simply have to differentiate between approved and disapproved candidates. Proposals for ABC rules are numerous, some dating back to the late 19th century while others have been introduced only very recently. This book explains and discusses these rules, highlighting their individual strengths and weaknesses. With the help of this book, the reader will be able to choose a suitable ABC voting rule in a principled fashion, participate in, and be up to date with the ongoing research on this topic
REPRESENTING AND LEARNING PREFERENCES OVER COMBINATORIAL DOMAINS
Agents make decisions based on their preferences. Thus, to predict their decisions one has to learn the agent\u27s preferences. A key step in the learning process is selecting a model to represent those preferences. We studied this problem by borrowing techniques from the algorithm selection problem to analyze preference example sets and select the most appropriate preference representation for learning. We approached this problem in multiple steps.
First, we determined which representations to consider. For this problem we developed the notion of preference representation language subsumption, which compares representations based on their expressive power. Subsumption creates a hierarchy of preference representations based solely on which preference orders they can express. By applying this analysis to preference representation languages over combinatorial domains we found that some languages are better for learning preference orders than others.
Subsumption, however, does not tell the whole story. In the case of languages which approximate each other (another piece of useful information for learning) the subsumption relation cannot tell us which languages might serve as good approximations of others. How well one language approximates another often requires customized techniques. We developed such techniques for two important preference representation languages, conditional lexicographic preference models (CLPMs) and conditional preference networks (CP-nets).
Second, we developed learning algorithms for highly expressive preference representations. To this end, we investigated using simulated annealing techniques to learn both ranking preference formulas (RPFs) and preference theories (PTs) preference programs.
We demonstrated that simulated annealing is an effective approach to learn preferences under many different conditions. This suggested that more general learning strategies might lead to equally good or even better results. We studied this possibility by considering artificial neural networks (ANNs). Our research showed that ANNs can outperform classical models at deciding dominance, but have several significant drawbacks as preference reasoning models.
Third, we developed a method for determining which representations match which example sets. For this classification task we considered two methods. In the first method we selected a series of features and used those features as input to a linear feed-forward ANN. The second method converts the example set into a graph and uses a graph convolutional neural network (GCNN). Between these two methods we found that the feature set approach works better.
By completing these steps we have built the foundations of a portfolio based approach for learning preferences. We assembled a simple version of such a system as a proof of concept and tested its usefulness
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