610 research outputs found
Double Auctions in Markets for Multiple Kinds of Goods
Motivated by applications such as stock exchanges and spectrum auctions,
there is a growing interest in mechanisms for arranging trade in two-sided
markets. Existing mechanisms are either not truthful, or do not guarantee an
asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade, or rely on a prior on the traders'
valuations, or operate in limited settings such as a single kind of good. We
extend the random market-halving technique used in earlier works to markets
with multiple kinds of goods, where traders have gross-substitute valuations.
We present MIDA: a Multi Item-kind Double-Auction mechanism. It is prior-free,
truthful, strongly-budget-balanced, and guarantees near-optimal gain from trade
when market sizes of all goods grow to at a similar rate.Comment: Full version of IJCAI-18 paper, with 2 figures. Previous names:
"MIDA: A Multi Item-type Double-Auction Mechanism", "A Random-Sampling
Double-Auction Mechanism". 10 page
Enabling Privacy-preserving Auctions in Big Data
We study how to enable auctions in the big data context to solve many
upcoming data-based decision problems in the near future. We consider the
characteristics of the big data including, but not limited to, velocity,
volume, variety, and veracity, and we believe any auction mechanism design in
the future should take the following factors into consideration: 1) generality
(variety); 2) efficiency and scalability (velocity and volume); 3) truthfulness
and verifiability (veracity). In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving
construction for auction mechanism design in the big data, which prevents
adversaries from learning unnecessary information except those implied in the
valid output of the auction. More specifically, we considered one of the most
general form of the auction (to deal with the variety), and greatly improved
the the efficiency and scalability by approximating the NP-hard problems and
avoiding the design based on garbled circuits (to deal with velocity and
volume), and finally prevented stakeholders from lying to each other for their
own benefit (to deal with the veracity). We achieve these by introducing a
novel privacy-preserving winner determination algorithm and a novel payment
mechanism. Additionally, we further employ a blind signature scheme as a
building block to let bidders verify the authenticity of their payment reported
by the auctioneer. The comparison with peer work shows that we improve the
asymptotic performance of peer works' overhead from the exponential growth to a
linear growth and from linear growth to a logarithmic growth, which greatly
improves the scalability
An Investigation Report on Auction Mechanism Design
Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information
available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take.
Since well designed auctions achieve desirable economic outcomes, they have
been widely used in solving real-world optimization problems, and in
structuring stock or futures exchanges. Auctions also provide a very valuable
testing-ground for economic theory, and they play an important role in
computer-based control systems.
Auction mechanism design aims to manipulate the rules of an auction in order
to achieve specific goals. Economists traditionally use mathematical methods,
mainly game theory, to analyze auctions and design new auction forms. However,
due to the high complexity of auctions, the mathematical models are typically
simplified to obtain results, and this makes it difficult to apply results
derived from such models to market environments in the real world. As a result,
researchers are turning to empirical approaches.
This report aims to survey the theoretical and empirical approaches to
designing auction mechanisms and trading strategies with more weights on
empirical ones, and build the foundation for further research in the field
Hire the Experts: Combinatorial Auction Based Scheme for Experts Selection in E-Healthcare
During the last decade, scheduling the healthcare services (such as staffs
and OTs) inside the hospitals have assumed a central role in healthcare.
Recently, some works are addressed in the direction of hiring the expert
consultants (mainly doctors) for the critical healthcare scenarios from outside
of the medical unit, in both strategic and non-strategic settings under
monetary and non-monetary perspectives. In this paper, we have tried to
investigate the experts hiring problem with multiple patients and multiple
experts; where each patient reports a preferred set of experts which is private
information alongwith their private cost for consultancy. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first step in the direction of modeling the experts
hiring problem in the combinatorial domain. In this paper, the combinatorial
auction based scheme is proposed for hiring experts from outside of the
hospitals to have expertise by the preferred doctors set to the patients.Comment: 7 Page
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